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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION  
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1.1 Background: public and private provisioning in solid waste management  
In growing urban centres in Africa, solid waste management
1
 (SWM) remains one of the 
most conspicuous and challenging environmental problems (Spaargaren et al., 2005). 
This has attracted intense debates from scholars and practitioners on how to best organize 
SWM, especially in relation to whether it should be provided by the public sector or 
private sector. The situation is made more complicated since different activities within 
the SWM system fall into different categories (Post, 2004). For example, the sale of 
recyclables resembles a purely private good2, while the cleaning of major roads and 
public areas falls into the category of collective (public) goods, and house-to-house 
collection of waste is positioned somewhere in between these extremes because it has the 
nature of a so-called joint use or merit good3 (Post et al., 2003; Post, 2004). Embarking 
on the road to the privatization of solid waste collection was largely based on the fact that 
it is possible for generators of garbage to pay for their waste collection and safe disposal 
and that probably private companies would provide such service better (and more 
efficient) than the public sector. 
 In most cases public sector provision takes the form of providing solid waste 
collection services free of charge and raising general revenues through other ways 
                                                 
1
 We study SWM from the “perspective of local authorities” (Baud, 2004: 6). Baud (2004) talks of two 
perspectives in the study of SWM. First, the perspective of local authorities that includes the collection of 
domestic solid waste and transportation and disposal of solid waste (usually in dump sites), the focus of this 
study. The second perspective is a more environmentally oriented view of urban SWM that includes reuse, 
recycling and recovery activities, and safe disposal of waste.  
2
 Cointreau-Levine (1994), however, argues that while recycling has historically been treated as a private 
good in most countries, in the past two decades industrialized countries have slowly changed their 
perspective on environmental awareness, thus recognizing that everyone benefits from recycling as a public 
good. It is argued that through recycling, foreign exchange is saved, natural resources are conserved, 
industrialization is promoted, and waste disposal is minimized. 
3
 A merit good is under consumed if provided by a market mechanism, because individuals typically 
consider how the good benefits them as individuals rather than considering the benefits that consumption 
generates for others in society. Merit goods or services can be offered on the ability to pay principle. 
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(Oduro-Kwarteng, 2001). But even when it is free of charge, residents have to make 
some effort to take the waste to a point of collection. From a personal point of view, it is 
cheaper to dump garbage anywhere (as long as no one is seeing you) than carrying it to a 
collection point that may prove costly in terms of time. This means that even when solid 
waste collection service is free, there has to be strict enforcement of laws to ensure that 
people don‟t litter. The externalities associated with solid waste provide a strong 
argument for government intervention in relation to SWM. 
The main arguments for private provision are that the hierarchical bureaucracy is 
inherently inefficient and that the introduction of market mechanisms and actors can 
substantially enhance the efficiency of public service delivery (Hood, 1991). Critics of 
the public sector also argue that the public sector is self-servicing, resulting into 
opportunism and dishonest behaviour by employees, clients and politicians as they 
substitute their own goals and preferences over efficiency and productivity considerations 
of the service (Larbi, 1999). The assumption is that there are benefits in terms of 
efficiency and effectiveness in exposing public sector activities to market pressures and 
in using markets to serve public purposes. It is widely believed that by comparison, non-
competitive provision leads to inefficiency, services don‟t correspond to consumer 
preferences and the given level of resources is not used optimally (Batley, 2001). The 
same arguments as outlined above were used to make a case for privatization of SWM. 
 As of today, the contribution by the private sector in solid waste service provision 
is a common phenomenon in most cities in developing countries (Kassim et al., 2006). 
The following privatization types are common for SWM in developing countries 
(Cointreau-Levine, 1994; Ogu, 2000; Post, 2004): (1) Contracting: whereby a 
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municipality awards a contract to one or more firms to provide services. Service contracts 
are used for waste collection, transportation, and landfill management. (2) Concession: 
whereby a municipality gives an enterprise the right to build and operate a waste facility. 
Concessions are commonly awarded for transfer stations, landfill development, recycling 
plants, and incinerators. (3) Franchise: where a local government has the authority to give 
exclusive franchise to a qualified private firm for the right and responsibility to provide 
service to customers within a zone. In return for such an exclusive franchise, the private 
firm pays a license fee to the government. The firm subsequently charges their customers 
appropriate fees to cover the cost of service. The fees charged may be regulated by 
ceilings fixed by municipal ordinance. Local government retains responsibility to monitor 
the performance of private firms having franchise agreements. and to regulate user 
charges and also retains the right to renew or revoke licenses in accordance with pre-
established criteria (Cointreau-Levine, 1994). (4) Open competition: whereby a 
municipality registers or licenses a number of enterprises as `approved service providers‟ 
and then encourages the approved providers to compete freely to provide a defined range 
of services. Open competition is often used for industrial waste collection. Private sector 
involvement in Kampala has vacillated from franchising, contracting to open 
competition. 
As already highlighted, there are in general potential benefits of private provision. 
However, governments (and the societies they represent) often see improving outcomes 
in service delivery as a public responsibility (WDR, 2004), a view endorsed by the 
millennium development goals (MDGs). For instance, it may not be possible for SWM to 
be left to be handled by the private sector alone, because it has strong external effects. It 
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is to some extent a non-exclusive and non-rivalled service; that is, once it is provided to 
some portion of the community, it benefits the overall public welfare and any resident 
can enjoy the benefit of the service without diminishing the benefit to anyone else 
(Kironde et al., 1997; Massoud et al., 2004; WDR, 2004). It is not always feasible to 
exclude from service those who do not pay, since public cleanliness and safe waste 
disposal are essential to public health and environmental protection (Cointreau-Levine, 
1994). A central solid waste collection system (for instance through the use of communal 
containers, also known locally as skips) comes in focus here, because once it is provided 
to some portion of the community, it benefits the overall public welfare. The service is 
also non-rivalled, meaning that any resident can enjoy the benefit of the service without 
diminishing the benefit to anyone else (Ndandiko, 2010; Oduro-Kwarteng, 2011).   
Further, market systems do not provide incentives to ensure that private 
businesses take into account the social and long term costs and benefits of their activities, 
referred to as externalities. For example, solid waste disposal can have significant 
negative spill overs on society if it is not performed according to standard. In the absence 
of stringent control and enforcement it might not be advisable to let the private sector 
provide the activity; hence, the reason why such a service requires public provision 
(Ndandiko, 2010). Further, solid waste services will be under-supplied if markets alone 
are left to determine their provision (Oduro-Kwarteng, 2011). 
In addition, potential consumers do not enter the market with equal resources, yet 
equity is often one of society‟s objectives (WDR, 2004). It is often believed to be the role 
of the state to ensure that goods and services are equitably distributed between members 
of a society in a fair and just manner. For instance, if a service like waste collection 
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would be left to the market, consumers from the low income areas who are incapable of 
paying may miss out on the service since the private providers will only target profitable 
areas. Markets may not achieve socially acceptable levels of equity (Batley, 2001; 
Ndandiko, 2010).   
These theoretical arguments related to market failures call for government 
intervention, but they don‟t necessarily call for public provision (WDR, 2004). They 
provide fundamental reasons for both private involvement and public intervention in the 
provision of SWM. Two things are worth mentioning here, which often are ignored in 
public-private theoretical debates but nevertheless are important in urban environmental 
infrastructure provisioning to which this thesis pays attention.  
First, private involvement sometimes is meant to refer to formal private 
companies, yet in developing countries the informal sector plays a big role in SWM 
(Klundert et al., 1995; Medina, 2005; Scheinberg, 2011). Specific socio-economic 
conditions prevail in many poor countries, including high population, economic activity 
concentration in urban areas leading to migration of rural population to urban areas, 
insufficient funds leading to SWM systems being run poorly and operating at low 
standards (Kironde et al., 1997; Spaargaren et al., 2005). This may include unreliable, 
inadequate coverage with open dumping as the only disposal method available 
(Cointreau-Levine, 1994). Insufficient collection, uncontrolled street collection points 
and improper disposal in open dumps allow room for informal refuse collectors to 
operate (Wilson et al., 2006). This is typically the case in SWM in Uganda. Batley (2001) 
refers to this as informal or unintended privatization where the failure of public solid 
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waste provisioning leads individuals or a group of individuals to step in to make up the 
deficiency in service provisioning and in turn earn a living.  
Second, public intervention in SWM is commonly meant to refer to decentralized 
municipal SWM but does not include public spending on special events in which city 
beautification is emphasized, with upgrading of waste management services given special 
consideration. This for instance was the case when Uganda hosted the Commonwealth 
Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) in November 2007. The opportunity offered 
by these events to attract extra funds for community improvements motivates politicians 
to bid for hosting such special events. This provides an argument for public, rather than 
private action.  
Clearly, many of these observed changes and dynamics have had effects on solid 
waste management, but have so far received only limited attention in research on urban 
and environmental governance, especially in developing nations. This study mainly 
addresses the changes and dynamics in the situation of household waste collection and 
disposal in Kampala. Household waste removal is one of the key factors in ensuring the 
health and safety of the population, but is surprisingly often neglected in rapidly growing 
cities of the third world (Doan, 1998). By providing theoretical and empirical evidence 
on these issues, this thesis will make a scientific contribution to the governance and solid 
waste management literature as far as developing countries are concerned. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. The next section describes  
the setting of solid waste management in Kampala, followed in section 3 by the 
characterisation of solid waste and the existing policy framework. Section 4 introduces 
the problem of the study and the study objectives. Subsequently, an overview is provided 
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of the study area (section 5), the  various data sources collected and used throughout this 
dissertation (section 6) and the contribution of this study to the wider literature (section 
7). Finally, the other chapters that make up this dissertation are introduced . 
 
9 
 
1.2 Solid waste management in Kampala 
The newly appointed Executive Director of Kampala Capital City Authority (KCCA
4
) 
Jennifer Musisi Semakula has been tasked with transforming the capital to become a 
modern city. The newly elected Lord Mayor of Kampala Elias Lukwago also campaigned 
on the platform of modernizing the city. In an interview with local daily newspapers, the 
Executive Director reveals how the management of solid waste is a big challenge facing 
Kampala and has therefore made garbage collection priority number one
5
. In fact, 
currently (2011) hardly a month passes without the press highlighting issues of poor solid 
waste management in Kampala. This is because the management of solid waste is a major 
public health and environmental concern in Kampala. For instance, the problem of 
flooding in Kampala‟s poor neighbourhoods is often blamed on garbage that blocks the 
drainage system. Diseases such as malaria and outbreaks of cholera, especially in wet 
seasons, are often indirectly attributed to poor solid waste management (SWM) in 
Kampala. The concern is serious, particularly in a capital city like Kampala, which is a  
commercial and administrative city and a gateway to the country for diplomats, 
businessmen and tourists. Poor visual appearance of Kampala may have negative impacts 
on official and tourist visits and foreign investment.  
 For one to appreciate the challenges Kampala city faces in relation to solid waste 
management, it is good to start with appreciating the changes that have occurred over 
time and the current state of solid waste organisation in Kampala. Under what can be 
                                                 
4
 Kampala Capital City Authority (KCCA) is the legal entity, established by the Uganda parliament. KCCA 
is responsible for the operations of the capital city of Kampala in Uganda. It replaced the former Kampala 
City Council (KCC). For the purposes of this thesis, we will mainly be referring to KCC since the study 
was carried out when the KCC was still in charge and when the status of Kampala had not changed (for 
further explanations of these changes see section 5). 
5
 New Vision 29
th
 May 2011, We must have order in Kampala; 11
th
 May 2011 Red pepper – Jeniffer Musisi 
reveals her vision for Kampala. 
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labelled the old system (see Figure 1.1 below), Kampala City Council had the statutory 
requirement of collection, storage and disposal of waste. Communal containers (skips) 
were placed in specific locations or stationary bunkers
6
 were constructed for households 
to receive garbage at any time of the day, especially in richer areas (Mugagga, 2006). 
However, not sufficient skips and bunkers were placed and constructed, respectively, in 
the city; a situation that encouraged open dumping in unauthorised places. Alternatively, 
households used paid individuals (informal collectors) to transport garbage to the skip, 
and Kampala City Council (KCC) trucks would subsequently transport the garbage to the 
official dump site. It should be noted that the distance to the skips was quite far and 
informal collectors would also dump garbage in unauthorized places as long as no one 
was seeing.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1: Household waste under the old system of SWM 
                                                 
6 Bunkers were placed in a few areas of the city, especially in government estates 
where civil servants used to live, like Bugolobi flats. The old system predominantly 
used the system of communal containers (skips). 
Household waste under the old system 
dump Informal collector 
dump 
KCC skip/Bunker 
Official dump site 
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In the new system (see Figure 1.2 below), which was introduced after the formal 
privatization of SWM around the year 2000, communal containers were largely 
withdrawn (and bunkers neglected) except in a few areas. After a pilot test of the 
feasibility of contracting services in Makindye division in 2001, it was decided to have 
skip-less refuse collection service in communities, with skips only restricted to 
institutions and markets (KCC, 2002; Mugagga, 2006). Formal private firms became 
dominant in waste collection, sometimes displacing informal collectors. Officially, 30 
private companies are registered by Kampala City Council (KCC) to collect waste in any 
division of the city as long as they get customers.  Private companies collect garbage 
from private homes or institutions and are paid directly by these home-
owners/institutions. Previously, KCC entered into formal contractual arrangements with 
private companies whereby the latter provided services for which they would be paid 
from local government sources (contracting out). KCC also awarded private companies a 
limited monopoly via competitive bidding in a defined area for a limited time. In this 
arrangement firms were allowed to charge residents, but KCC would pay a lump sum to 
private collectors to meet the costs of collecting garbage from poor households who 
cannot afford to pay. Despite the existence and dominance of the private sector, Kampala 
city council did not withdraw from collection of waste as planned, citing lack of capacity 
by private sector providers among other reasons. It is still involved in the collection and 
transportation of waste to the dumpsite. Informal collectors are still widely prevailing, 
sometimes working with KCC and often a cause of illegal dump sites in the city. In fact, 
indiscriminate dumping still exist especially in high density residential areas. Typically, 
private firms are motivated by profit and due to KCC‟s lack of capacity to manage all the 
12 
 
waste there are still many uncovered households who practice “self-provision.” 
Community based organizations (CBOs) are also involved in collection of waste from 
households, but due to their lack of capacity, they also contribute to the illegal dumpsites 
in the city (Tukahirwa, 2011). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.2: Household waste under a new system of SWM 
  
As Figures 1.1 & 1.2 show, the main actors in solid waste management are KCC (the 
public body responsible for Kampala city, recently renamed into KCCA), the formal 
private sector with private sector firms licensed to carry out the business of solid waste 
collection, the informal private sector in the form of refuse collectors who agree with 
Household waste under the new system 
dump Informal collector 
dump 
KCC skip 
Official dump site 
Formal collector 
(Private/KCC) 
CBOs 
dump 
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individual households and small business owners (shops) to collect their solid waste, and 
Community Based Organizations (CBOs). This study does not address the activities and 
contributions of CBOs, because they have been addressed in another, related study 
(which was also part of the Partnerships for Research on Viable Environmental 
Infrastructure in East Africa (PROVIDE) project; (See Tukahirwa, 2011). 
 
 
1.3 Solid waste characteristics and overview of the policy and legal framework for 
SWM in Kampala 
 The monthly generation of solid waste in Kampala is estimated at 42,000 tonnes 
of which only 15,000 tonnes are deposited at the Kiteezi landfill (KCC, 2006). The rest 
either remains uncollected or is disposed of using other means. Five broad groups have 
been identified as sources of solid wastes in Kampala city (KCC, 2006). These are 
individual households, institutions, commercial establishments, industries and road 
sweepings. Of these, this study mainly focuses on domestic waste. Domestic waste has a 
relatively high moisture content and is relatively dense. Table 1.1 below reveals the 
general waste composition in Kampala (KCC, 2006). 
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Table 1.1: General Waste Composition in Kampala. 
Type of solid waste % (2001) % (June 2006) 
Paper & board 5.4 10.6 
Glass 0.9 1.8 
Metal 3.1 0.4 
Plastic 1.6 11.8 
Organics 83.5 74.0 
Construction  1.4 
Street Debris 5.5  
Source: KCC, 2006
7
 
 
 The responsibility for providing a waste collection and disposal service to the 
citizens of Uganda rests with the Ministry of Local Government. The authority to operate 
this service is passed to KCC under legislation contained in the Urban Authorities Act of 
1964 and the Local Government Act 1997. The National Environment Management 
Authority (NEMA) is the institution mandated to coordinate, monitor and supervise 
environmental management in Uganda. NEMA is a semi-autonomous body that works 
closely with lead agencies including local government departments in charge of 
environment. In Kampala, collection and transportation of solid waste is a responsibility 
of the divisions under the Medical Officer of Health and supervised by the Senior 
Principal Assistant Town Clerk (see Figure 1.3 below). The centre is responsible for 
management of the sanitary landfill, whose operations have been contracted out. The 
constitution of the Republic of Uganda (2005), under the chapter of land and 
environment, outlines the importance of the protection of environment. The constitution 
further provides guidelines on sustainable development. The guiding principles adopted 
include: living within our environmental limits without compromising the ability for the 
future generations to enjoy the same later, ensuring a healthy society and using 
appropriate technologies. The Public Health Act (PHA) of 1964 defines the role of urban 
                                                 
7
 The study commissioned by KCC does not provide data for construction waste in 2001 and street debris 
waste in 2006. Another study has been commissioned by KCC that will probably release latest informative 
information on SWM in Kampala including types of waste generated but the study findings are not yet out.  
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authorities and their communities as regards to solid waste handling and disposal.  This 
act covers all the health issues that arise due to poor management of solid waste. The 
Urban Authorities Act 1964 and the Local Government Act 1997 allow KCC to collect 
revenues to finance the service provided. The Local Government Act (1997) also 
operationalizes the country‟s decentralisation policy, assigns roles and responsibilities to 
each level in the Local Government hierarchy and details out the role of stakeholders. 
Section 5 of the Public Health Act, Cap.281, empowers all local authorities, such as the 
City Council, to take all lawful, necessary and reasonably practical measures to safeguard 
and promote public health. It is also a duty of a local authority to maintain its area in a 
clean and sanitary condition at all times and to prevent the occurrence of any nuisance. 
Section 55 of the Public Health Act, Cap.281 defines nuisance as including un-collected 
garbage, among others.  
 In the year 2000, the Kampala solid waste management ordinance was enacted. 
The ordinance provides a legal framework for the operation of private sector service 
providers in SWM, for the charging of service fees to the population of Kampala, and for 
penalties. According to the KCC Solid waste Management Ordinance 2000 and the Solid 
Waste Management Strategy, December 2002, as revised in 2006, the collection, 
transportation and disposal of garbage are the responsibility of Kampala City Council 
(KCC), now KCCA, and its divisions. KCC is required through its agents, servants or 
licensed collectors to ensure that solid waste (garbage) is collected and conveyed to 
treatment installations or approved disposal sites to the extent required to satisfy both 
public health and environmental conservation requirements. According to section 20 (d) 
of the Solid Waste Management ordinance, 2000, it is an offence for a person to scatter or 
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litter solid waste at any private or public property. Section 5 (1) of the ordinance also 
prohibits depositing of waste on private property, public street, roadside, or in a ditch, 
river, stream, lake, pond, channel or in a park, excavation or any other place where it may 
be or become a public health nuisance. Section 4(4) of the National Environment (waste 
management) regulations (S.1.No 52/1999) states that: “A person who generates 
domestic waste shall sort the waste by separating hazardous waste from non-hazardous 
waste in accordance with the methods prescribed under sub-regulation”. Section 5 of the 
same regulation requires a generator of domestic waste with or without a license issued 
under these regulations, to dispose non-hazardous waste in an environmentally sound 
manner, in accordance with by-laws made by a competent local authority. Section 6 (6) 
provides for a person or organisation in the business of transporting or storage of waste to 
apply to the Authority for a licence for the transportation of waste or a licence for the 
storage of waste, within ninety days after the commencement of the Regulations. Section 
7 (2) also states that a person granted a licence to transport waste shall ensure that: a) The 
collection and transportation of waste is conducted in manners that will not cause 
scattering of the waste; b) The vehicles, pipelines and equipment for the transportation of 
waste are in such a state as not to cause the scattering of, or the flowing out of the waste 
or the emitting of noxious smells from the waste; c) The vehicles for transportation and 
other means conveyance of waste follow the approved scheduled routes from the point of 
collection to the disposal site or plant.  
 However, enforcement of these regulations have been challenged with weak 
punitive measures. For example anybody contravening sections of the Solid Waste 
Management Ordinance or sections of the Waste Management Regulations is only liable, 
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on conviction, to imprisonment for a term of not more than six months or to a fine of not 
less than three hundred and sixty thousand shillings. Both penalties don‟t improve or 
repair the state of the degraded environment (WaterAid, 2011). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.3: The current organizational arrangement of solid waste management in 
Kampala 
 
1.4 Problem statement and study objectives 
The way solid waste management is organized in Kampala and the challenges being 
faced are in many ways similar to other cities in the developing world (Achankeng, 2004;  
Afon, 2007; Awortwi, 2004; Ahmed et al., 2004; Schubeler, et al., 1996; Cointreau-
Levine, 1994; Karanja, 2005; Kaseva et.al, 2005; Kassim, 2006; Tadesse, et al., 2008; 
Medina, 2005; Scheinberg, 2011; Oduro-Kwarteng, 2011; Ndadiko, 2010). Hence, the 
search for ways to upgrade waste management systems has always been an on-going 
Senior Principal Assistant Town Clerk 
Senior Division Medical Officer of Health 
Solid Waste Management Officer 
Private Contractors Direct Service Providers  
 
18 
 
effort in many cities in the developing world. In East Africa, the past decade has 
witnessed the implementation of policies and reform initiatives, including the 
involvement of many actors (formal and informal), in SWM. Despite that, many urban 
centres are still facing major SWM problems (Karanja, 2005; Spaargaren, et al., 2005; 
Mugagga, 2006; Nkya, 2004; Okot-Okumu, et al., 2011). Even where successes have 
been registered, the question is whether these successes or positive effects in SWM can 
be sustained for a long time (Golooba-Mutebi, 2003; Kaseva, et al, 2003; Kassim, 2006). 
The persistent solid waste problems have created a desire for empirical studies to inform 
urban governance policies and strategies (e.g. Baud et al., 2004; Spaargaren et al., 2005). 
Along with other studies in SWM in Sub-Saharan Africa scholars have focussed on the 
performance of solid waste management (Obirih-Opareh et al., 2002; Post et al., 2003; 
Kassim, 2006; Kaseva et al, 2005; Awortwi, 2004) without getting into deeper analysis. 
These studies reveal many challenges faced in solid waste management. For instance, 
solid waste collection is based on the house-to-house system mainly used in rich areas, 
while the central container system is applied to the remaining areas that are not easily 
accessible (Obirih-opareh et al., 2002). Other scholars (e.g. Post et al., 2003) argue that 
the introduction of cost recovery in low income neighbourhoods have incited many, 
especially poor, households to either engage in free rider practices or to opt out of the 
service with detrimental effects for public health. It is also noted that government bodies 
are generally reluctant to create partnerships with informal sector enterprises. Yet studies 
show that such partnerships can deliver good quality waste management services in terms 
of the use of more appropriate technologies and closer links with the community (Baud, 
2004). Further, it is noted that problems of SWM hinge on the lack of private sector 
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capacity and enforcement of regulations as major constraining factors to performance 
(Oduro-Kwarteng, 2011). This is not unlike what the WDR (2004) report says about why 
too often urban services fail to serve poor people because these services are inaccessible 
or prohibitively expensive. But even when these services are accessible, they are often 
dysfunctional, unresponsive to the needs of a diverse clientele, and failing innovation to  
increase productivity, according to the World Development Report (WDR, 2004). 
 A number of detailed academic studies have been done on SWM in East Africa 
including: Majale (2011), who focuses on institutional arrangements in urban centres; 
Oberlin (2011), who focuses on the role of households in SWM; and Tukahirwa (2011), 
who focuses on the role of NGOs and CBOs. Other existing literature has often focused 
on descriptive analysis of the solid waste management activities of the various actors and 
their contributions to sustainable development (see Baud et al., 2004, Karanja, 2006; 
Kassim, 2006). Baud et al. (2004) broadened the research scope to include issues like 
equality, coverage, affordability and environmental concerns. It is surprising that issues 
of cost efficiency and service effectiveness have not been given more attention, 
especially since the concern of SWM practitioners is on how to manage it efficiently and 
effectively. Recent research has to some extent dealt with whether there is a difference in 
the relative efficiency of private and public service providers, with SWM being one of 
the cases studies (e.g. Ndadiko, 2010). Although literature on the organization of SWM is 
large and growing, detailed analysis on service effectiveness is lacking. In this study, we 
basically assessed the contributions of different solid waste management services to a 
cleaner environment, especially of the household and neighbourhood. Cleaner 
neighbourhoods largely depend on the quality of waste collection. We used customer 
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satisfaction as a proxy for quality of services rendered. This was complemented with data 
on service coverage. We used this approach because clients are usually in a better 
position to assess the quality of the services than governmental organizations or private 
companies involved in service provisioning. This study therefore, takes into account the 
perceptions and interests of service recipients/consumers, which are often neglected and 
not given much emphasis in previous research. 
 Further, while studies have examined private sector participation in SWM in East 
Africa (e.g. Kaseva et al., 2005; Kasim, 2006; Karanja, 2005), they have not consistently 
analysed and compared public and private sector effectiveness in solid waste collection. 
Few studies (if any) have devoted significant attention to the analysis of methods and 
technologies of disposal of solid waste. Similarly, few studies have been devoted to the 
analysis of the informal sector as one of the actors at the primary level of solid waste 
collection (Medina, 2005). Besides, little systematic knowledge exists of the actual 
contribution of informal sector providers to solid waste improvement.  
 Against this background the main objective of this study is to assess the public 
and private provision of SWM in Kampala. We assess the contribution of the various 
actors in the collection and transportation of solid waste and assess the extent to which 
the various policies and interventions have addressed the challenges of solid waste 
collection and transportation in Kampala.  
In specifying this main objective, four specific objectives are the central focus of 
this study: 
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1. To compare the operations and discuss the effectiveness of public and private 
provision of solid waste collection in Kampala. 
2. To analyse the effects of removing a number of large containers used in the 
collection and transportation of solid waste (“skips”) in Kampala. 
3. To assess how the informal sector co-exists with the formal sector in solid waste 
collection in Kampala. 
4. To investigate whether environmental improvements – and especially those 
related to solid waste – materialised during the 2007 Commonwealth Heads of 
Government Meeting (CHOGM) in Kampala, and whether these improvement 
endured afterwards.  
 
1.5 Description of study area 
This study focuses on Kampala, the capital city of the Republic of Uganda (see Figure 
1.4 below). The history of Kampala can be traced back to 1600s when it was established 
as the Capital of Buganda Kingdom
8
. It served as a political and administrative capital 
until 1893, when the British declared Uganda their protectorate and transferred the capital 
to Entebbe. It turned again into the capital city in 1962 at Uganda‟s independence. 
Kampala is located in Central Uganda, on the northern shores of Lake Victoria, bordering 
with Wakiso district to the North, East, West and South-West, while Lake Victoria is in 
the South East; it covers an area of 195sq.km. Kampala has five divisions
9
 namely: 
                                                 
8
 Buganda Kingdom is one of the several kingdoms in Uganda that existed during the pre-colonial era. It 
was also the most organized with centralized structures to the extent that the British used the Kiganda 
system of administration in other areas that were put under the British colonial administration. The 
headquarters of Buganda Kingdom was Kampala and with Buganda Kingdom playing a big role in helping 
the British consolidate their rule in other parts of Uganda, Kampala further developed to become the main 
administrative and commercial city for the whole of Uganda. 
9
 With new changes under the Kampala Capital City Authority, divisions have become municipalities. 
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Makindye division, Kawempe division, Kampala Central division, Lubaga division and 
Nakawa division (see Figure 1.5).  
 
 
Figure 1.4: Map of Uganda showing where Kampala is located 
 
Kampala has approximately a night population of between 1.2 million to 1.5 
million people. The day population is estimated at close to 3 million people, of which 
15.4% live in informal and unplanned settlements. 40% of the households engage in 
urban agriculture, which contributes a lot to the accumulation of waste (Auditor General, 
Kampala 
City 
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2010). The colonial state developed Kampala as an administrative center and this 
accelerated the migration of the rural population, who came looking for opportunities. 
Later, the urbanization rate surpassed the absorptive capacity of the city to provide 
services such as housing; safe water; drainage; and solid waste management (Mukwaya, 
2004).  
Despite its proximity to the equator, it has a tropical climate rather than a typical 
equatorial climate. The modified climate is due to the high altitude, long distance from 
the sea, relief and proximity to the large water mass of Lake Victoria (Matagi, 2002). The 
topography of the city is characterized by a series of low lying hills with flat hill tops. 
Kampala was originally built on seven hills but now has expanded to include 46 hills.  
These hills are surrounded by a network of wet valleys which are covered by papyrus 
swamps.  
Kampala has had a unique administrative structure in Uganda. It has been the only 
urban authority designated as district. However, it has recently changed status. Under the 
Kampala City Bill (2009), the city is now regarded simply as located in Buganda 
Kingdom, but with a special status under the control of the Central government. This 
change is intended to streamline the status of Kampala as the capital city of Uganda and 
spells out its administration to ease provision of effective administration in the city and to 
address the appalling conditions of its infrastructure.  
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Figure 1.5: Kampala city and its divisions 
 
1.6 Data  
This sub-section gives an overview of how data was collected in this research. The details 
of the methodology are described in each chapter. Official data bases on waste in 
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Kampala are deficient as they are not comprehensive (Auditor General, 2010). For 
instance, the number of households and institutions visited by private collectors is not 
known to KCC and the divisions. In addition, the divisions lack data on number of 
households served, number and capacity of private collectors and the composition of 
solid waste stream. Therefore, field research was adopted as a major complement to the 
available data.  
The specific research objectives, as outlined previously, are addressed on the basis 
of six surveys that were undertaken between May 2007 and November 2010. Table 1.2 
below provides a detailed overview of the major contents of these data sets and where 
these data were collected. The first two surveys collected data related to the perceptions 
of residents of Kampala on solid waste management before and after Kampala hosting 
the CHOGM event. The third survey tested the perceptions of people before and after the 
implementation of the privatization policy in solid waste management. The fourth survey 
was meant to capture the perceptions of residents of Kampala in relation to the removal 
of communal containers in most household areas of Kampala. The fifth was a large 
survey that was intended to capture the different actors in solid waste management and 
how they co-exist with each other. The sixth and last survey was a small survey among 
the informal waste collectors that was meant to capture why they have stayed in the 
business of solid waste collection despite the presence of the formal collectors (KCC and 
private companies). 
Ideally, impact assessment studies require longitudinal data. But such longitudinal 
data is lacking since not many studies have been carried out in Uganda in the area of 
solid waste management. In the absence of such data, we used memory and reflexive 
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comparisons. Because garbage management in Uganda and other developing countries 
are hot issues of emotional debate and discussion that sticks into the memory of many 
urban residents, such research methodologies are possible.  
The respondents were randomly selected from the citizens (and/or clients of service 
providers) of Kampala depending on the willingness to answer questions in 
questionnaires. Whereas the original target was to get data that is representative for 
Kampala, the realities on the ground during the process of data collection couldn‟t allow 
us to attain our objective fully. If the targeted respondent was not available (mostly the 
working class) or not interested to be interviewed, we would move to the neighboring 
household. However, to capture the views of the people located in rich neighborhoods, 
we carried out interviews over the weekends when they are mostly at their residences. 
There were also many respondents who were not part of the target group because we 
were mainly interested in respondents who had lived in Kampala for a long time. In such 
cases also we would move to the neighboring household. The sampling strategy chosen 
therefore may not allow us to claim that the data collected is fully representative of 
Kampala.  
The questionnaires were interviewer-administered to ensure that we interviewed the 
right people who have lived in Kampala for a long time and therefore were 
knowledgeable about the (changing) state of solid waste management in the city over the 
years. But interviewer-administration of the questionnaires also made sure that the 
respondents understood the questions and that no bias occurred in terms of illiteracy or 
education level.  
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The quantitative data sets were complemented with qualitative information 
collected from interviews with key respondents, especially managers of KCC and private 
sector companies, informal waste collectors, and policy makers. At various points 
throughout this research, use is made of secondary data provided by KCC complemented 
by additional research findings provided by other researchers in the East African region 
(See Golooba-Mutebi, 2003; Okot-Okumu et al., 2011, Tukahirwa, 2011; Oberlin, 2011, 
Majale, 2011). 
 
Table 1.2: Description of data sets constructed for this research 
Data set 
code 
DS1 DS2 DS3 DS4 DS5 DS6 
Survey 
description 
Household 
survey 
(CHOGM) 
Household 
survey 
(CHOGM) 
Household 
survey 
(Privatization) 
Household 
survey (Skips) 
Household 
survey 
(Performance) 
Informal 
collectors 
survey 
Year of 
study 
2007 2008 2008 2008 2009 2010 
Sample size 454 447 383 301 475  30  
Division Kawempe, 
Kampala 
Central 
Kawempe, 
Kampala 
Central 
Kawempe, 
Kampala Central 
Kawempe, 
Nakawa 
Kawempe, 
Nakawa 
Kawempe, 
Nakawa 
Type of data 
collected 
Perceptions on 
seriousness of 
SWM :  
littering & 
illegal piles of 
waste, 
nuisance from 
solid waste 
transfer 
points, smell 
of solid waste, 
solid waste 
collection 
from 
households  
 
Perceptions on 
seriousness of 
SWM  :  
littering & 
illegal piles of 
waste, 
nuisance from 
solid waste 
transfer 
points, smell 
of solid waste, 
solid waste 
collection 
from 
households 
Perceptions of 
solid waste 
management 
(Same as in DS1 
& 2) and choice 
of disposal 
method (bring to 
skip, door-to 
door, bell ringing, 
open dumping) 
Perceptions to 
use of skips; 
their 
appropriateness, 
distance, 
effectiveness, 
cleanliness 
around the skip, 
skip change 
frequency . 
Household 
characteristics, 
waste 
characteristics, 
frequency of 
garbage 
collection, where 
service providers 
go, whom do they 
serve, changes in 
service provision, 
satisfaction with 
services rendered, 
fees collected 
Household 
characteristics, 
incomes, fees 
charged, 
working 
relationship 
with other 
providers, 
technologies 
used and 
working 
conditions 
 
 
1.7 Contribution of this research 
This study is part of the Partnerships for Research on Viable Environmental 
Infrastructure in East Africa (PROVIDE), which aimed to carry out research for a 
transition towards sustainable waste water and solid waste infrastructures in East African 
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cities. In an effort to address SWM in particular and sanitation in general, scholars have 
developed ideas on what has become known as „mixed modernities‟ or the Modernized 
Mixtures Approach (MMA) (see Spaargaren et al., 2005; Van Vliet et al., 2010; 
Oosterveer et al., 2010; Scheinberg, 2011) . The MM Approach contends that problems 
related to environmental infrastructures in developing countries have much to do with the 
models of modernization and urban development applied so far. Such (western) 
modernization models are mostly conceived as monolithic or one dimensional, making 
strong assumptions on homogeneity of households, density of households, degree of 
urbanization, (financial) accessibility of services, availability of advanced technologies, 
and the like. Yet the actual situation in East African cities and neighbourhoods often 
deviates from these assumptions, and so do existing urban environmental infrastructures. 
The literature on SWM in developing countries show that small scale, flexible, low-
technological and decentralized approaches have flourished widely as opposed to the 
large scale, uniform, centralized and high-tech approaches of the western systems. But 
these existing approaches or models in urban centres of developing countries have not 
proved to be able to solve problems around sanitation and solid waste. The MMA 
contends that a solution might be found in combining the best of both paradigms into new 
configurations that take into account the specific local conditions of developing countries. 
Developing and accessing the modernised mixtures approach (MMA) means taking the 
best features out of both paradigms, combine them into hybrid solutions and evaluate to 
what extent that leads to better alternatives. In other words, developing and 'testing' a mix 
of scales, strategies, technologies, payment systems and decision making structures that 
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better fit specific local situations in urban centres of developing countries (Spaargaren et 
al., 2005).  
 The aim of the project is to contribute to the knowledge base for MMA, which 
can be used in the future by researchers and policy makers in the area of urban 
environmental infrastructure. Within the PROVIDE framework and the Modernized 
Mixtures Approach, this study investigates pro-poor modernized mixtures in the form of 
public-private mixes of solid waste collection and transportation. Private refers then to 
both formal collectors and informal collectors of solid waste. Informal sector (collectors) 
involvement is often thought to be appropriate for slum conditions and for conditions in 
unplanned neighbourhoods. High income areas would then better be served by private 
sector waste collection and low and middle income areas, who may lack the economic 
power to pay for private services of the formal sector, would then preferably be served by 
the public sector. This study will investigate and assess such claims.  
 At a broader level, the study provides a deeper understanding of the co-existence 
of the various actors in solid waste collection and transporting and of the performance of 
the initiatives and policies so far implemented in solid waste management in Kampala. 
To summarize, the research presented in this thesis contributes to the literature in four 
main ways. First, by analysing public and private provisioning of solid waste collection, 
this study contributes to the debate on the benefits of privatization of urban service 
delivery. Second, the study contributes to a better understanding of choices made by 
households after communal containers (skips) commonly used for solid waste collection 
were removed in Kampala. Third, new evidence is provided in this dissertation to be able 
to better understand the informal sector, the reasons for the existence of informal 
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collectors in solid waste collection, and their co-existence with the formal sector. Lastly, 
a contribution is made to the emerging academic discipline of mega-events and their 
environmental legacies by presenting evidence of the environmental legacies of hosting 
CHOGM in Kampala. 
 
1.8 Outline of the thesis 
This thesis is divided into six chapters. Chapter two compares the operations and 
discusses the effectiveness of public and private provisioning of solid waste collection in 
Kampala. Chapter three analyzes the effects of removing large containers, popularly 
known as skips, on the collection and transportation of solid waste in Kampala. Chapter 
four examines how the informal sector and the formal sector co-exist in solid waste 
collection in Kampala. Chapter five investigates whether performance improvements – 
and especially those related to solid waste – materialized during the 2007 Commonwealth 
Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) in Kampala, and to what extent they endured 
afterwards. Finally in chapter six, the conclusions of this study are formulated and their 
implications for further study and for policy making and management of solid waste in 
Kampala and beyond. 
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CHAPTER 2: THE OPERATIONS AND EFFECTIVENESS OF 
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE PROVISION OF SOLID WASTE 
COLLECTION SERVICES IN KAMPALA10 
                                                 
10
 A version of this chapter has been published as: Katusiimeh, M.W., A.P.J. Mol and K. Burger,  The 
operations and effectiveness of public and private provision of solid waste collection services in Kampala, 
Habitat International (2011), doi:10.1016/j.habitatint.2011.10.002) 
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Abstract  
This paper compares the operations and discusses the effectiveness of public and private sector 
provision of solid waste collection in Kampala, Uganda. Household data suggest that the private 
sector is more effective than the public sector. Private sector companies provide services like 
container provision and providing timely and fixed collection time tables. Contrary to popular 
perception, fees charged by private companies are moderate. Public sector clients are charged 
fees even when the service is supposed to be free. Clients of private sector providers are more 
satisfied than those of public sector providers. It is, however, revealed that while the public sector 
serves mainly the low incomes, the private sector serves mainly the rich. In spite of these notable 
differences, clients of both public and private sector perceive the problem of solid waste 
management (SWM) in Kampala to be very serious. The effectiveness of public and private 
sector operations in solid waste collection in Kampala is hampered by lack of transparency. 
Given the situation of open competition for clients involving both public and private sector in 
Kampala, it is possible the public sector can operate effectively if they start commercial services 
officially like their private sector counterparts. This calls for a formal public-private partnership 
where the public and private sector can work together with the public sector dominating poor and 
marginalized areas while the private sector concentrates on rich neighbourhoods. 
  
Key words: Solid waste collection, privatization, effectiveness, Kampala, Uganda, Households. 
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2.1 Introduction 
It is widely acknowledged that most cities in developing countries face challenges of 
poor solid waste management (SWM) resulting into major problems relating to public 
health and environmental pollution. Hardly a month passes without the press highlighting 
garbage complaints from city residents and reporting on heaps of uncontrolled garbage, 
roadsides littered with refuse, streams blocked with garbage leading to flooding and the 
presence of many illegal disposal sites (Matagi, 2001). The situation is made worse with 
rapid urbanization taking place and slums growing at an alarming rate.  
 In the 1980s, public sector monopoly of solid waste management (SWM) in urban 
cities was blamed for the mess citing inadequate financial resources and lack of 
management and technical skills. Public sector monopoly according to the World Bank 
also impedes the efficient allocation of resources and obstructs the functioning of markets 
(WDR, 2005). The World Development Report (2004) had earlier argued that too often 
services fail poor people because they are inaccessible or when accessible they are 
dysfunctional, extremely low in technical quality and unresponsive to the needs of the 
clients. The report also cites lack of innovation and widespread corruption as evidence to 
problems with public sector delivery of services. 
 Many analysts of urban environmental infrastructure in developing countries 
buoyed by the emergence of the new public management (NPM) model contended that 
without the discipline of competition, the public sector would not provide effective 
services.  The public sector was criticized for being run under an old administrative 
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model (the classical Weberian type of administration) that was characterized as slow, 
hierarchical, not cost-efficient,  inflexible and not citizen oriented (Hood, 1991; Hughes, 
2003). This situation was further exacerbated by growing mistrust of the people in 
governments who were seen as mired in corruption (Doan, 1998). Dissatisfaction with the 
quality and reliability of services and the inefficiencies and even corruption of public 
sector operators made private sector participation attractive (Annez, 2006). The thinking 
was that privatization would not only solve failures of public ownership (Shirley & 
Walsh, 2001), but the public would benefit from the introduction of private sector 
management practices (Stren, 2001).  
Many developing countries reshaped their urban systems and environmental 
infrastructure policies to reflect the new management thinking so as to implement 
elements of the NPM model. Reforms implemented in most urban areas in Uganda in the 
1990s were based on NPM principles, especially promoted by international donors such 
as the World Bank. The water and sanitation reforms in Uganda gained momentum along 
the NPM lines. As early as the mid-1990s, the Uganda government recognized the limited 
capability and capacity of local authorities to provide adequate sanitation and solid waste 
management (SWM) to urban communities (Tukahirwa et al., 2010). The absence of 
sufficient funds for them to operate SWM services properly reinforced the argument for 
stronger private sector involvement. The desire to move in this direction was already 
spelled out in various policy documents including the influential World Bank sponsored 
urban environmental sanitation project (Mugagga, 2006). Privatization is a key 
component of reforms introduced in SWM in developing countries. In Kampala, in order 
to institutionalize private sector participation, the Kampala City Council (KCC) solid 
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waste management Act was enacted in the year 2000. As a result, like in many other 
countries in the developing world, the public and private sector co-exist in SWM. 
However, despite the active involvement of both public and private sectors, major 
problems still remain as far as SWM is concerned. For instance only 40% of the garbage 
that is generated in Kampala is transported to the official dumpsite at Kiteezi (KCC, 
2006). The purpose of this paper therefore, is to compare the operations of the public and 
private provision of solid waste collection in Kampala and discuss their effectiveness.  
 
2.2 Methodology  
Solid waste management (SWM) in this study is meant to mean solid waste collection. 
When we refer to the private sector, we restrict ourselves to the analysis of the private 
firms that are formally registered and recognized by KCC.  
 To compare the operations of public and private provision of solid waste 
collection, data collection among clients of public sector (KCC) and private firms in 
Kampala was done through a quantitative survey carried out between January and May 
2009 in the divisions of Kawempe and Nakawa. The questionnaire was administered to 
475 respondents. Among the 475 respondents who responded to the questionnaire, 56% 
are served by KCC (12%) and the private sector (44%). The analysis is limited to these 
respondents. The survey captured the socio-economic characteristics of respondents, 
frequency of solid waste collection, perceptions and satisfaction with present solid waste 
services, payment dynamics and services rendered by private and public sector. 
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Data collection took place through a structured, interviewer-completed 
questionnaire to make sure respondents understood the questions and that no bias 
occurred in terms of illiteracy or education level. To ensure representativeness, a 
stratified random sampling strategy was followed, in which random sampling of 
respondents in the parishes selected involved targeting all income groups. If the sampled 
respondent was not available, not interested, or not part of the target group, the 
interviewer would move to the next random sampled respondent in that cluster. Given 
the difficulty of eliciting income and expenditure information, low-income households 
were defined as those that reside in poor neighborhoods characterized by high population 
densities. Areas were classified as high income if they had low population densities and 
where neighborhoods are well planned.  
Interviews with key participants like the KCC waste managers (10), managers of 
private firms (15), workers of both KCC (10) and private firms (15), the residents 
especially local council leaders (6) and opinion leaders (10) were conducted. The aim 
was to get explanations on the operations and effectiveness of public and private sector in 
SWM in Kampala. 
The data through qualitative methods was transcribed and qualitatively analyzed. 
Survey data was analyzed descriptively where we derived frequencies and percentages. 
We used an independent sample t – test to check for the mean differences and to check 
whether or not there are significant differences in the scores. 
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2.3 Results and discussion 
2.3.1 Public and private sectors operations in SWM in Kampala 
For long, Kampala local government had the monopoly of being responsible for 
collection, storage and disposal of waste by statutory requirement. Communal containers 
(skips) were placed in specific locations for households to bring garbage at any time of 
the day especially in rich areas (Mugagga, 2006). However, an insufficient number of 
skips were placed in the city which created a situation that encouraged open dumping in 
unauthorized places. Alternatively, households paid individuals (informal collectors) to 
transport garbage to the skip which Kampala City Council (KCC) trucks would take to 
the official dump site. Informal collectors were needed because the distance to the skips 
was quite far but informal collectors would also dump in unauthorized places as long as 
no one was watching.  
 The strategic framework for reform (SFR) of 1997 however, proposed that SWM 
be privatized with private firms collecting refuse directly from beneficiaries at a fee, 
KCC subsidizing the low income areas in the short term and then later withdrawing 
completely (KCC, 2002; KCC, 2006). After formal privatization set in around the year 
2000, communal containers were largely withdrawn. After the pilot refuse collection 
service was implemented in order to test the feasibility of contracting services  in 
Makindye division in 2001, it was recommended to have skip-less refuse collection 
service in communities, with skips restricted to institutions and markets (KCC, 2002; 
Mugagga, 2006). As a result of the implementation of the policy, the most observable 
change in the SWM sector in Kampala is the increased involvement of the private sector. 
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Officially, 30 private companies are registered by Kampala City Council (KCC) 
to collect waste in any division of the city.  Private companies collect garbage from 
private homes or institutions and are paid directly by these home-owners and institutions. 
Previously, KCC entered into formal contractual arrangements with private companies 
whereby the latter provided services for which they would be paid from local 
government sources through contracting. Firms like Nabugabo-Shauri Yako Joint 
Venture and Bisons Consult International were awarded contracts in 2001. KCC also 
awarded private companies a limited monopoly via competitive bidding in a defined area 
for a limited time. In this arrangement firms were allowed to charge residents, but KCC 
would pay a lump sum to private collectors to meet the costs of collecting garbage from 
poor households that cannot afford to pay. For example, in the central division of 
Kampala, garbage collection was taken over by Nabugabo Enterprises. In Kawempe 
division, NOREMA and Hilltop private companies were given contracts to manage the 
collection of solid waste. In Makindye division, Homeklin Ltd. was contracted. These 
arrangements were abandoned by KCC due to its lack of capacity to manage the 
contracting system and lack of capacity and transparency on the part of private firms. As 
a result, Kampala city council did not withdraw from collection of waste as planned. It is 
still involved in the collection and transportation of waste to the dumpsite. Records at 
Kiteezi dumping site in 2009 indicate that KCC is responsible for 87 thousand (about 
27%) tons of garbage dumped compared to the private sector‟s 237 thousand tons (73%). 
By the time of carrying out this study, KCC operated alongside the private firms in many 
ways commercially providing solid waste services to Kampala residents. Private 
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companies and KCC have widely scattered clients all over the city openly competing for 
customers.  
 
2.3.2 Socio-economic and demographic characteristics of respondents  
We asked for respondents of their educational status, the ownership of the house where 
they stay and the quantity of waste generated. We also classified their income category 
(see table 2.1 below for details of percentage scores). It was discovered that the rich, not 
surprisingly perhaps, are served by mainly private firms while most of the low income 
households are served by KCC. There is a significant difference in the scores for KCC 
(M=2.1, SD=0.7) and private sector (M=1.4, SD=0.5); t (8.5), P=0.000.  
 KCC serves the people with relatively little education (primary and secondary). 
Private firms serve those with higher education (tertiary). There is a significant difference 
in the scores for KCC (M=3.3, SD=0.6) and private sector (M=3.9, SD=0.4); t (-8.4), 
P=0.000.  
 For the estimates of the quantity of waste produced in the household per week in 
Kg, we found out that there was a significant difference in the scores for KCC (M=3.5, 
SD=0.7) and private sector (M=3.8, SD=0.4); t (-5.1), P=0.000. These results suggest that 
private firms serve those with relatively more garbage than KCC confirming earlier 
results that private firms serve the rich. Studies show that rich households generate higher 
quantities of waste than the poor and that income level is a determining factor for 
domestic solid waste generation rates (Boadi et al., 2003; Kaseva et al., 2005).  
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 For house ownership, there was a significant difference in the scores for KCC 
(M=2.0, SD=0.6) and private sector (M=1.6, SD=0.7); t (3.3), P=0.001. These results 
suggest that most clients of private firms live in their own houses unlike clients of KCC 
who are mainly tenants. House ownership  is associated with being rich.  
Table 2.1: Socio-demographic characteristics of respondents 
Variable Public sector Private sector 
Percentage Percentage 
Income category   
High income 18 67 
Medium income 55 30 
Low income 27 3 
Educational level   
Primary 11 1 
Secondary 53 15 
Tertiary 36 84 
House ownership   
Owner 13 46 
Tenant 80 47 
Government House 2 4 
Caretaker 5 3 
Quantity of waste (kg)   
3-5  15 1 
6-10  25 16 
Above 10 65 83 
 
 
 Generally, the results as revealed in the socio-economic characteristics of 
respondents reveal that private firms target the rich who have the economic means to pay 
consistently for their services.  This is an indication that private firms are more effective 
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in serving the rich. This is not surprising as the finding is in line with those of many 
earlier studies. For instance, according to Spaargaren et al. (2005), the pressure for profit 
maximization forces the private sector to seek rents from serving mainly the highest 
income areas or fully paid services leaving poor and marginal areas or low income people 
under the responsibility of under-resourced local authorities.  
2.3.3 Services provision 
We compared the responses of private sector and public sector clients in respect to 
service provision particularly in the provision of containers and frequency of collection of 
waste from households. 
2.3.3.1 Container provision.  
85% of KCC clients provide their own containers (mostly self-provision) while most 
(65%) clients of private firms indicate they receive containers from their service 
providers. The private sector providing containers can be seen not only in terms of 
customer care but also to bind the customer to the provider. Many of the containers are 
well labelled especially bins indicating which firm supplies them to clients.  This means 
that the private sector is more effective in providing services like container provision 
unlike the public sector especially when public sector (KCC) communal containers 
(skips) were removed in many neighbourhoods in preference for the door-to-door 
collection system. 
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2.3.3.2 Frequency of collection of waste from households 
Respondents were also asked how public and private providers compare in frequency of 
garbage collection. There was a significant difference in the scores for KCC (M=2.9, 
SD=1.1) and private sector (M=3.5, SD=0.9); t (-3.7), P=0.000. These results suggest that 
there are clear differences on frequency of garbage collection between private firms and 
KCC. Surprisingly, the majority (51%) served by KCC indicates that waste is collected 
daily unlike those of private firms (1%) contradicting results of similar studies (Obirih-
Opareh, et al., 2002). Two reasons  could explain this difference. First, KCC has a large 
majority (38%) of customers that are shop keepers as compared to private sector‟s 22%. 
The house in which they live  works as a shop at the same time and typically is near the 
road or market places  with easy  access for KCC vehicles that mainly collect market 
waste. Second, most low income households, (KCC mainly serves low income 
households) have no good waste storage containers. This fact coupled with the lack of 
appropriate in-house storage facilities and the high decomposition rate makes most low 
income households dispose of waste daily (Boadi et al., 2003). The high income 
households have onsite storage facilities and most contract with waste collectors that 
have fixed collection time tables. This finding is similar to findings from other related 
studies (Kaseva et al., 2005; Okot-Okumu et al., 2011) (See Table 2.2).  
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Table 2.2: Frequency of collection of waste from households 
 
 
2.3.4 Payments for solid waste collection 
All private firm clients pay for solid waste collection unlike for KCC where 76% of the 
clients pay. This payment pattern is particularly strange since KCC officially does not 
charge customers. The field interviews, however, indicated that most KCC customers pay 
and the money ends up with KCC solid waste management supervisors and drivers of 
their vehicles. This finding could be the reason why they pay lower fees (Mean = 22,102, 
SD = 21,824) per month compared to private firm customers (Mean = 31,382, SD = 
18,709) as the service is already subsidized. Both public (68%) and private (59%) clients 
consider fees paid to be moderate. When asked about how often payment to the service 
providers is done, both public and private customers indicate once a month. However, a 
large percentage of KCC clients pay weekly unlike those of private firms.  
2.3.5 Satisfaction with service provision 
In this study, satisfaction was used as a proxy for quality of services provided. Customer 
satisfaction is seen as a key performance indicator in any business and to measure 
effectiveness of services rendered. Thus it was important to ask Kampala residents to 
Frequency Public Private 
Percentage Percentage 
Daily 51 11 
Thrice 14 44 
Twice 27 31 
Once 6 14 
Less frequently 2 0 
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compare and contrast their level of satisfaction with the present situation of SWM. First, 
the perceptions of both private and KCC clients are compared on SWM problems in the 
neighborhood as this may have an effect on the general satisfaction of services rendered. 
There were no significant differences in the scores for KCC and private sector for all 
three variables tested (solid waste collection, littering of solid waste and nuisance of 
transfer points). Results suggest that both public and private firms‟ customers perceive 
the problem of solid waste collection, illegal piles of waste to be very serious. In a related 
question, both KCC and private firms clients indicated mainly personal health and 
littering of waste as the most urgent problem related to SWM. 
 
2.3.5.1 Satisfaction with the present situation of SWM 
As already noted, we asked Kampala residents to compare their level of satisfaction with 
the present situation of SWM in terms of frequency of garbage collection from their 
households, vehicles used, frequency of collection from the neighborhood and 
enforcement of law. In terms of frequency of garbage collection from their households, 
there was a significant difference in the scores for KCC (M=3.1, SD=1.1) and private 
sector (M=3.8, SD=0.8); t (-5.1), P=0.000. These results suggest that clients of private 
firms are more satisfied than clients of KCC. This tends to confirm the earlier observation 
that  a characteristic of low income people (mostly served by KCC) is to dispose of their 
waste daily and not necessarily collected by KCC all the time.  When not collected by 
KCC, it is dumped in the illegal sites in the neighborhood and left there to rot and 
become a nuisance. This observation is in line with the Auditor General (2008) report that 
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faults KCC for irregular solid waste collection in many poor neighborhoods and markets 
causing pollution and health problems. In terms of satisfaction with the vehicles used, 
there was no significant differences in the scores for KCC (M=3.0, SD=0.9) and private 
sector (Mean=3.3, SD=0.9); t (-2.0), P=0.040.  These results suggest that clients of both 
KCC and private sector are not satisfied with the vehicles used. This result is because of 
the use of uncovered trucks that litter garbage and the use of old vehicles and those 
unsuitable for waste collection. Clients were also asked   about their level of satisfaction 
with the frequency of garbage collection in their neighborhood. The distinction between 
household frequency and neighborhood frequency is important because of the co-
existence of different methods of collecting waste. These are door-to-door collection of 
waste by the service provider and the communal collection (either a car coming and 
residents deposit garbage in the truck or communal collection sites exist).There was a 
significant difference in the scores for KCC (M=2.9, SD=1.2) and private sector (M=3.7, 
SD=1.0); t (-5.1), P=0.000. Results suggest that private sector clients are more satisfied 
than their public sector (KCC) counterparts as regards to frequency of collection in the 
neighbourhood. In terms of satisfaction with enforcement of law to ensure compliance 
with the solid waste management ordinance, there was no significant difference in the 
scores for KCC (M=2.7, SD=1.1) and private sector (M=2.2, SD=1.2); t (2.6), P=0.011. 
These results suggest that clients of both private and public sector indicate that issues of 
enforcement by KCC to ensure compliance with the solid waste ordinance are not taken 
seriously. They are in agreement that KCC has not done a good job (see table 2.3 below 
for percentage scores). This finding is in line with the Auditor General‟s report on solid 
waste management in Kampala and the findings in another related study (See Oberlin, 
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2011). According to the Auditor General (2010), KCC largely failed to establish a solid 
waste management system to manage garbage collection from 2002 through 2007. The 
report notes the failure to conduct solid waste management awareness, to enforce the 
solid waste management by laws like failure to punish those who illegally dump waste, to 
supervise and monitor the activities of private agents licensed to collect waste and, lastly, 
to ensure that solid waste is transported properly and conveyed to official dump sites. In 
all the variables tested those served by private sector are more satisfied than their 
counterparts (clients of KCC).  
 
Table 2.3: Satisfaction with service provision 
Satisfaction with service provision Public  Private 
Frequency of garbage collection from household % % 
Poor 29 6 
Moderate  31 27 
High 40 67 
Satisfaction with vehicles used   
Poor 34 20 
Moderate 29 37 
High 37 43 
Frequency of garbage collection in 
neighbourhood 
  
Poor 40 12 
Moderate 27 28 
High 33 60 
Enforcement of the law   
Poor 40 65 
Moderate 35 16 
High 25 19 
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2.3.6 Explanations 
Data above show that generally private sector services are more appreciated compared to 
their public sector (KCC) counterparts. In spite of that observation, household data 
reveals the situation of solid waste management in Kampala is still a great concern. This 
is backed up by official statistics from KCC that show that service coverage of solid 
waste collection services is at 40% (KCC, 2006). Interviews with solid waste managers 
of private firms and KCC managers reveal lack of transparency as the main reason as to 
why solid waste collection is not performing effectively despite the public and private 
sectors being actively involved.  
First, senior KCC officials in Kampala were reluctant to embrace fully the agenda 
of privatization by arguing that outsourcing of solid waste collection service providers 
was expensive and that local firms did not have the necessary human, technical and 
financial resources to provide a better service than had been provided by the public sector 
(Golooba-Mutebi, 2003). Some senior KCC officials still hold this view. While this might 
be true, interviews reveal that KCC officials are also motivated by a desire to continue 
their benefits from the chaos under a public run SWM, which allows for rent seeking11. 
When solid waste collection was partially contracted out in 2003 (a partnership between 
KCC and Bisons Consult), the partnership was undermined by KCC with irregular and 
delayed payments and inaccurate assessments that led to the underpayment for the 
company‟s services. The company eventually withdrew from the contract12. While this 
could be attributed to lack of financial resources by KCC13 to pay the contractors and 
                                                 
11
 Interview with KCC Solid Waste Engineer July 12
th
 2007 
12
 Interview with Bisons General Manager, 12
th
 March 2008. 
13
 As argued by one of the KCC officials and some private sector company managers. 
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lack of capacity in form of monitoring staff having few transportation resources, 
telephones or mobile communication equipment, most respondents, including KCC 
officials, attributed this to the „sabotage‟ of the new reforms, especially the contracting 
out method of solid waste collection, in order to create „rent seeking‟ opportunities where 
the officials could benefit. This point is given more credence by the failure of KCC to get 
out of the business of solid waste collection and transportation, as was planned initially 
(KCC, 2002). KCC reneged on its promise to contract out service delivery to private 
firms, and only focus on supervising operations. This is especially so with money 
continuing to be allocated for solid waste collection. These findings are in agreement 
with (Post, 2004) who argues that there is often strong opposition to privatization from 
groups that stand to lose from the reform. 
Second, the activities of waste management are funded through the annual budget 
allocation and the official policy is that KCC doesn‟t charge user fees directly from the 
residents. While this is sometimes adhered to, often times KCC collectors especially 
„refuse supervisors‟ charge residents at lower rates compared to their private collector 
counterparts.  KCC still dominates solid waste collection in certain areas and most 
surprisingly in neighborhoods with rich settlements. In fact KCC and private firms 
collide sometimes especially where they work in the same area14. Those residents who 
prefer KCC say its services are cheaper than those of the private companies. This hidden 
and unfair competition demoralizes private sector service providers15 developing feelings 
of uncertainty on their part and holding back for fear and doubt about KCC‟s intentions.  
Third, a number of private garbage collectors such as BINIT, NABUGABO, 
                                                 
14
 Minutes, Public Health Department MIN PHC 36/07/2004 
15
 Interview with KCC Solid Waste Engineer July 12
th
 2007 
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UPDEAL, NOREMA, HOME CLEAN, and ESKOM are operating without permits from 
KCC (Auditor General, 2010). Although known to the divisional authorities, they had not 
signed agreements with the council for allowing them to operate. Despite the absence of 
the signed contracts, Kawempe division, by June 2007 had an outstanding amount of 
Shs.225 million (USD 98,597) payable to contractors (Auditor General, 2010). In early 
2008, the same companies signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with 
Kawempe division to collect solid waste on very unclear terms. For instance, it was not 
clear who was to meet the costs of  waste collection, how much the private collectors 
would be paid as a result of the work done, and based on what indicators the division 
shall monitor and evaluate the performance.16 The MOU was agreed upon and signed 
without making their details available to the council and without the involvement of the 
solid waste engineer17. Lack of transparency in the award of contracts has the potential to 
demoralize those who could have been willing to invest to improve solid waste 
management in the city.  
Forth, as a result of lack of transparency, there is lack of trust between the major 
players in the SWM business (public sector, private sector and the general public). The 
private sector is suspicious of KCC intentions and found KCC unreliable18, while on the 
other hand, the private companies hope to benefit from secrecy, have not been transparent 
to reveal their incomes and expenditures to KCC, which is one of the reasons given as to 
                                                 
16
 Solid waste engineer-Kawempe‟s letter to the Senior principal Assistant Town Clerk Kawempe division 
on the MOU between NOREMA (U) Ltd AND Kawempe division July 8, 2008 
17
 In the minutes of the meeting of the Education, Sports and Health Policy Committee, the solid waste 
management engineer submitted the requirements and proposals that were not taken into consideration 
(under looked.) 
18
 Several interviews conducted with private sector managers reveal that it is because of KCC breaking 
promises and not living to their word in the contracting business. 
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why KCC stops paying and subsidizing private contractors19. The public (consumers of 
services), are also not always cooperative especially when it comes to paying for solid 
waste collection and assisting law enforcers in dealing with those who litter solid waste 
or who fail to abide by the solid waste laws and regulations. Sometimes, local council 
leaders have sabotaged enforcement work by the private firms claiming they were not 
consulted20. The relationship between private firms is also not good as cases of unfair 
competition between rival firms, especially between Nabugabo Enterprises, Global 
Investments Limited and Bin IT, sometimes end up in physical fights and court cases21. 
The Town Clerk of Kampala sometimes resorts to putting up a public notice warning 
private garbage collectors and the general public that KCC had no running contract with 
any private garbage collecting firm and no private collector should claim to have 
exclusive rights of collecting garbage in any part of the city. Situations like these increase 
operating and transaction costs because of the uncertainty in the business of solid waste 
management.  
 
2.4 Conclusions  
The main objective of the research which underlies in this paper was to compare the 
operations and discuss the effectiveness of public and private provision of solid waste 
collection.  The case of Kampala, with regard to public and private provision of solid 
                                                 
19
 Interview with KCC Engineer July 12
th
 2007 
20
 In the minutes of the Education, sports, and health policy committee, members pointed out that the 
garbage contractors instituted guards to control careless dumping but they were not known to the local 
leaders and they couldn‟t work because of that as local leaders refused to cooperate with them. 
21
 John Eremu & James Kabengwa reports in the New Vision 25
th
 February 2009 which was confirmed in 
interview with the manager of the private firm, Great Waste and Recycling Foundation, that a row over 
private firms on accusations of sabotaging each other‟s operations had an effect of putting on hold the 
importation of 20 modern garbage trucks over allegations that Nabugabo Updeal intends to burn them. 
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waste collection, reveals that problems and challenges continue over the state of solid 
waste management as evidenced by the perception that the problem of SWM is still very 
serious.  Yet, in general, results from this study confirm the belief that the private sector 
is more effective than the public sector. The results further confirm the suspicion that 
private sector providers mainly serve the rich and that they are more innovative as 
compared to their public sector counterparts. The private sector clients are much more 
pleased than their public sector counterparts with the services provided. To a big extent, 
the findings of this study are in agreement with the WDR (2004) that asserts that the 
strength of the private sector lies in its customer responsiveness and innovativeness. 
However, the effectiveness of solid waste collection is hampered by corruption and lack 
of transparency involving both the public and the private sector.   
 This study generates the much needed data to suggest planning and policy 
recommendations for Kampala and other cities with similar conditions. Given the 
situation of competition, it is possible the public sector can operate effectively too if they 
officially start commercial services. The challenge is how to maintain cost recovery 
among the poor without leading them to opt out of the services with disastrous 
consequences for the environment. Tailoring private sector participation to socio-
economic circumstances, deepening efforts to promote competition, and introducing 
mechanisms to ensure that low income households have access to affordable services 
may be the solution to the problems in providing services in low income countries. This 
calls for a formal public-private partnership where the public and private sector can work 
together with the public sector dominating poor and marginalized areas while the private 
sector dominate rich neighbourhoods. 
52 
 
 
 
 
53 
 
CHAPTER 3: PRIVATISATION OF WASTE COLLECTION 
SERVICES AND THE REMOVAL OF PUBLIC CONTAINERS IN 
KAMPALA. 
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Abstract  
This paper analyzes the effects of removing a number of large containers used in the 
collection and transportation of solid waste (“skips”) in Kampala.  Household survey data 
reveal that the commercial services attract clientele, not only of former users of skips, but 
also of households that formerly dumped their garbage. We find a strong association of 
skips with lack of cleanliness. The dissatisfaction with the skip system and appreciation 
of the current system of door-to-door collection was most notably recorded in high-
income areas and by high-income households. On average the privatised system was 
preferred, but when differentiated by income we find that households with lower income 
and education prefer the old skips.  
 
Key words: Communal containers,  Solid waste collection,  Privatization, Kampala 
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3.1 Introduction 
Two methods of solid waste collection are popular in developing countries. One is the 
use of communal containers (skips) by public providers, the other is house to house 
collection by private service providers. The latter method allows private providers to 
collect fees for their services. Their services may also take the form of announcing the 
arrival of a truck in a residential area upon which residents can bring their waste out to a 
truck (for a fee). It is typically applied in high income areas (Obirih-Opareh, 2002), while 
public collection of household waste through communal containers is traditionally done 
in low-income areas and in areas with market activities. In the latter case, market 
participants are sometimes charged a fee. Next to the two methods of collecting solid 
waste, a third method of disposal is important, namely that of private households by 
themselves, either through burning, burying or through dumping the waste on piles in the 
neighborhood.  
A viable private sector service provision cannot emerge as long as free public 
containers are available. The removal of the containers creates room for the private 
sector, but may deprive many households of a cheap way of disposing of their waste. 
These households may resort to environmentally less attractive ways of disposal. 
 Research and analysis on methods and technologies of disposal of solid waste is 
rare as most literature focuses on the role of public, private and public-private 
partnerships in the delivery of services. Studies on the disposal of waste highlight the 
environmental and health problems associated with the use of public skips and how they 
could lead to environmentally unsound practices within the areas concerned (Achankeng, 
2004; Obireh-Opareh et al., 2002; Agunwamba, 1998; Boadi et al., 2004). They cite the 
lack of collection points and containers, and the corresponding distance people have to 
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travel to dispose of their waste encourages illegal dumping. Another problem relates to 
uncertainty about the responsibilities for cleaning collection points because the truck 
drivers and those working for private contractors just lift containers, without cleaning 
litter and spillage. The unreliable collection schedules resulting in large heaps of solid 
waste and attendant stench of decaying organic wastes which exposed communities to 
risks of disease epidemics and also waste containers are too high for children to access 
properly. When not collected regularly, old waste heaps provide breeding grounds for 
dangerous animals such as rodents and snakes. In addition, communal collection systems 
put a high burden on the local government (Obirih-Opareh, 2002; Doan, 1997; Tamura, 
2007, Oteng-Ababio, 2010).  
 Communal containers are often completely in the hands of the city authorities or 
partly outsourced to private waste company to lift the containers and take these to the 
dump site (Tamura, 2005, Demanya, 2006). Refuse collection vehicles evacuate the 
containers at frequent intervals, usually daily or every second day, to remove 
accumulated waste. The principal advantage of this method of collection is that it reduces 
considerably the number of sources from which waste has to be collected. Also in low-
income communities characterized by limited access for refuse collection trucks, door to 
door collection is not economically feasible and only a communal container system is 
viable.  
This paper deals with the effects of removing a large number of communal 
containers, known as skips, from areas in Kampala around the year 2002. We describe 
how the transition of skips to commercial providers was appreciated by households, and 
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highlight how this transition affected the informal service providers that used to take 
waste from households to the skips. 
In Kampala, before privatization of solid waste collection, the official way of 
collecting garbage from households was the use of communal containers. Skips were 
supplied by the Kampala City Council (KCC).  Out of the estimated need of 800 skips, 
only 529 were in place by 2006 and in various forms of deterioration ( KCC, 2006). By 
2008, most skips had disappeared and only remain with institutions such as schools, 
hospitals and markets.   
The pilot refuse collection service implemented in order to test the feasibility of 
contracting services in Makindye division in 2001 with funding from the Uganda First 
Urban Project recommended having skip-less refuse collection service in communities, 
with skips only restricted to institutions (KCC, 2002). Plans to implement a cost recovery 
mechanism was instituted in which slums and other disadvantaged communities that 
cannot afford to pay for the service were to be subsidized. In order for the cost recovery 
to work in Kampala it was deemed necessary that “all community skips be withdrawn so 
that communities are served by a skip-less mobile truck system” (KCC, 2002). The 
number of skips kept gradually falling and bad ones were not repaired by KCC.  
In this paper we try to answer the question if the removal of skips as a means of 
collecting waste has been a good decision from the perspective of households. We do so 
by first investigating the choices made by households after removal of some of the skips. 
We then investigate the opinions held by households as to the erstwhile skip-based 
services and their present service provider. In particular we focus on their evaluation of 
the service as such, and of other aspects such as cleanliness of their neighborhoods. As a 
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switch to private sector services also entails payments of fees, we try to adjust the 
evaluations for the possible effects that the level of fees might have. We report on survey 
results held in Kampala. The surveys detail the households‟ responses to the change in 
system, and their perceptions as to costs, and environmental effects.  Households that 
were interviewed gave their views on skips, and on the present services. Clearly skips are 
associated with filth, stench and other negative aspects. The present conditions are 
considered better, but we show that this view is only held by high-income areas. 
In the next section we elaborate a theoretical model of household decision making 
on ways to dispose of its household waste. The model highlights the role of one particular 
method, that of using skips and shows the consequences of its abandonment. We then 
present data and methods of investigation in section 3.3. In the fourth section, we present 
survey data on the actual choices made by households before and after the removal of 
skips and the analysis of these data to arrive at the conclusions, which are discussed in 
section 3.5.  
 
3.2 Theoretical considerations 
We first discuss the household perspective. They faced a situation where garbage 
disposal required the household to take the garbage to a nearby skip. Depending on the 
distance, the household may decide whether or not to do so. They may also hire a person 
to take the garbage there. The alternative is to throw the waste in the surrounding area or 
burn it. So the effort involved is related to the distance to the skip, or – if they choose not 
use it – to the time involved in disposing of waste otherwise. Cash costs involved are 
none, unless someone is hired to take the garbage to the skip. 
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 On the benefits side, the household will prefer the use of a service to take  the 
waste far from the household over a situation in which the household has to endure the 
smell of decaying or burning waste nearby. Only for households that live near to the skip 
will the situation be different. If the skip is there, they may use this, but meanwhile they 
have to endure the externalities of the skip.   
 Households not only benefit from what they do themselves, they are also affected 
by what their neighbours do. If these choose to dispose of waste in their back yard, it may 
harm the households around them and lower the incentives of the latter to choose cleaner 
technologies. 
 To highlight the main trade-offs, consider the following model: The household 
maximizes a utility function with arguments cleanliness, time and costs. The utility is 
maximized by deciding on where to take the garbage and whether or not to hire a person 
or company to take it.  
 Figure 3.1 sketches the possibility set, ranging from doing nothing with no 
(environmental) benefits to dumping the waste in the street (little costs involved, little 
benefit), to taking the waste to a nearby heap, or a skip or incurring higher costs and 
having the garbage properly disposed of. If the household‟s indifference curves (between 
spending money or effort, and enjoying clean surroundings) are as drawn in blue dotted 
lines (more to the left) in Figure 3.1, the optimal choice would be take the garbage to a 
nearby heap. If additional costs are of less importance to a household relative to 
additional benefits, the indifference curve would run more horizontally, as the solid red 
lines more to the right, and a paid collection service comes into the picture. Households 
whose costs are high, due to high opportunity costs of their time, can hire persons to take 
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the garbage out to a pile or a skip. The possibility set  indicates the cheapest solution for 
the household to use any of the technologies.  
Figure 3.1 Preferences and possibilities for poor (blue, dotted) and rich (red, solid) 
 
 As the costs involved in using any of the possibilities will change with the 
distance, some households will have a possibility curve that clearly favours one option 
(say, households close to skips) while others may not have any feasible option apart from 
dumping. Feasible options for a households are those that are not cancelled out by nearby 
alternatives. Consider a case where skips are close to a household. This shifts the 
corresponding kink in the possibilities curve to the left. If the point shifts far enough to 
the left, heap will be cancelled as a relevant option: the household will then be either 
dumping or using skips. The same may occur if informal workers would offer cheap 
services to take  
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Figure 3..2a and 3.2b: Preferences for disposal around the House (H), Skip (S) or Private 
service (P, P‟) with varying costs: a) Skips far away; b) little space/time. 
 
garbage out to skips. Similarly, private sector services may compete with skips only if 
costs are low or benefits high enough, such that the benefits/costs ratio exceeds that of 
using skips.  
 Households may find themselves in quite different positions: some may be close 
to collection points, other households far away, some people may easily dispose of waste 
in their own yard and time, others may have limited space and time to do so. This 
difference in possibilities is likely to be greater than differences in the felt benefits, or in 
the trade-off between benefits and costs. Figure 3.1, thus only puts one possible shape of 
the possibility curve for one specific “type” of household.    
 Some households will see the opportunities as in Figure 3.2a, with large distances 
to public collection points; other households as in Figure 3.2b, with larger costs for own 
disposal.  
 Introduction of private services, and/or the removal of skips lead to various 
transitions, depending on the location of the household and its preferences. In Figure 3.1, 
without a private sector, skips are a preferred option by both the poor and rich; in figure 
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3.2a, skips are used by rich, and home solutions by the poor; in figure 3.2b, only skips 
would be used. Now if skips are removed, and private services are offered, rich 
households in Figure 3.1 shift to P (private), while poor households may divide 
themselves over P and other solutions. In Figure 3.2a, the same will apply, while in 
Figure 3.2b, almost all households will shift to private sector services. Empirically 
therefore, the abolition of skips can lead to more demand for both private services and for 
home-based solutions. 
3.2.1 Private sector supply response 
Supply of waste collection services by the private sector involves an element of fixed 
costs for equipment and administration. In addition fixed costs are involved in the 
collection activities themselves in the form of costs of the driver and trip to the waste 
dump site. The latter aspect provides an incentive to get the truck as full as possible 
before setting off to the dump site. The former aspect regulates the number of trucks, the 
frequency of service per week, and the fee to be charged. With a low frequency, more 
garbage per household is collected per visit, which makes the hands more productive, 
reduces the time to get a full truck, and thereby leads to highest earnings per day. 
Increasing the frequency may lower the turn-over per worker and lead to higher costs per 
household. Adding more trucks and clients simply multiplies the problem, without 
complicating it any further. But the administrative overhead can be spread over more 
clients, thus reducing the costs per client. Firms with more trucks can therefore charge 
lower fees, and firms with less frequent visits per household can so too. In 
neighbourhoods with dense housing, travel time is reduced which also reduces costs per 
household.  
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 If, therefore, a limited number of customers were served by the private sector 
under the skips-regime (typically the well-off, less densely populated areas), the removal 
of the skips opens the door to a group of customers that can be served at lower costs per 
client. This is because more customers can share the costs of overhead, and they may be 
more densely settled. On the other hand the cost of collecting the fees may be higher.  
 Figure 3.2b shows the effects. If skips are still present while private sector 
services are introduced, their per unit costs will be high, leading to position P‟ rather than 
position P. Same benefits are achieved but at higher costs. For rich households the best 
choice will then be to go for private services, but the poorer households will continue to 
use skips. Removal of the skips will expand demand for private sector services, leading to 
lower costs, and will shift point P‟ to where point P is. This makes the costs lower for all 
households and brings private services within reach of poorer households. Another reason 
why the attractiveness may rise is that collection services will typically be offered to the 
neighbourhood as a whole rather than to individual households separately. The more 
households make use of effective services, the more benefits will be felt by individual 
households because of the externalities of garbage collection.  
 In the following sections of this paper, we provide the needed information: What 
did erstwhile skip-users choose, and how is this related to their original position as to use 
of skips (with or without paid services) and to their income. How many non-skip users 
also shifted to using private sector services? We also seek to find corroboration of the 
shape of the possibility set: can we verify that – on average - higher benefits can be 
obtained only at increasingly higher costs? We try to distil this information from data on 
fees that are paid, and the alleged quality of the service experienced by the households.  
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3.3 Data and methods of investigation  
Data collection among urban residents in Kampala was done in three rounds of survey.  
The first survey (DS3) was administered to 383 respondents in Kampala (204 in Kampala 
central division and 179 in Kawempe division). This survey captured the distribution of 
residents who possibly used different methods of solid waste collection before and after 
privatization. This was meant to capture the behaviour of the residents as to the choice of 
disposal system after the reduction in the number of skips in Kampala and the 
introduction of private sector waste collection. The distinction before-after was 
implemented by asking questions about the period 1996-2001 and the period 2002-2007. 
The second survey (DS4) was administered to 301 respondents (185 in Nakawa division 
and 116 in Kawempe division). Residents were able to indicate the level of satisfaction 
(by a score of 1 to 5) in relation to the collection frequency, appropriateness of the use of 
skips, distance to the where the skip is/was placed, cleanliness of the neighbourhood, 
effectiveness of skips. The last survey (DS5) was administered to 475 respondents (315 
in Nakawa division and 160 in Kawempe division). This survey captures income bracket 
of the household, education of the respondents not captured by other surveys to help us 
explain the perceptions of the people  before and after the use of skips.  The perceptions 
of people on the performance of different agents in solid waste collection in Kampala was 
captured. Here, questions related to the different methods of solid waste collection also in 
comparison with skips were asked.  
 All the surveys took place through a semi-structured questionnaire. The 
interviewer administered the questionnaire in person. This was meant to make sure we 
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interviewed the right people who already lived in Kampala when skips were widely used 
and to take care that that no bias occurred in terms of literacy or educational level. But 
the interviewer-administration was also to make sure we interviewed respondents who 
were knowledgeable about the changing state of solid waste management collection 
methods. The respondents were randomly selected from various parishes but depending 
on who agreed to be interviewed. All the surveys were carried out in 2009 at different 
times and with different respondents in three divisions out of five divisions of Kampala 
namely Kawempe division, Nakawa division and Kampala Central division. The 
divisions in Kampala are similarly composed of mixed populations in terms of income 
category apart from a few areas where there is a concentration of only rich people or poor 
people. The same methods of data collection were applied in all surveys as described 
above and since different questions (relevant for this paper) were asked in different but 
related surveys, we analysed them separately. We believe the data are reliable because 
similar questions from the three surveys produced almost similar results. We also got a 
high positive response rate with 75% of whom we approached accepting to be 
interviewed.  
 In addition to surveys, interviews were carried out with the service providers 
(Kampala city council officials (5), private sector managers (7), informal refuse 
collectors (30), leaders of CBOs in solid waste collection (3), Local council officials (5)) 
as to their perception of solid waste collection and particularly the use of skips and non-
use of skips. This helped us to understand better the data from the survey. All income 
categories were included (high income, medium income and low income). Given the 
difficulty of eliciting their income and expenditure, we defined in the first survey low-
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income households as those that reside in areas or poor neighbourhoods characterized by 
high population densities; medium income households are residing in those places in 
Kampala that are the unplanned neighbourhoods but inhabited by relatively rich people. 
We classified high income areas as areas with low population densities, and where 
neighbourhoods are well planned.  
 
3.4 Empirical findings 
3.4.1 Choice of method of waste disposal before and after privatization 
Column 2 of Table 3.1 shows the distribution of users before and after privatization (we 
restricted us to those that also answered the question on 2002-07 period): In the period 
1996-2001, 143 households used skips, 58 used services to take their garbage to the skip 
(these are mostly the people in richer areas) and 92 households dumped their garbage on 
(informal) piles. After commercialization of solid waste collection, the use of skips 
diminished, but did not disappear: out of the 143 households that answered the question, 
about half (75) of the original users continued to use skips. 
Table 3.1:  
Table 3.1: Households by disposal system used in 1996-2001 and by system used 
in 2002-2007 
 
Choice made in 1996-2001 Choice made in 2002 – 2007 
 Households  
 
Skip Bell 
Sys 
Bring to 
collect 
point 
Door 
to 
door 
Piles Other 
Skip 47% 143 75 18 23 22 4 1 
Bell system 1% 4 1 2 0 1 0 0 
Bring to collect pt. 19% 58 4 6 8 39 0 1 
Door to door 2% 6 1 0 1 4 0 0 
Piles 30% 92 7 11 6 30 38 0 
Totals 100% 303 87 37 38 96 42 2 
Percentages  100% 29% 12% 13% 32% 14% 1% 
Source: own survey (DS3) 
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This can be explained by the use of skips that are still provided to market places and 
major institutions and their use by households living close to places where they are 
placed. Some old dilapidated skips are also still in existence in some parts of the city and 
residents still dump in and around them. The other former skip users divided themselves 
over a  bell-system, where a bell is rung to announce the arrival of the collection vehicle; 
a system where someone calls at the door to take it to the collection point [„bring to 
collect pt.‟], or a door-to-door collection system, in which garbage is collected at the door 
and then taken to a vehicle. Clearly, very few households shifted from using skips to 
dumping the garbage onto piles. On the contrary: many households that used to dump 
their waste onto piles, are now paying for collecting their waste mainly using private 
collection systems. The households that now use neighbourhood piles to dump their 
waste typically did so in the past as well. They may have little alternative open to them.  
 When categorized by income level of the area where the household lives, we see 
that richer areas typically used skips with paid services to take the waste there: 37%. In 
the medium and poorer areas this was only 8%. Use of piles in the neighbourhood 
occurred equally in all areas (around 30%).  After the removal of skips, those households 
that used paid services (see „bring to collect pt.‟ in Table 3.1 above) continued to do so, 
but now this amounted to a private sector service. The households that brought the 
garbage to the skips themselves formed a minority in the richer areas (30% compared 
with over 60% in the other areas), but did not show a very particular pattern in their 
choice of new provider: about half of them had still access to skips (same percentage in 
other areas), others switched to door-to-door collection. This latter service was adopted 
less in the middle income and poorer areas, where a bell-ring and door-to-container 
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system was favoured more. This latter service is typically rendered by the informal  
collectors. 
 
Somewhat surprisingly, therefore, we see that  
a) many households who used the skips before, still do so now and  
b) that the other former skip users typically switched to private sector services: 
hardly any household reverted to dumping.  
c) Households in poorer areas now make more use of informal services and a bell-
ring system; those in richer areas now use door-to-door collection by the private 
sector. 
d) Many households that relied on dumping, now switched to paying private 
commercial providers for solid waste collection services. 
 
Thus the scope for commercial services has expanded enormously, not just to former skip 
users but also to those that did not use any service before. Under the skip-regime, the 
only substantial form of „privatization‟ was that households paid to have garbage taken to 
collection points. In all, less than 21 per cent used some form of paid service. In more 
recent years, 57 per cent use paid services, many of them (32%) a door-to-door collection 
system.  
 Determinants of the choices include the level of income (proxied by the 
classification of the neighbourhood). In addition, we can think of the nature of the 
households as a possible determinant. Many households occupy a house that is also used 
as small enterprise, mostly a shop. As shops generate more or different waste, this may 
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affect the choice of provider. As mentioned above, other important characteristics are the 
distance to skips and the time and space for own disposal of waste. These variables are 
not known from the survey. The income level of the area captures the shadow costs of 
time somewhat. Location can also be related to the length of stay in Kampala of a 
household. The longer the stay, the better located a household can be. And if households 
previously chose to resort to dumping or other home-based solutions for waste disposal, 
this is likely to indicate that skips were too far away. Referring back to Figures 3.1 and 
3.2, these variables relate to the horizontal position of the disposal methods. Richer 
households, and those that are longer in Kampala, may find it more easy to access private 
sector services, and those that dumped waste before should not now rationally choose for 
a skip. The vertical position also matters and the appreciation of the service may matter 
for its choice. Ideally we should use a variable that indicates how any method is rated, 
including methods not actually chosen. This is not available. Using the rating of the 
chosen method would amount to circularity in the explanation of the choice. What we can 
do, is to include the rating of the former service. This was typically a service that may 
now be abandoned. The lower the rating was for the old service, the stronger (possibly) 
the incentive to switch to another method. 
 
Table 3.2: Multinomial logit of choice of provider in 2002-2007, model A 
  skip Car+bell Collect 
Container 
Dump 
Dumped before -2.24 0.09 -0.73 2.62 
High income area -1.47 -4.43 -1.01 -0.69 
Residential -1.22 -0.98 -1.80 -0.89 
Rating service before 0.20 0.65 0.73 0.11 
Length of stay in Kampala -0.05 0.05 -0.03 -0.06 
Constant 1.94 -1.90 -0.72 -0.91 
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N=283; pseudo-R2=0.26; option 4 (collect by car) was the basis. Bold coefficients are 
significantly different from zero (10%). 
  
We estimate two models, one with all of the above explanatory variables (model A), and 
one in which the previous choice is omitted (model B).  The dependent variable in both 
cases is the choice of provider in the period 2002-2007, i.e. after privatization. The 
appropriate model for such a choice is a multinomial model, which relates the odds of 
choosing a particular provider to household characteristics. The results of the estimation 
of model A are given in Table 3.2.  
 To apprehend the model, we simulated with the estimated model to see the 
probabilities of choosing a particular provider. To this end, we use various values for the 
original position in which the household may find itself: dumped waste before rather than 
used skip; being in high income area; being a residential household rather than a shop 
too. 
 
Table 3.3: Probabilities of choices simulated for stereotype households (model 
A) 
Dump 
before 
High 
inc 
Resid-
ential 
Skips Car + bell Collect 
Container 
Collect 
Car 
Dump 
0 0 0 0.51 0.18 0.18 0.11 0.02 
0 0 1 0.41 0.18 0.08 0.31 0.02 
0 1 0 0.38 0.01 0.21 0.37 0.03 
0 1 1 0.21 0.00 0.06 0.70 0.02 
1 0 0 0.08 0.28 0.12 0.16 0.36 
1 0 1 0.05 0.23 0.04 0.35 0.32 
1 1 0 0.04 0.01 0.11 0.40 0.44 
1 1 1 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.65 0.30 
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Table 3.3 shows that a major factor for the use of skips or dumping is whether this was 
done before. The variable indicating whether a household dumped the waste before is 
assumed to capture rather permanent elements like distance to any facility. Income makes 
a difference for the other options: high income households typically choose collection of 
waste at the door and with a vehicle, while poorer households go for option 2, a vehicle 
comes in the neighbourhood and rings a bell. The choice between door-to-door system 
and having waste taken to a container is related to the nature of the house: shopkeepers 
go for a container, while residential households go for a private collection service. 
The effect of length of stay in Kampala is to move households away from use of 
skips or dumping towards any of the commercial services. Twice as long a stay in the city 
reduces the probabilities of skips or dump by half. A similar effect is found for the rating 
that households gave to the old situation, but here also the collection by a vehicle is 
affected. The better the rating of the old service was, the more households go for option 
3, collect for a container and option 2, the bell system. 
 Earlier choice for dumping may not be exogenous to the household. If it represent 
accessibility of other options it may well be, but if it is a deliberate choice it is not. To 
verify the forces leading to such choice, the model was also estimated without the 
variable indicating earlier choice. Results are in the appendix, and the resulting 
simulation of effects of income-area and being residential rather than a shop are in the 
Table 3.3A below. 
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Table 3.3A: Probabilities of choices simulated for stereotype households 
(model B) 
high inc Residence Skips Car + bell Collect 
container 
Collect 
Car 
Dump 
0 0 0.41 0.20 0.16 0.13 0.09 
0 1 0.30 0.20 0.07 0.32 0.10 
1 0 0.30 0.01 0.19 0.39 0.12 
1 1 0.16 0.00 0.06 0.69 0.09 
 
 Table 3.3A shows that a choice for dumping is hardly influenced by income or 
residence considerations. Apparently this had more to do with the specific location of the 
household. The choice for commercial services (collect-car) is strongly dependent on 
whether households live in high-income areas or are residents only (i.e. not have shops). 
Typically the contribution of either is around 25% to the probability of choosing this 
service. This goes at the cost of skips and containers in the case of residents, and at the 
cost of skips and a bell system in the case of high-income areas. These effects also 
resulted from model A.  
 In this model B, length of stay came out as significant only in inducing a choice 
away from dumping, indicating that indeed households may become better situated over 
time. The variable rating previous service levels (again) induced households to switch 
toward to cheaper solutions of skips (including paying to take it there) or bell-ring system 
rather than dumping or commercial services. 
 Thus, the empirical results confirm the theoretical model: richer households 
choose for private sector services. We show below that these carry higher fees but also 
bring higher levels of service. The results also confirm that a higher appreciation of the 
earlier method leads to a choice that resembles the earlier method. The old situation was 
one out of three: skips, a skip-based transport service or dumping. Households that were 
happy with this, now choose for skips, a skip-based service or (new) a bell-ring system. 
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Households that disliked it, now choose more private sector services. In terms of Figure 
3.1 and 3.2, a lower appreciation is represented by lower points (or arrows), with smaller 
benefits at a given level of costs. 
 
3.4.2 Relation between fees and service level 
Figure 3.1 suggests that more benefits come at increasingly higher costs. This can be 
shown empirically. We equate „benefits‟ with level of satisfaction about the current 
system, and „costs‟ with the fees that must be paid for these benefits. This can be an 
underestimation, as non-paid costs in terms of household time or effort are not accounted 
for. 
 Tracing the average levels of satisfaction and the average fees paid for the groups, 
distinguished by provider, we can generate the following Figure 3.3. 
 
 
Figure 3.3: Mean scores on service by mean fees paid 
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 Higher fee payments lead to higher levels of satisfaction with service rendered by 
the collection system, in this case ranging from mere dumping on the down-left side to 
(market) containers on the right. The three systems on the left are collection systems for 
residential households, while use of skips (directly or via collection at the door) is more 
for small enterprises, as we have seen in the choice-model above. Note that these ratings 
are provided by the users, i.e. by the households that have chosen for these methods. This 
will bias their appreciation upwards. As we will see below, skips are actually not rated 
highly by the public. The high ratings for skips of Figure 3.3 are, nevertheless relevant 
for those that use these skips. Users of say the door-to-door system will appreciate their 
service-of-choice, and may hold much lower appreciation of skips. 
3.4.3 Rating of old skips  
We noted in the estimation of Table 3.2 above that the rating of the earlier situation 
(where no private services were offered) mattered considerably for the present choice. 
Households who rated the old situation low, were more inclined to go for private sector 
services now. We therefore take a closer look into these ratings in this section. Question 
is what aspects of the earlier situation contributed to the overall rating and in particular 
whether fees matter for the rating. 
 To this end we use a survey (DS4), held in Kampala in 2009. Households were 
asked about their rating of the skips before privatization. Only interviewees were selected 
that had lived long enough in Kampala to have experience with the skip system. 
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Figure 3.4: Distribution of ratings of aspects of skips from 1 to 5 (best) (and of the 
present service method) 
 
 Figure 3.4 gives the summary outcomes of answers to evaluatory questions on the 
conditions with skips. People were asked to rate on a scale of 1 to 5 (5 being the best) 
their appreciation of various aspects of the skip system. Going from bottom to top of 
Figure 3.4, we see that collection frequency was rated average with 20% score of 2, 45% 
scoring 3, and the rest better than 3 (scores of 1, very bad, were not given). The same 
score was given to the appropriateness of skips, and their effectiveness as a collection 
system. On top of the Figure, somewhat worse rating is given to the distance people had 
to go to reach the skips (37% scoring 2) and the frequency with which the skips were 
emptied. The overriding feeling against skips is clearly is the rating for cleanliness: 65% 
or more of respondents found the immediate surroundings of skips unclean, and the same 
held for their own neighbourhood. The results are in line with Tadesse et al. (2008) for 
Mekelle city, Ethiopia. In their study, when households were asked whether or not they 
would agree with the placement of waste containers nearer to their houses, 69% 
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responded „no‟ and 31% said „yes‟ revealing that there is strong resistance against waste 
facilities such as containers to be placed within a short distance of dwelling areas 
(houses). This then led to the score for the present system, without skips in this survey, 
that came out as rather favourably and is shown in the middle of Figure 4: more than 60% 
rated “the service you are receiving without skips” better than average (score 4 or 5). 
When asked whether the skips should be brought back, 74% answered „no‟. 
 The rating given to the skip‟s performance is influenced by the respondent‟s 
income, as indicated by the neighbourhood he or she lives in: the higher the income 
category (category 1), the lower the score. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
bold: significantly different from medium column; N=102, 94, 83 resp. 
source: own survey (Skips Kampala) 2009 
 
Table 3.4 shows that the respondents in the high income neighbourhoods are significantly 
less positive about the skips, and more favourable about the current system, and strongly 
against the return of skips. Differences between middle and low income areas are minor, 
Table 3.4: Average scores (from 1 to 5=best) on old skip‟s 
performance by income area 
 High Medium Low 
Frequency Garbage Collection 2.85 3.11 3.35 
Appropriateness Of  Skip 2.90 3.23 3.33 
Effectiveness Of Skip 2.82 3.12 3.25 
Cleanliness Around Skip 2.21 2.50 2.46 
Cleanliness Neighbourhood 2.20 2.40 2.46 
Walking Distance To Skip 2.65 2.80 2.76 
Freq Skip Renewal 2.80 2.88 2.96 
Current System 4.53 3.59 3.40 
Should Skips Return? (% No)  92  67  65 
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but frequency of garbage collection in poor income regions is evaluated significantly 
better.  
 Skips score particularly low on cleanliness. This reduces their effectiveness in 
rendering benefits to the users: whereas their waste is transported, the hinder they 
experience from it is not diminished much. In addition, the efforts they have to make are 
still considerable, given the low score on the walking distance: apparently skips are rather 
far away. This may explain why in Table 3.1 so many non-users of the skips are 
recorded.  
 The current system (i.e. with private firms collecting waste) is considered much 
better in the rich areas, but in middle-income and notably in poor areas the differences in 
scores for the skip system and the current system are minor.  
 Thus, we can conclude that the current system is serving the richer areas much 
better than the old skip-based system, while the other income categories are not 
significantly better off.  
 In the larger survey conducted in March 2009 in Kampala (DS5) we can 
distinguish between the effects of the area and those of the household income itself. 
We do so by means of an ordered logit model. In this model the rating of skips services 
(from a low 1 to a high 5) is related to explanatory variables by means of the following 
model: let the latent (unobserved) variable indicating the preference be y, and be related 
to explanatory variables x by 
   jj xy  
We observe a score k (k=1 to 5) according to 
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Thus, the alphas that are estimated in the ordered logit model, indicate the levels at which 
a household with characteristics indicated by x, changes from one score to the next.  
As explanatory variables xj we use 
 residing in a high-income area (incatego_1) 
 income bracket of the household (income) 
 education level of the household head (educlevl) 
 division (5=Kawempe; 3=Nakawa) 
 if respondent is neither head nor spouse (head_3) 
Evaluatory variables (on a scale of 1 to 5) are 
 rate the appropriateness of skips when they were there (rate skip) 
 opinion on the service receiving with skips (skip service) 
 opinion on the service receiving without skips (without skip) 
 rate the cleanliness of the neighbourhood at the time when skips were around 
(cleanliness) 
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The means and standard deviations of these variables are: 
 
 
 
Results of the estimation: 
Table 3.6: Ordered logit estimation of skip evaluation 
 Rate skip cleanliness Skip service Without skip 
incatego_1 -0.43 0.44 0.29 0.24 
Income -0.28 -0.18 -0.09 0.49 
Educ level -0.30 -0.29 -0.31 0.22 
Division -0.44 -0.45 -0.27 0.14 
Head_3 0.61 0.74 1.08 0.32 
     
alpha_1 -7.12 -6.02 -4.83 -2.92 
alpha_2 -4.20 -3.06 -2.63 1.02 
alpha_3 -2.85 -1.33 -0.98 2.81 
alpha_4 -0.88 -0.31 1.09 3.87 
alpha_5    6.24 
     
Pseudo R2 0.075 0.042 0.030 0.077 
N 381 416 371 406 
bold coefficients are significantly different from 0 at 10% level 
source: own survey (public-private SWC providers Kampala), 2009  
 
The interpretation of these results can be shown by using the first estimation. Skips are 
rated lower in high income areas, and additionally by high income earners, and those with 
higher education. The value (of y) obtained by combining the effects of income category, 
income bracket, education level , division and the nature of the respondent (head_3) is 
important for the link with the rating. If the value is below -7.12 the lowest rating is 
Table 3.5: means of variables (N=343) 
 Mean St. Dev. 
Rate skip 2.83 1.022 
Skip service 2.72 0.954 
Without skip 3.01 1.155 
Cleanliness 2.61 0.923 
Incatego_1 0.37 0.479 
Income 4.41 1.469 
Educ level 3.50 0.668 
Division 3.77 0.968 
Head_3 0.17 0.377 
Cost now 0.04 0.173 
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given, and one needs a value of about 3 more (to -4.20) to generate a rating of 2, and 
again 1.45 more (to -2.85) to see a rating of 3 etc.  
 The cleanliness around skips, however, has more to do with income than with the 
neighbourhood: in richer areas it is considered cleaner, but less so by richer households. 
The system without skips is appreciated particularly by households in the higher income 
brackets. The estimation shows the effects of income to be substantial: a move from 
income bracket 4 to 6 (i.e. from 0.2-0.5 million to over 1 million Ush, the two most 
populated brackets in the sample) leads to a change in the ratio of negative-positive 
scores (below and above 3) of the rating of the skips from 42/27=1.6 to 56/17=3.3 and of 
the rating of the present system from 36/38=0.9 to 18/62=0.3. Figures 3.5 a) and b) show 
the effects. 
 
  
 
 
 
                a) rating of skips                                              b) rating of present system 
Figure 3.5: Frequency distribution of ratings for two income 
  
In fact, households that are in the poorer areas, are not rich themselves and do not have 
high levels of education, typically rank the skip system as good or better than the system 
without skips: with income in bracket 2 (50-100 thousand USh) and education not 
beyond primary school, more than 50% of the households rate skips at levels 4 or 5. 
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3.4.4 Effects of fees on the ratings 
The strong effects of income on these ratings suggests that the fees may play an 
important role. Is it that households prefer skips for their low or zero fees and that 
commercial collection system may score better on quality, but score low in appreciation 
because the high fees annihilate the benefits? If so, this would mean that households who 
pay higher fees now for private collection services rank the virtues of skips higher than 
those who pay lower fees. And it could imply that those who pay higher fees show less 
appreciation for the current system. We investigate both.  
 There is some, not particularly strong, statistical evidence to this effect. To 
investigate both aspects, we must logically confine ourselves to those who actually pay a 
fee now. This is obviously a select group, and we need to take this into account; hence we 
used the Heckman 2-step selection model. Results are in Table 3.7. 
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Table 3.7: Effect of collection fees on rating of systems 
            of skips     of present system 
    Coef    Z    Coef    Z 
incatego_1 -0.167 -1.11 -0.093 -0.54 
income -0.103 -1.41 0.175 2.40 
educlevl -0.277 -1.99 -0.114 -0.79 
division -0.275 -4.43 0.134 1.96 
costnow 1.650 1.98 -0.787 -1.20 
_cons 5.298 8.61 2.776 5.54 
     
selection equation    
incatego_1 0.407 1.85 0.300 1.58 
income 0.201 2.74 0.167 2.41 
educlevl 0.365 2.58 0.356 2.62 
division -0.168 -2.10 -0.244 -3.51 
_cons -0.852 -1.71 -0.361 -0.71 
     
/athrho -0.146 -0.37 -1.895 -4.99 
/lnsigma -0.061 -1.31 0.194 3.69 
     
Rho -0.145 -0.37 -0.956 -29.12 
sigma 0.941 21.46 1.214 18.99 
lambda -0.136 -0.37 -1.161 -12.76 
N 392  405  
censored 97  97  
 
 
 After the selection effect is accounted for, and with inclusion of the fee (costnow 
records the cost per month in million Shs) the income effect on the rating of skips itself 
has become weaker and is no longer significant. Higher income has a positive effect on 
paying for waste collection per se however. If higher fees are paid, the rating of skips 
improves. Note that the model is not the same as in the case of ordered logits: we now 
have a linear regression model (rather than the ordered logit) to represent the influence on 
rating.  
 The right hand side of the table shows the effects on the rating of the current 
system. The significant and positive coefficient of income shows that its effect is 
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maintained. The fees paid (as expressed by costnow) have a negative (but not significant) 
effect on the level of satisfaction with the current system.  
 The data thus provide little evidence on the effects of fees on the evaluation of the 
systems: the higher the present fees, the more the old system may be preferred and the 
less the present system seems to be appreciated. But no strong effects of the fees resulted 
from this analysis. 
 
3.5 Conclusion 
We can conclude from the analysis related to the choices made and the perceptions after 
most of the skips were removed, that the major alternative to skips was the use of the 
commercial services, mainly private sector‟s services. This choice was made not only by 
former skip-users but also by many who previously dumped the waste on open piles or on 
the road. When asked to rate the skips system, the respondents in the surveys indicated a 
strong association of skips with lack of cleanliness. The lack of satisfaction with the skip 
system (and appreciation of the current system) was most notably recorded in high-
income areas. On average the present system was much better evaluated.  
 Elaborated further with the help of another survey, we found that the evaluation of 
skips is affected by not only the income level of the neighbourhood but also by household 
income and education. In addition, we found a weak positive effect of the current fees 
paid. We also found symmetrical effects on the evaluation of the present system: most 
appreciated by high income, better educated households. The effects of income are strong 
enough to render the evaluation of the skips system equal, if not superior to the current 
system for the households with lower income and education and outside the rich areas.  
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 Theory as derived in Figures 1 and 2, suggests that the removal of skips would 
affect welfare of households in two ways: one is the removal of the option of using skips, 
which would decrease welfare of those that used it; the other is the enabling of private 
sector services being offered to these households. Many households (50 percent) did not 
use the skips before. Instead they resorted to private ways of disposal including dumping. 
The removal of many of the skips not only induced the former skip-users to switch to 
commercial services, but also enabled many non-users of skips to avail of these services. 
The lowest benefits are derived from mere dumping and many households have chosen to 
abandon this practice in exchange for commercial solid waste collection services, 
typically much more expensive. In poorer areas, they chose in particular the systems 
using car + bell ringing. This involves some efforts of the household members 
themselves too. In richer areas, the most popular choice is door-to-door collection with a 
truck. These households were often using paid services before to take the garbage to the 
skips. But also quite a number had no recourse to skips, and their removal, by enabling 
private sector services to emerge, led them to switch from private ways of disposal to 
making use of these services.  
 Formerly many households paid people to take their waste to collection points, 
including the skips. This was particularly so for households that also run small 
businesses. Typically informal workers were offering these services. These households 
continued to do so, though some shifted to using commercial services, especially those of 
the (formal) private sector. The advent of the (formal) private sector thus led to a 
decrease of the demand for informal services. The evaluation by households of the waste 
disposal services before and after the removal of skips shows that richer households are 
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clearly pleased with the removal, but that poorer households, particularly those with low 
levels of education do not feel better served than they were before.  
 The results of this study have implications for other urban towns in Uganda and 
other developing country towns that have opened the door for private sector services 
provision, where free public containers are largely used and where the use of informal 
collectors is dominant. An appropriate mix of public and private service could be useful 
especially if public provisions can be strengthened for the second stage of waste 
collection among the low income communities. This will enable low income 
communities to dispose of garbage cheaply and possibly eliminate illegal dumps – with 
environmental benefits for the community but at a cost of formal private sector 
expansion.  
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CHAPTER 4: CO-EXISTENCE OF FORMAL AND INFORMAL 
WASTE COLLECTION IN KAMPALA. 
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Abstract 
We analyse how the informal collectors and the formal sector co-exist in solid waste 
collection in Kampala. We rely on household surveys and a small survey among the 
informal collectors in Kampala. Findings suggest that informal collectors play a 
substantial role in the first stage – collecting solid waste from the households, notably 
from poorer segments of the population. This is not the „dualist‟ aspect of poor earnings 
but actually made possible by them escaping control on where to deposit the waste. 
Employing a simple technology, and bringing the waste no farther than the nearest 
unofficial „collection point‟, they provide services at low cost to the households, but 
much less so to the community (environmentally of little use). If public provisions can be 
made for the second stage in waste collection, this may trigger even more supply of 
small-scale collecting services, a combination that may prove cost effective. 
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4.1 Introduction 
Developing countries have so-called informal sectors, which are important forms of 
income activities providing employment to many people (ILO, 2002). The informal 
sector consist of small scale, often not state-registered or even illegal, industries and 
service providers that sell goods and services, and seem to form an economy of its own. 
This informal sector is distinct from the more formal industries and services that are 
larger, better organized, richer and officially recognized by state authorities.  
  Also within solid waste management (SWM) a formal and informal sector can be 
distinguished. The formal sector consists of public service providers and private 
companies, while the informal sector consist of individuals or small unregistered 'firms' 
that are active as waste pickers, waste collectors, itinerant buyers and recyclers (Furedy, 
1995; Wilson et al, 2009; Nzeadibe et al., 2010). 
 In this paper we focus on a specific group of informal SWM actors, namely the 
informal collectors. Their position is different from that of, say, waste pickers and 
recyclers, in that these latter groups often grow parallel to the quantity of waste collected 
by the formal sector. Informal collectors, on the other hand, are typically in a zero-sum 
game with (formal) private sector waste collectors for their clientele.  
 We will argue, however, that while this is the case for competition between 
informal collectors and formal private collectors, this may not be true vis-à-vis formal 
public collectors. The reason is that public waste collectors are not faced with the need to 
go from door to door to collect money (and waste), but typically employ a technology 
that involves collecting waste at some distance from the household door. They use 
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containers or depots to collect household waste, which is then brought to an official 
dumpsite or treated otherwise. This leaves room for informal collectors, who take the 
garbage from the household to the container or collection point. The choice of this 
collection system then leaves room for informal collectors, who are then „structurally‟ 
linked to a collective-container based system.  
 If private sector collection is introduced when free containers are still around, 
private companies must compete with a collective mode of collecting waste that brings 
lower fees for households, which could make formal private services unattractive. This 
has been the reason for Kampala to remove many of the collective containers (skips) in 
the city when private collectors were introduced. 
 So, this paper investigates the nature of and relations between formal and 
informal waste collectors, focusing on two questions: Does the informal sector in the 
SWM business only consist of poor workers that can find no other job and who serve 
only the poor households that cannot afford formal service providers? And do informal 
sector waste collectors function in close dependency with – rather than separation from – 
the formal sector, with which it competes for clients and to which it offers services and 
goods? In the next section, we explore the theoretical debates on the informal sector in 
relation to urban SWM in developing countries. Subsequently, the methodology of the 
study is outlined, followed by a presentation and analysis of the results. Finally, the paper 
ends with a conclusion. 
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4.2 Informal sector in urban solid waste management in developing countries.  
Klundert et al. (1995) define the informal sector as the unregistered, unregulated or 
casual activities carried out by individuals or/and families or community enterprises that 
engage in value-adding activities on a small scale with minimum capital input.  
 The informal economy in developing countries has been a subject of theoretical 
debates dominated by the dualist school, the structuralist school and the legalistic school. 
The dualist school first popularized by International Labor Organization (ILO) in the 
1970s argued that there are two distinct urban economies (the 
poor/informally/unemployed vs. the rich/formally employed. The ILO 1972 report on 
income and employment thus coined the marginal, poor, “informal” sector of the 
economy, which produced goods and created employment and income for the poor. 
Whereas formal enterprises were characterized by large-scale production, incorporation, 
and the use of capital intensive technology, the ILO indicated that informal enterprises 
involved small scale production, family ownership and labor intensive techniques. The 
informal sector mainly articulates small scale performance and is somehow isolated from 
the formal sector (Ngiba et al., 2009; Michael, 2011).  
 The structuralist school gives another view of the informal sector, but does not 
exclude or undermine the contributions of the dualist school (Michael, 2011). The 
structuralist school argues that formal and informal sectors are linked to one another and 
the informal sector is subordinate to the formal sector (Chen et al., 2004; Michael, 2011). 
The informal sector is an integral component of total national economies, rather than a 
marginal appendix to them (Beneria, 1989). Formal and informal firms are often 
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dynamically linked as many informal enterprises have production or distribution 
relations with formal enterprises (direct production of goods and services), and supply 
them inputs, finished goods or services either through direct transactions or via sub-
contracting arrangements. Many formal enterprises hire wage workers under informal 
employment relations as a way of reducing labour costs (Chen, 2005; Michael, 2011). 
According to the structuralist school, the formal economy always enjoys a dominant 
power relationship over the informal economy (Ngiba et al., 2009), and can develop 
favorably because of and thanks to the informal sector. 
 The legalist school argues that the underlying reason why many citizens in 
emerging democratic, market systems do not participate in the formal economy is 
because the institutional structures or the rules of the game prevent them from doing so. 
The barriers to participation in the formal political and economic systems include: 
obtaining a business license, hiring employees, knowing and complying with applicable 
government rules and regulations, obtaining a loan, paying taxes, enforcing a contract, 
and so forth (Kuchta-Helbling, et al., 2000).  
 These three theories help us to understand the situation of informal solid waste 
collection in Kampala and how the informal waste collectors co-exists with the formal 
waste collection sector. 
 The informal sector encompasses a wide range of areas of informality -- 
economic and social, covering business activities, employment, markets, settlements and 
neighborhoods, each of which has implications for public policy (Furedy, 1995). SWM is 
no exception to this pattern. In fact SWM in many low- and middle-income countries is 
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sometimes driven by the informal sector (Nzeadibe et al., 2010; Scheinberg et al., 2010 
& 2011) to the extent that in many cities more wastes are dealt with informally than 
managed formally (Furedy, 1995).  Our application of “informal sector” is to the 
activities of unlicensed individuals or group of individuals who are engaged in collecting 
waste from the households, or what Medina (2005) refers to as “informal refuse 
collectors.”   
 Little systematic knowledge exists of the actual role that informal providers play 
in collecting waste and on how they co-exist with formal private companies and the 
public sector. Most studies into the informal sector in SWM look at the roles of 
unregistered, unregulated and casual family/community enterprises and individuals in 
recycling of waste and in thus adding value to recovered waste materials (Taylor, 1999; 
Klundert et al., 1995; Fahmi, 2005; Nas et al., 2004; Wilson et al., 2006; Sudhir et al., 
1997; Rogerson, 2000; Wilson et al., 2009, Baudouin et al., 2010, Nzeadibe et al., 2010; 
Scheinberg 2010 & 2011). Accordingly, few studies have been devoted to the analysis of 
the actors in the informal sector involved at the primary level of solid waste collection 
(Medina, 2005). The few studies available don‟t provide details on the characteristics of 
informal collectors and why they exist despite the presence of formal collectors. We 
highlight the contributions of these few studies below.  
 Informal initiatives play an important role in the collection of solid waste, the 
primary sub-system of waste management (Van Horen, 2004; Afon, 2007). Informal 
waste collection from households is a source of employment for the operators and fulfils 
a demand for the residents. The collection technology used by the informal collectors is 
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quite basic (Doan, 1998): they gather household trash in small buckets or baskets which 
they carry from household to household and they use either a wheel-barrow or a simple 
push cart to transport collected waste to the designated intermediate collection point built 
by the city in each neighborhood. At these intermediate collection points municipal 
trucks can then pick up the trash and transport it to the dumpsite or landfill, usually 
located outside the city limits (Doan, 1998). Chekole (2006) shows that in Ethiopia the 
informal solid waste collecting actors operate in their immediate geographical and social 
space and therefore have more chance to be competitive and retain their customers. This 
is not unlike what Tukahirwa and colleagues (2011) find for Kampala. The informal 
waste collection does not impose any transaction costs on the formal system, nor does it 
represent any financial costs to the public sector (Van Horen, 2004). Though the direct 
household environment looks clean where informal collectors operate from, the outside 
environment is worse off as operators more than incidentally dispose collected waste at 
unofficial places, leading to the development of clandestine waste dumpsites (Afon, 
2007; Oberlin, 2011). According to Van Horen (2007), the informal sector therefore 
exists not only as a survival strategy for the very poor, but it also fills gaps that exist due 
to the inefficiencies of the formal system (Wilson et al., 2009). 
 In other studies, the economic impact of the informal sector was found to be 
significant as the average waste picker earns much more than the prevailing minimum 
wage (Nzeadibe et al., 2010). Privatization threatens the sustainability of garbage 
collector communities by removing access to their economic asset, waste garbage 
(Fahmi, 2005; Fahmi et al., 2010). As far as partnering with the formal sector is 
concerned, members of the informal sector may be reluctant to enter into formal 
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arrangements with other MSW stakeholders and to comply with commercial registration 
requirements. According to Taylor (1999), many informal workers aspire upward 
professional mobility, looking upon their current waste related job as only transitional.  
 
4.3 Setting and data 
In Kampala, the capital city of Uganda, SWM is the responsibility of the Kampala City 
Council (since 2011 the Kampala Capital City Authority, KCCA) and its divisions. KCC 
is required to ensure that solid waste (garbage) is collected and conveyed to treatment 
installations or approved disposal sites (Auditor General, 2010). The resources 
committed to solid waste management (SWM) by KCC proved insufficient and in the 
1990s privatization was introduced (among other reasons) to attract sufficient finances. 
Privatization is seen as important in the general process of improving and modernizing 
urban waste management systems.  
 In order to institutionalize the active participation of other, non-public service 
providers, regulations were formulated pertaining to SWM with a view of promoting and 
enhancing partnerships between the city council and other private service providers. A 
case in point is the KCC Solid Waste Management Ordinance (2000). However, none of 
these regulations considers the informal sector as an active and worthy actor and partner 
in SWM. In fact, section 20 of the KCC Solid Waste Management Ordinance (2000) 
defines as an offence for someone to collect, transport, remove or dispose refuse at a fee 
without a valid permit. Notwithstanding the absence of legal support, in Kampala the 
informal sector is active in the business of solid waste collection, supplementing the 
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efforts of KCC and the formal private sector. And the World Bank recognizes the 
contribution of the informal sector as alternative service providers that can help to serve 
the poor (WDR, 2004). 
 In order to analyze why informal collectors keep in the business of solid waste 
collection, we examined the relationship and linkages between the informal refuse 
collectors and other (formal) actors in the solid waste collection business, namely KCC 
and private firms.  For that we examined both the demand side (clients/customers) and 
the supply side (informal and formal collectors). On the demand side, we investigated: 
fees charged and income categories of clients served and client satisfaction of services. 
On the supply side, we investigated the earnings of informal refuse collectors, the future 
plans of informal providers, relationships between formal providers and informal 
providers, and the legal existence of the latter. 
 A survey of urban citizens of Kampala was carried out in the divisions of 
Kawempe and Nakawa. Kawempe is the poorest of Kampala‟s five divisions (Habyarima 
et al., 2007), while Nakawa is the biggest division with concentrations of rich 
neighborhoods. Given the difficulty of eliciting income and expenditure, we defined low-
income households as those that reside in poor unplanned neighborhoods (parishes) 
characterized by high population densities; medium income households are those 
residing in unplanned or semi-planned neighbourhoods with mixed densities. We 
classified high income households as those households situated in areas with low 
population densities, and where neighborhoods are well planned. We randomly selected 
respondents in selected parishes. If the targeted respondent was not available or not 
interested to be interviewed, we would move to the neighboring household. In total, the 
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questionnaire was administered to 475 respondents in Nakawa division (315 over 11 
parishes) and Kawempe division (160 over 9 parishes) (details in Table 4.1). Among the 
475 households who responded to the questionnaire, 21% indicated they are served by 
informal sector providers. The rest is served by KCC (12%), the formal private sector 
(44%), and community-based organizations (CBOs) (1%), or found themselves ways of 
disposing garbage (22% „self-provisioning‟) (Figure 4.1).  
  
Figure 4.1: Actors in solid waste collection 
Source: Own survey. 
 In addition, an interview guide with standardized semi-structured questions was 
used to conduct interviews with thirty (30) informal service providers in Nakawa 
division. It is important to stress that no information or estimation exists of the total 
number of informal refuse collectors and therefore we cannot claim representativeness. 
The informal refuse collectors were interviewed in 11 of the parishes where we carried 
out the study (Luzira, Naguru 1, Bukoto, Kiwatule, Kiswa, Ntinda and Kyanja parishes 
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in Nakawa division, and Mulago 1, Mulago 11, Wandegeya and Mpererwe in Kawempe 
division). These interviews were especially carried out in the morning when informal 
waste collectors are bringing waste at the waste collection centers. 
 KCC waste managers (5) and formal private sector providers (7) were also 
interviewed to find out whether they have any working relationship with informal refuse 
collectors. We also interviewed local council officials (5) in the areas we carried out the 
study from.  
Table 4.3: Study areas 
Nakawa Division (N=315) Kawempe Division (N=160) 
Parish N Income category Parish N Income category 
Bugolobi 25 Mixed Mulago 1 34 Mixed 
Kyanja 33 High Mulago 11 14 High 
Ntinda 43 High Kikaya 27 Mixed 
Banda 42 Low Mpererwe 8 High 
Naguru 1 14 Mixed Komamboga 32 Mixed 
Nakawa 1 29 Mixed Kifumbira 8 Low 
Bukoto 19 Low Makerere 11 20 Mixed 
Kiwatule 23 Mixed Wandengeya  8 Mixed 
Mbuya 31 Low Kazo Angola 9 Mixed 
Luzira 29 High    
Kiswa 27 High    
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4.4 Results and discussion 
4.4.1 Characteristics of informal waste providers in Kampala 
As pointed out earlier, we carried out a small survey among 30 informal waste collectors. 
All the interviewed informal refuse collectors are males. This is not unlike what Nzeadibe 
et al., (2010) found out in Lagos Nigeria that informal solid waste activity is a 
predominantly male occupation. The average age of the informal refuse collectors is 32.3 
years, with 45 being the eldest and 25 the youngest informal waste collector. 38% of the 
interviewed collectors had acquired secondary education ranging from standard one up to 
standard four, 19% with no schooling at all and 43% having completed primary 
(elementary) level. This is similar to the findings of Afon (2007) and Nzeadibe et al., 
(2010). The collection technology used by the informal collectors in Kampala is quite 
basic. Informal refuse collectors collect garbage in small buckets, loose containers, 
cardboard boxes, gunny bags and polythene bags and they carry garbage from household 
compound to the nearby collective center/dumping site using either a wheel-barrow or a 
bicycle that they own. Informal collectors don‟t provide containers to their clients. One 
respondent (informal refuse collector) had acquired a motorcycle. Most (90%) use their 
own startup capital as they don‟t need much capital to start-up business. Few borrowed 
money from relatives and micro finance institutions. All waste collectors have no 
disposal permit and they are not registered. There are several illegal dump sites where 
they dump the garbage, mostly 50 to 300 meters from the clients households. In fact, 
much of what is collected by the informal waste collectors ends up in illegal dump sites. 
Their services amount therefore to moving the waste, rather than removing it. Informal 
refuse collectors have no standard method of charging fees on the waste collected and the 
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respondents (clients) indicated that fees are collected mostly per service or per week. The 
amount of money collected from clients depends on the quantity of waste in question and 
the bargaining power of the informal refuse collector and the client. Informal collectors 
charge per service between UGX 300 – 2000, but most informal collectors charge UGX 
500 per service, similar to what Oberlin (2011) found out in Dar-es-salaam Tanzania. 
Apart from 6 respondents who never answered the question, all informal collectors have 
been in the business of solid waste collection between 1-5 years. All view it as a weekly 
and year round activity, meaning there are no seasonal breaks.  
 
4.4.2 Income category of service recipients 
The dualist theory of informal sector claims that the informal waste collectors cater for a 
customer base that is not able to pay high prices for high quality services. In other words, 
the informal sector serves the poor. In order to ascertain this claim we asked respondents 
(clients) of all income categories which service provider collects waste from their 
household. By service providers we mean whether they are served by the formal sector 
(KCC and private companies) or informal sector (particularly informal collectors) or not 
at all (self-provisioning).  
The results show that informal refuse collectors serve parishes of all income 
categories, similar to other service providers (Figure 4.2). Therefore, informal service 
provisioning is not at all restricted to low income areas. The results of an independent 
sample t-test indicate that there were no significant differences between KCC and 
informal refuse collectors, but there were significant differences between formal private 
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sector and informal refuse collectors. These results suggest that there is no difference by 
income category between respondents served by informal refuse collectors and KCC but 
formal private companies clearly favour high income groups. Figure 4.2 shows the shares 
of the 3 income categories for the 4 types of waste collection service provision. 
 
Figure 4.2: Service providers and the percentage of households they serve in terms of 
income category. 
 
The differences between clients served by informal refuse collectors and KCC on 
one hand and the formal private sector (companies) on the other hand might be due to 
costs (fees paid) involved. Fees paid by households to either KCC or formal private 
sector are significantly higher than those paid to informal collectors. Mean values are 28 
thousand shilling a month for private sector, over 13 thousand for KCC, and only 8 
thousand for the informal collectors‟ services. Figure 4.3 shows that most clients (53%) 
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served by informal refuse collectors pay below UGX 5000 (USD 2) a month indicating 
that compared to other service providers, they provide services at lower rates.  
 
Figure 4.3: Fees paid per month by service provider.  
 
From the above data on fees paid and income category of the service providers 
that collect waste from households it can be concluded that the informal sector serves all 
income categories, but especially the middle income and low income. But they do not 
necessarily serve only the poor as the dualist theory may want us to believe. The fees 
charged for solid waste collection by the informal sector collectors on average are low 
compared to those of the formal sector as Table 4.2 below shows. 
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Table 4.2: Average cost of solid waste collection services per provider, as rendered to 
clients in UGX per month. 
Income category Private sector Public sector Informal collectors Overall 
High Income 126,275 40,789 14,250 42,805 
Middle Income 42,973 25,217 6,664 22,593 
Low income 6,875 20,000 2,710 5,775 
Overall 56,711 36,008 7,021 31,349 
 
 While the average fee charged by informal services is 7,021 (see Table 4.2), in 
poor areas this is only 2,710, against 14,250 in rich areas. But informal providers fees in 
rich areas are on average still below the private sector fees in poor areas. 
It should be noted that the fees charged by informal collectors are low, not 
necessarily because the clients served are poor but because of other factors. Through 
observation and interviews with informal refuse collectors, several reasons explain why 
informal refuse collectors charge lower rates compared to other service providers. First, 
informal refuse collectors are mainly paid for transportation service of waste to the 
collective collection centers because they don‟t have the capacity to transport garbage to 
the official dumpsite. Interviews with informal refuse collectors reveal that they mostly 
dump garbage in what they call “gazetted collection centers”22. KCC trucks and 
sometimes trucks of formal private companies (paid by KCC) pick the garbage from 
these collective collection centers, especially after people in the neighborhood complain 
about nuisance. Second, informal refuse collectors don‟t provide containers to households 
for storing garbage unlike the private sector (66%) or KCC (16%). Third, informal refuse 
collectors work mostly in their own neighborhood or in familiar neighborhoods and they 
don‟t incur transport costs. This situation privileges them to be more accepted and 
                                                 
22
 What they call gazetted collection centers, are illegal dump sites mostly at places where communal 
containers popularly known as “skips” used to be placed before they were removed. 
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competitive within their community rather than any other enterprise because they are 
known in these communities and they have knowledge on income levels and thus know 
what they can charge. This is what Oberlin (2011) refers to when she argues “ .... waste 
pickers have personal relationships with households. The personal relationship might be 
established as a result of being in the same neighborhood and thus they interact 
frequently which enables mutual understandings, and eases communication between 
households and waste pickers” (Oberlin 2011: 126). This means that higher trust levels of 
a household in services of a provider, makes access to the services of that service 
provider more likely (Tukahirwa et al., 2011). Clients of informal providers also pay cash 
mostly on a daily or weekly basis, as compared to clients of KCC and formal private 
sector who have more long term contracts (Figure 4.4). This advantages informal refuse 
collectors as their payment schedules are more flexible for households with irregular 
incomes. 
 
Figure 4.4: Payment regimes per waste collection service provider 
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The flexibility in payment schedules is more significant when the frequency of 
garbage collection from households is taken into account. Figure 4.5 reveals that the 
frequency of informal sector garbage collection at households is comparable to private 
sector garbage collection, but lower than public sector collection. 
 
Figure 4.5: Frequency of solid waste collection at households per service provider 
 
While it is clear that informal refuse collectors serve the poor, surprisingly too 
some 14.3% serve the rich and 55.1% serve the medium income areas (Figure 4.2). 
Through observation and interviews with informal refuse collectors and their clients, 
several reasons explain why informal refuse collectors serve also high income and 
medium income households. First, especially at the high and medium income households 
collection of waste is done in accordance with spontaneous needs. Clients know where 
the informal collectors stay and have their telephone numbers and call informal collectors 
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wheel barrows and bicycles and therefore are able to navigate through the narrow roads 
and in difficult terrain in the unplanned and semi-planned settlements, where big trucks 
of the formal providers cannot easily come. In addition, informal collectors use cheap 
containers like wooden boxes and broken jerry-cans that can easily be accessed by their 
customers. Formal providers sometimes insist that customers possess metallic bins and 
polythene bags, which are either regarded as expensive or are not preferred. 
 
4.4.3 Quality of services provided 
The assumption from informal sector theories, especially the dualist theory, 
stresses that there would be a marked quality difference between services provided by the 
formal sector compared to those provided by the informal sector. We used customer 
satisfaction (on a Likert scale of 1 (=not satisfied) to 5 (=very satisfied)) as a proxy for 
quality of services. We asked respondents (clients) to rate their satisfaction of the services 
rendered by service providers. An independent sample t-test was conducted to compare 
the satisfaction of respondents who receive the services of the informal refuse collectors 
and those of other service providers. There are no significant differences in the scores for 
KCC (M=3.13, SD=1.1)
23
 and informal sector (M=3.04, SD=1.1) (t=0.472, P=0.638). 
However, there are significant differences in the satisfaction scores for private contractors 
(M=3.85, SD=0.86) and informal refuse collectors (M=3.04, SD=1.1) (t=6.7 P=0.000). 
The results suggest no big difference in satisfaction levels of respondents served by 
informal refuse collectors and KCC. But formal private companies/contractors seem to 
                                                 
23
 M= mean; SD= Standard Deviation; t=Difference between the mean or average scores of two groups; 
P=Probability Values  
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provide a superior
24
 service to their clients, compared to other providers notably informal 
refuse collectors and KCC (Figure 4.6). Note that these are user-scores, so there may be 
some degree of selection bias. 
 
 
Figure 4.6: Satisfaction with the service rendered by service providers 
 
4.4.4 Incomes earned by informal refuse collectors 
It is claimed in the dualist theory that informal sector workers earn low wages compared 
to those who work in the formal sector and that they will be looking for an opportunity to 
transit from the informal sector to join the formal sector for better working conditions. 
Our findings reveal that, in terms of incomes earned, informal refuse collectors who serve 
low income and middle income households earn in the range of UGX 105,000 – 140,000 
(USD 40-70 USD) a month. This figure is calculated based on the number of customers 
daily served (15-20) times the average monthly fee per household of UGX 7000. This 
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payment received by informal refuse collectors is higher than what KCC and private 
companies pay their workers. KCC workers (truck loaders of garbage) are recruited to 
earn 3000 Uganda shillings per day and assuming they work daily, their total income is 
90,000 Uganda shillings (USD 45). Workers for KCC are not always paid in time; 
sometimes they get to seven months in arrears
25
. Formal private sector companies pay 
their employees in the range of 3000 – 5000 a day, totaling to between 90,000 – 150,000 
(USD 50-70) a month. Those employed in the formal sector and those in the informal 
sector do not receive additional benefits, such as insurance and medical care. But 
interviews reveal that employees in the formal sector enjoy some degree of job security. 
Informal refuse collectors spend little costs  on collection equipment, only on bicycle 
repairs and on some occasions on buying sacks. This means that informal refuse 
collection is potentially a economically lucrative activity, at least compared to those who 
work in comparable formal organizations as KCC and private sector companies, contrary 
to what the dualist school hypothesizes. 
While informal sector waste collectors do the job year round, they regard it as a 
part – time activity, mostly working in the morning and evening hours. The rest of the 
time is spent on other income generating activities to supplement their incomes from 
garbage collection. Around 30% of the interviewed respondents are involved in sorting of 
materials for reuse and recycling purposes. Sorting of garbage for material reuse and 
selling this to recycling companies is a major source of income outside the payment 
received for collecting and transporting material from household. The respondent who 
sort garbage earn UGX 50,000 – 100,000 per month (USD 35 – 50) from the sale of 
                                                 
25
 City council of Kampala – letter to the Senior Principal Assistant Town Clerk Kawempe division from 
the solid waste engineer, Monday, April 21, 2008. 
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recyclable items, recovered from the collected household garbage but also from the 
dumpsites or communal collection centers operated by KCC or formal private companies. 
This finding contradicts results of earlier studies (e.g. Wilson et al., 2009) that income 
generated from sorting and recycling collected materials is more important to the 
informal sector than waste collection servicing.  
While recycling is not a big business in Kampala, recently small scale recycling 
companies have mushroomed and informal sector providers take advantage by 
supplementing their incomes from recyclable materials. This business is not exclusive to 
informal waste providers. Even those who work for the formal sector, especially for 
KCC, have time and opportunities for such additional income generating activities. For 
example, the sale of banana peelings is emerging as a  business also for formal collectors 
in Kampala. The peelings are sold mainly to small scale farmers who keep some cows to 
supplement their incomes by milk sales. Waste paper is mainly sorted to be sold to food 
vendors for charcoal stove lighting. Plastic recycling has picked up and is now a source 
of income for (in)formal collectors in Kampala with many recycling companies springing 
up to recycle plastics. Informal refuse collectors interviewed also were involved in 
“boda-boda” (bicycle taxi) business, brewing alcohol, shoe-shining, running a bar, 
running a kiosk and other casual work activities like compound cleaning and fetching. 
They revealed that they earn with these activities almost the same amount of money as 
with solid waste collection, except for boda-boda business and running a bar which earns 
more (but require investments). 
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4.4.5 Future plans of informal sector collectors 
The dualist theory argues that the informal economy is seen as a labor reservoir and 
training facility in that workers were supposed to first enter the informal sector and then 
enter the formal protected sector after they had improved their skills. This is to some 
extent true with the situation of informal refuse collectors in Kampala city. For example, 
76% of the informal refuse collectors are not sure of what the future holds, inevitably 
considering looking at informal refuse collection as a temporary pre-occupation. Some 
wish to work for established companies or KCC if the pay is right and there is an 
opportunity. Others say they are accumulating money to apply and go for further studies 
and acquire land in the villages for agricultural purposes. Other respondents see the job as 
too tiresome and dangerous at a risk of acquiring diseases like stomach aches, diarrhea, 
malaria during wet season, body cuts and bruises, fever and constant back ache. The 
situation is compounded by lack of protective clothing‟s like gumboots and gloves. On 
the other hand, 36% of the respondents tended to talk about the freedom that their 
occupation gave them and to have settled into the business as a long-term career and 
would want to continue in the business of solid waste collection. They argue that solid 
waste collection is a permanent business with more and more people generating waste 
every day and therefore a sure business opportunity, the experience acquired and having 
established themselves in the business and to some it is the only source of income. Some 
talked of their future plans like forming an association or company with counterparts to 
purchase a truck to ease collection and transport garbage to the dump site and acquire 
more capital to expand as there no other jobs available. However, one principal limitation 
they face is the lack of access to credit services. While they indicated they don‟t need 
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much money to start the business of solid waste collection, when it comes to 
considerations for expanding on the business informal refuse collectors borrow from their 
relatives and friends and some from existing micro finance institutions. Accessing loans 
from banks and micro finance institutions is a very complicated issue for informal refuse 
collectors. The standards set are high and informal refuse collectors cannot easily meet 
the criteria for consideration. These include, but are not limited to: having a business, 
belonging to loan groups, being identified and recommended by local council officials, 
ability of weekly loan repayments, the need of property as security. In any case some are 
semi-illiterate and find it difficult to understand the dynamics related to dealing with 
accessing and managing loans.  We lack data to compare with the situation of formal 
sector as regards to their future plans but we can conclude as far as this point is 
concerned that, there is not so much in support of the dualist theory.  The informal 
collectors are looking elsewhere for other job opportunities and not necessary to work 
with the formal sector providers or formalizing their business.  
 
4.4.6 Links between the formal sector and informal collectors  
The structuralist school of thought believes that the informal and formal sector are linked 
to one another with many informal enterprises, supplying inputs, finished goods or 
services to the formal sector, either through direct transactions or via sub-contracting 
arrangements. Our findings in Kampala indicate that there appears to be some linkages, 
mainly with KCC. For example, over 50% of the informal refuse collectors have some 
form of cooperation and contact  with KCC. Collaboration with KCC takes the form of 
informal refuse collectors pulling funds for fuel to be used on KCC trucks to transport 
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garbage to the dumpsite; KCC enforcement staff helping informal refuse collectors to 
recover their money from “stubborn” customers not willing to pay; and informal sectors 
collectors working with KCC or formal private companies on a part time basis in loading 
garbage on vehicles or transporting waste to the collection centers. Interviews with 
managers of private sector companies revealed that informal refuse collectors are also 
used by private companies, though on a rare basis. One third of the informal sector 
respondents revealed that they have little or no collaboration with formal sector 
providers. This is partly due to the perceived illegality of the informal sector activities by 
formal service providers. In a few instances informal refuse collectors have paid bribes to 
law enforcement officers and policemen for fear of being arrested for dumping in illegal 
sites. Informal refuse collectors are accused of being responsible for littering and illegal 
piles of waste. Informal refuse collectors accuse KCC and formal private companies to 
have taken advantage of their desperate situation because of the high unemployment rates 
to keep the pay at lower levels. Few cases of conflict were noted, especially in cases 
where private sector collectors encroach on the territory of the informal providers, much 
to the annoyance of the latter. The formal providers, especially private firms, also accuse 
informal refuse collectors of charging (too) low fees that make their services less 
competitive. In all, there is not much evidence in support of the structuralist view on the 
informal sector: although they may be collaborative at times, there appears to be little 
structural interdependency between informal and formal collectors. Sub-contracting 
arrangements are non - existent.  
There is, however, a form of structural co-existence between public and informal 
service providers. The formal sector leaves room for the informal sector to serve 
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households in those case where physical collection is difficult for the formal sector or 
where it becomes economically unfeasible.  In addition, the public service of collecting 
waste through collective containers (skips), the access to which cannot be charged, leaves 
room for informal service providers to take garbage from households to those collection 
points. As long as such free public services are provided, the informal service providers 
can make a decent living.  
4.4.7 Legal recognition 
The legalist school of the informal sector implies that formal businesses abide by the 
stipulated rules and regulations and that informal firms resemble their counterparts, the 
only difference being that they are not registered. However, solid waste collection in 
Kampala shows a more complex picture. Similar to the informal waste collectors formal 
operators sometimes work without licenses, but they are allowed to do their business 
including transporting garbage to the dumpsite, according to the report of Ugandan 
government Auditor General (2010). The report further says that KCC has also failed to 
establish a proper mechanism for regulating the operations of private collectors. Most of 
the private collectors have no capacity to adequately collect and transport refuse to the 
landfill, according to the National Environment (Waste Management) Regulations. For 
instance, most vehicles that transport garbage to the disposal site loose waste on their 
way, there are no approved scheduled routes from the collection point to the disposal site, 
and the personnel involved in the collection and transportation of garbage are not 
provided with adequate protective and safety clothing. In Kampala therefore, the 
definition of formal is quite different from what the legalist school suggests. In Kampala, 
formal collectors are defined as those that have in principle legal existence by being 
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registered with a public body (KCC) and that transport waste to the final disposal site in 
Kitezi; informal collectors are those that have no legal existence through registration at 
KCC. The informal collectors take advantage of the lack of seriousness in enforcement of 
laws by KCC and the vagueness of who is legally allowed or not allowed in the business 
of solid waste collection. Clients may not easily distinguish formal and informal 
collectors as both are allowed to operate.   
 From the data and analysis made, there are two expected scenarios. First, if the 
formal private sector (private companies) is encouraged and facilitated, especially with 
the public sector withdrawing from solid waste collection, it is highly likely that the 
informal collectors will be pushed out of business. This observation is in line with the 
WDR (2004). Informal collector are regarded as competitors and private collector will 
demand stronger enforcement. In a push to maximize profits, private collectors will also 
try to employ their own staff to go door-to-door to collect waste, unless coverage targets 
are defined in such a way that they can be met with the services of „small independent 
providers‟. In this way, the private companies may have the incentive to encourage the 
involvement of „small independent providers‟ typically the informal collectors. But if the 
public sector expands providing free services by placing public containers, it is likely that 
the activities of the informal sector will expand too. The public containers enable 
informal collectors to deposit their garbage in environmentally friendly places and ensure 
that they remain competitive vis-a-vis private sector collectors. 
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4.5 Conclusions 
 The informal collectors distinguish themselves from the formal waste collectors 
by providing „first-line‟ services only, taking garbage away from households, but not 
taking this all the way to the dumpsite. As the opportunities for restricting themselves to 
this stage are typically enhanced by KCC that offers (free-access) communal waste 
container services, informal collectors can be seen as structurally linked to the formal 
public sector. Informal providers provide a cheaper, but low-level service, and more often 
than the formal sector collectors they serve poor households. But not to the extent and 
exclusivity claimed by dualist scholars. 
 The fairly large market share of informal collectors can be explained by their 
competitiveness vis-à-vis the formal private sector: their fees are substantially lower than 
private sector fees. The informal providers are competitive because they provide less 
waste storage equipment, have little collection equipment (and thus investments), and do 
not transport waste over long distance. But not because labor costs of informal sector 
collectors are lower. In fact, the informal collectors exploit the lapse in enforcement of 
environmental regulation. Their continued role, next to public service providers, is 
possible because they fill a niche in taking garbage from the households to (legal) 
collection points or illegal dumping places at lower costs and/or in localities that cannot 
be physically served by the formal sector.  
 Recent years have shown a relative withdrawal of the public sector from waste 
collection. This led to an increase of households being served by formal private services. 
From an environmental point of view this is an improvement. Yet, poorer households 
also increasingly become to rely on private waste collection arrangements. If such 
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services are only offered by formal private waste collectors, costs for poor household will 
be unaffordable. The widespread use of informal providers is an affordable alternative for 
poorer household, and  if public provisions are made for the second-stage in waste 
collection, this may even be environmentally sustainable. This combination may prove an 
cost-effective and environmentally sound way to move waste from poorer households to 
decent dumpsites, more effective than by public services alone and cheaper than by 
private services alone.  
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CHAPTER 5: ENVIRONMENTAL LEGACIES OF MAJOR EVENTS. 
SOLID WASTE MANAGMENT AND THE COMMONWEALTH 
HEADS OF GOVERNMENT’S MEETING (CHOGM) IN 
KAMPALA26. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
26
 A version of this paper was published as Katusiimeh M.W & A.P.J Mol, Environmental legacies of 
major events. Solid waste management and the Commonwealth Heads of Government‟s Meeting 
(CHOGM) in Kampala, African Studies Quarterly 12(3) 2011. 
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Abstract 
Important political, cultural or sports events can accelerate improvements in 
environmental policy and performance. This study investigates whether environmental 
improvements – and especially those related to solid waste – materialized during the 
2007 Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting (CHOGM) in Kampala, Uganda, 
and whether these improvements lasted well after that event. A quantitative survey was 
used to investigate the state of solid waste management before, during and after 
CHOGM, measured through the perceptions of urban residents. Interviews and 
documents were used  to interpret survey results. The study concludes that additional 
resources and institutional changes in solid waste management in the line up to CHOGM, 
resulted in considerable improvements. Some of these effects on solid waste management 
lasted to at least one year after hosting the CHOGM event. In addition, CHOGM lifted 
the differences in perceptions of solid waste management between the city centre and 
peripheral divisions.  
 
Key words: Solid Waste Management, CHOGM, Uganda, Major Events,  
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5.1 Introduction 
In November 2007 Kampala hosted the biennial Commonwealth Heads of Government 
meeting (CHOGM). All 53 heads of governments of the Commonwealth nations grouped 
together for one week (23
rd
 November to 30
th
 November 2007), to discuss matters of 
common interest. In preparation of this CHOGM meeting Kampala was upgraded: roads 
were repaired and improved (sometimes at the costs of small shops adjacent to the roads), 
graffiti was removed, buildings were upgraded, and solid waste management was 
improved. The national Uganda government as well as the Kampala City Council (KCC) 
spent significant resources in this urban upgrading. And this is not unlike what other 
large cities hosting similar major events have experienced, whether it were political 
meetings of heads-of-states (such as Earth summits, UN general assembly meetings), 
major sports events (such as Olympic Games, or World cups), or large cultural festivals 
(such as Live Aid concerts, World Expos). But do such urban upgrading and 
improvement efforts have an impact, and if so; does the impact last beyond these events? 
This study investigates whether environmental improvements – and especially those 
related to solid waste – materialized during the 2007 CHOGM meeting in Kampala 
continued, and whether they lasted until at least one year after that event. As with many 
Sub-Saharan African cities (See Owusu, et al., 2010; Baudouin et al., 2010; Kaseva, et 
al., 2005; Karanja, 2005; Awortwi, 2004; Spaargaren, et al., 2005) for a long time 
Kampala has experienced many problems related to solid waste management (Golooba-
Mutebi, 2003; Tukahirwa et al., 2011; Okot-Okumu et al., 2011). These problems are 
related but not limited to lack of access of solid waste services by especially the poor 
communities (Obirih-Opareh et al., 2002; Post et al., 2003; Tukahirwa et al., 2011), 
reluctance to create partnerships with major actors like CBOs and informal enterprises 
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(Baud, et al., 2004; Tukahirwa, et al., 2010; Baudouin, et al., 2010) and disorganized, 
unregulated and not sufficiently supervised SWM operations, resulting into heaps of 
garbage on the streets (Karanja, 2005; Tukahirwa et al., 2010).   It was hoped that 
CHOGM would be more than a temporal improvement of solid waste collection and 
treatment; that the improvements in solid waste management would become 
institutionalized, such that Kampala would not fall back to the old, pre-CHOGM, 
situation. So, the central research question that motivated this study is whether and to 
what extent there are environmental legacies (of at least one year) related to solid waste 
management from hosting the 2007 CHOGM; or in other words: to what extent have 
CHOGM-induced environmental reforms become institutionalized in solid waste 
management in Kampala city?  
After providing an overview of the literature on the major events and their legacies, 
the paper reports on empirical survey research carried out in Kampala on solid waste 
perceptions, investigating temporal and spatial differences of solid waste management 
following the CHOGM event. 
 
5.2 Major events and their environmental legacies 
5.2.1 Mega and major events 
Hallmark or mega-events are short-term events of fixed duration. The British sociologist 
Maurice Roche (1994: 1) has laid out the critical characteristics that define mega-events:  
“Mega-events (....) are short term events with long-term consequences for 
the cities that stage them. They are associated with the creation of 
infrastructure and event facilities often carrying long-term debts and always 
121 
 
requiring long-term use programming. In addition, if successful, they project 
a new (or renewed) and perhaps persistent and positive image and identity 
for the host city through national and international media, particularly TV, 
coverage. This is usually assumed to have long-term consequences in terms 
of tourism, industrial relocation, and inward investments.”  
What defines certain events as „mega‟ is that they are „discontinuous‟, out of the 
ordinary, international and simply big in composition. They have the ability to 
transmit promotional messages to billions of people via television and other 
developments in telecommunications. Mega-events attract large international 
audiences and have an international composition (Horne & Manzenreiter, 2006). 
Defined as events that achieve sufficient size and scope to affect whole economies 
and receive sustained global media attention, „mega-events‟ include the World‟s 
Fairs; the World Cups in soccer, rugby and cricket; the larger regional sports 
gatherings (e.g. European championships, Asian Games, Pan-American Games); 
and the Olympic Games (Gold & Gold, 2008). But mega-events can also have a 
more economic or political character, such as United Nations general assembly 
conferences, Earth Summits, special World Trade Organization meetings and 
other political gatherings where a considerable number of heads of state and 
government gather together and draw large scale media attention. Often, these 
mega events are organized in more wealthy locations, as – once awarded – 
primary responsibility for financing and organizing the event then rests with the 
host. But also the African continent knows its mega-events: the 1995 Rugby 
World Cup, the 2002 Earth Summit in Johannesburg (also known as Rio +10), the 
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2003 Cricket World Cup and the recently held World Soccer Cup 2010, all in 
South Africa. South Africa is the first African nation to host an event of such 
magnitude like the Football World Cup, prompting former South African 
President Thabo Mbeki to pronounce that this was not a South African event but 
an African one (Pillay et al., 2008). South Africa with a GNI per capita of USD 
5,570 (World Bank, 2009) is economically richer than most developing nations 
especially on the African continent and has the capabilities to host such mega 
events. It is often characterized as one of the most developed under the 
developing countries. For example, approximately USD 52 billion was spent on 
preparations to host the soccer World Cup, especially on infrastructure 
development in South Africa. But more often significant events in the African 
region are what we would call major events, rather than mega-events, having a 
less dramatic budget and a less global audience like African football 
championships, African Union (AU) meetings and other important summits. In 
Uganda approximately UGX 300 billion (USD 100 million) (almost the 
equivalent to one tenth of the annual revenue collections in the 2006/2007 fiscal 
year) was spent on CHOGM preparations (Auditor General, 2008). With a GDP 
of $42 billion it is unlikely that Uganda – or any other African nation with a 
similar size of its economy –can host mega events of the magnitude like Soccer 
World Cup, but it can host something major as the CHOGM.  
In December 2003, the Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting in Abuja, 
Nigeria, decided that Uganda would host the 2007 CHOGM. This decision was 
reaffirmed at the 2005 CHOGM in Malta. CHOGM  have been held before on the 
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African continent: in Zambia (1979), in Zimbabwe (1991) in South Africa (1999) and in 
Nigeria (2003). Since 2003, Uganda started preparing a meeting that would bring 53 
heads of government of the Commonwealth of Nations together, to consult, share 
experiences and deliberate on issues of pan-commonwealth and international 
significance. Her Majesty the Queen of England attended, Prince Charles visited and 
participated in a number of civil society events and the CHOGM was preceded by two (2) 
weeks of activities. There was a Business Forum attended by more than 200 young 
people from 45 countries, peoples forum attended by 1500 delegates from 59 countries 
(including non-commonwealth members) and the Foreign Ministers Forum meeting. 
Uganda had not hosted a major international meeting at the magnitude of CHOGM. 
Although considerably smaller in participants, (media) audience, and budget than mega-
events, it shared with mega-events the international character and media coverage, the 
still considerable investments (for Uganda), and the national self-confidence and civic 
pride.   
 
5.2.2 Major events and the environment 
As the range of festivals and major events has grown over the years, their impacts have 
increasingly come under scrutiny. Various evaluations and more in-depth studies have 
found that large scale events have a variety of potential impacts, including economic, 
social, cultural, political, physical and environmental ones (Impacts 08 – Langen & 
Garcia, 2009). The high-profile nature of such events generates the analysis of their 
favorable consequences, such as increases in tourism, economic performance, urban 
infrastructural improvements, or the more intangible benefits of civic pride, 
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“boosterism”, and international image building (e.g. Hall, 1992; Hiller, 1998). There is 
however, growing skepticism over the extent to which hosting events results into 
significant developmental impacts (Pillay et al., 2008; Andranovich et al., 2001; Lenskyj, 
2001). The argument of these skeptics is that while there are some positive legacy 
impacts, it may be intangible and ambiguous (Pillay et al., 2008).  According to Hiller et 
al., 2000: 440, “such events are often seen as no more than public relations ventures far 
removed from the realities of urban problems and challenges.”  
 Once a city has been chosen as the site for a major event, the event begins to take 
on a life of its own. The urgency and goal orientation of the project within tight timelines 
may require that normal procedures be set aside. Sometimes, the urgency overrides the 
traditional participatory planning processes (Pillay et. al, 2009). Concerns over 
(construction) deadlines and external requirements, as well as the desire to maximize 
international impact, means that event preparation and operation become an absolute 
(national) priority. Furthermore, for the sake of a successful event, people are urged to 
pull together and to minimize criticism in the face of need for cooperation. 
Research and analysis on most major events is piecemeal and fragmentary, with a 
strong focus on (i) western, industrialized countries/cities where most major events take 
place; (ii) the favorable economic, infrastructural and tourism effects (e.g. Hiller 1998, 
2000; Teigland, 1999; Moragas et al., 2003; Roche, 2006; Impacts 08 – Langen & 
Garcia, 2009). There is surprisingly little of scholarship on the role of major events in 
developing countries; on the impact of event-related developments on low-income 
communities (e.g. Schimmel, 2006), either in wealthy or developing countries; and on the 
short and longer term environmental consequences and legacies of major events (e.g. 
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Mason & Beaumont-Kerridge, 2004; Hayes and Karamichas, 2006), especially in relation 
to the former two points. 
The environmental legacies of major events and the sustained improvement in the 
quality of life for local/city communities have recently become more popular themes for 
research (Del Corpo, & Dansero, 2007; Close, Askew and Xin, 2007; Collins et al., 2009; 
Raj and Musgrave, 2009; Mol, 2010; Karamichas, 2011; Mol and Zhang, 2011). 
However, the evidence for sustained environmental improvements following major 
events remains limited, anecdotal and restricted to sports events such as the Olympics. 
Constructing positive environmental legacies, instead of only capturing the economic 
rewards, involves the inclusion of event (re)constructions (both physical and institutional) 
into long term sustainable development strategies, as happened with the Sydney and 
Beijing Olympics (Mol, 2010). Key to constructing environmental legacies is the 
institutionalization of environmental upgrading activities and strategies, so that these last 
well beyond the event. For example, it can be hypothesized that city authorities work 
more efficiently and effectively after hosting a major event, that physical infrastructure is 
improved, and that people have increased expectations and demand after having 
experienced how good it is to live in a clean city. But such hypotheses have hardly been 
tested with empirical research, especially not with respect to developing countries and 
non-sporting events. 
 
5.3 Data and methods of investigation 
To investigate whether major political events in developing countries construct positive 
environmental legacies, we analyzed solid waste management improvements during and 
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after the CHOGM in Kampala. Through a quantitative survey urban citizens of Kampala 
were asked on their satisfaction with the way solid waste collection and transportation 
was organized and implemented. Purposive sampling (Kothari, 2005) was used because 
we had to verify that the respondent met the criteria for being in the sample. To be 
selected for the study, a respondent should have stayed in Kampala city and in the same 
place of residence since the beginning of 2006 until one year after CHOGM.  
Respondents were selected from two (out of five) pre-selected Kampala divisions: 
Kawempe division and Kampala Central division. Kampala Central division is the major 
business district, is at the centre of Kampala, has also poor slum areas and was the 
location of most of the CHOGM events. Kawempe division is at some distance from the 
city centre, has a mixed population and was less central as a location for CHOGM events 
(Figure 5.1).  
Data collection took place through a (mostly) structured and self-completion 
questionnaire, using a five-point likert scale for the closed questions. Self-completion 
was meant to make sure that we interviewed the right people who have lived in Kampala 
since 2006 and therefore were knowledgeable about the (changing) state of solid waste 
management in the city over the years. But self-completion of the questionnaire also 
made sure that the respondents understood the questions and that no bias occurred in 
terms of illiteracy or education level.  
Survey interviews were carried out in two rounds. The first round was carried out in 
March 2008 (only four months after CHOGM) and the second round of interviewing was 
carried out in October 2008 (one year after CHOGM). During the first round of 
interviewing (March 2008) questions were asked on the perceived solid waste 
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management situation before CHOGM (early 2006), during CHOGM (November 2007) 
and four months after CHOGM (March 2008). During the second round of interviewing 
(October 2008), respondents were asked how they felt about the solid waste management 
situation in early 2006 (before CHOGM), November 2007 (at CHOGM), March 2008 
(shortly after CHOGM) and October 2008 (one year after CHOGM). A total of 500 
respondents were randomly selected in the first round (March 2008), of which 454 
respondents answered the questionnaire. In the second round (October 2008), 447 
respondents were randomly selected and 410 questionnaires were returned. To ensure 
representativeness, we followed a stratified random sampling strategy, in which random 
sampling of respondents in the parishes selected involved targeting all income groups 
(neighborhoods) and areas near and far away from where the CHOGM event was held. If 
the sampled respondent was not available or not interested or not part of the target group 
(those who had not come to Kampala 2 years before the CHOGM event), we would move 
to the next random sampled respondent in that cluster. Table 1 below depicts descriptive 
statistics of the two surveys. 
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Figure 5.1: Kampala city and its divisions with the location of the CHOGM event (the red 
dot) 
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Table 5.1: Descriptive statistics on solid waste management, two surveys 
Solid waste management variables 1st survey (March 2008) 2nd survey (October 2008) 
Obs** Mean**  S.D** Obs Mean  S.D 
Littering & illegal piles of waste, 2006* 448*** 4.3 0.98 410 4.2 1.06 
Littering & illegal piles of waste, 2007 451 1.4 0.83 410 2.2 0.95 
Littering & illegal piles of waste, 2008 March 450 2.9 1.13 410 3.1 1.02 
Littering & illegal piles of waste, 2008 October - - - 409 3.6 1.348 
Nuisance solid waste transfer points, 2006 448 4.2 1.10 410 3.8 1.14 
Nuisance solid waste transfer points, 2007 451 1.3 0.76 409 2.2 0.92 
Nuisance solid waste transfer points, 2008 March 450 2.7 1.15 409 3.0 1.04 
Nuisance solid waste transfer points, 2008 October - - - 410 3.4 1.26 
Smell of solid waste, 2006  448 4.3 1.13 409 4.1 1.54 
Smell of solid waste, 2007 451 1.4 0.78 409 2.1 1.08 
Smell of solid waste, 2008 March 450 2.8 1.12 406 3.0 1.17 
Smell of solid waste, 2008 October - - - 408 3.5 1.41 
Solid waste collection from households, 2006 447 3.7 1.30 407 3.7 3.42 
Solid waste collection from households, 2007 449 2.0 1.42 406 2.3 1.01 
Solid waste collection from households, 2008 March 448 2.9 1.37 403 2.8 1.22 
Solid waste collection from households, 2008 October - - - 402 3.1 1.22 
Solid waste collection from enterprises, 2006 448 3.9 1.01 405 3.1 1.25 
Solid waste collection from enterprises, 2007 451 2.3 1.65 406 2.0 1.09 
Solid waste collection from enterprises, 2008 March 450 3.0 1.22 405 2.5 1.06 
Solid waste collection from enterprises, 2008 October - - - 406 2.8 1.23 
Street sweeping, 2006 441 3.9 1.53 406 3.3 1.38 
Street sweeping, 2007 445 2.0 1.52 406 2.2 1.30 
Street sweeping, 2008 March 443 3.3 1.59 405 2.7 1.25 
Street sweeping, 2008 October - - - 406 3.0 1.37 
* 2006 = before CHOGM; 2007 = during CHOGM; 2008 March = four months after CHOGM; 2008 October = 1 year after CHOGM** Obs = 
no. of observations/respondents; mean = mean score on a likert scale of 1 to 5; S.D.= standard deviation; *** Some of the questionnaires returned 
had missing values. This explains the decline in the number of observations in both the first and second survey.
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In addition to the survey, monthly data were collected of recorded solid waste mass brought to 
the central Mpererwe Sanitary Landfill during 2006 – 2008 and also for 2009 and early 2010. 
Formal and informal in-depth face-to-face interviews were held with a number of KCC officials 
(5), division officials (10) and licensed service providers (15). Other techniques of data collection 
included document review, especially official letters, policy documents, and correspondences. 
This material was later used to interpret survey results. 
The data analysis centered around the assessment of the (temporal/semi-permanent) effects 
of CHOGM on solid waste management, measured through the perceptions of urban residents. In 
addition, geographical differences were analyzed between the Central division and Kawempe 
division, in relation to the distance from the CHOGM event. The data were analyzed using 
percentages and non-parametric tests: Wilcoxon signed rank test and Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney 
test. Wilcoxon signed-rank test (one sample median test) allowed us to test whether a sample 
median differs significantly from a hypothesized value. Specifically, the test was used to 
determine whether there is a significant difference in median in littering and illegal piles of solid 
waste, nuisance from solid waste transfer points, smell of solid waste, solid waste collection from 
enterprises and sweet sweeping before CHOGM, during CHOGM and after CHOGM.  
Before moving to the results, first, we report on a test whether results are affected by recall 
bias or by time differences between the 1
st
 and 2
nd
 survey. We checked whether the respondents 
of the first survey (organized in March 2008) value the quality of the environment four months 
after CHOGM the same as the respondents of the second survey (organized in October 2008) 
value the quality of the environment four month after CHOGM. For this the Wilcoxon signed 
rank test was used. The low Z values and p-values > 0.05 in Table 5.2 show that the first survey 
respondents value the solid waste management situation four month after CHOGM not 
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statistically different from how the second survey respondents value the solid waste management 
situation four month after CHOGM. This implies that questionnaire results have not been not 
affected by a recall bias or by time differences.  
 
Table 5.2: Recall bias between first and second survey for solid waste management four months 
after CHOGM, using Wilcoxon signed rank test 
 Z-value P-value 
Littering & illegal piles of waste 0.059 0.953 
Nuisance from solid waste transfer points -0.234 0.815 
Smell of solid waste -0.228 0.820 
Solid waste collection from households 0.053 0.958 
Solid waste collection from enterprises -0.084 0.933 
Street sweeping 0.645 0.519 
 
Second, since the respondents of the first survey value the quality of the environment the same as 
the respondents in the second survey, we analyzed them together. Both Kawempe and Central 
divisions are put together. In other words we pool across locations and across surveys. 
 
5.4 CHOGM and its effects on solid waste management 
5.4.1 Solid waste management before CHOGM 
For long, Kampala experienced many problems of solid waste management (KCC, 2006). For 
example, Kampala failed to have regular city-wide collection of waste, resulting in accumulation 
of solid waste in drainage channels and along roads in especially poor neighborhoods. Irregular 
collection was also caused by irregular payment for the collection of solid waste by citizens. Lack 
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of capacity of the Kampala City Council (KCC) and private contractors increased the amount of 
small scale informal solid waste service providers. Unfortunately, these many small players were 
not registered, supervised or regulated by authorities, resulting in confusion, animosity and 
differentiated charges. Disorganized, unregulated and not sufficiently supervised solid waste 
collection and transportation by (private) solid waste collectors lead also to illegal dumping 
(Tukahirwa et al., 2010).  
Solid waste transportation trucks were not covered as they ferried solid waste through the 
city. Light solid waste was often blown by winds and spread along the way while 
inconveniencing other road users or, in extreme cases, causing road accidents. Mesh nets when 
used, were often burnt by fire in the solid waste. KCC and private contractors used old vehicles, 
and a lot of money was spent on repair and maintenance of this fleet. 
Though Kampala City Council (KCC) has contracted solid waste collection and treatment 
to private firms since the late 1990s, KCC still is in business of collecting and transporting part of 
the city garbage to the disposal site. As a result, private contractors are de-motivated as there is 
hidden – and sometimes unequal – competition between the private contractors and the public 
sector. KCC‟s main formal tasks are to supervise, contract out, enforce the law and sensitize the 
population on solid waste. But there were no instituted monitoring and evaluation mechanisms 
for the performance of the new privatized solid waste management system.  
It is against this background of relatively poor solid waste management that CHOGM was 
held in Kampala city in 2007, and improvements were made to upgrade the solid waste 
management infrastructure. 
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5.4.2 Preparing for CHOGM 
As a host country, Uganda Government was mandated to put in place facilities that meet 
requirements of the commonwealth Secretariat which were in accordance with the specifications 
contained in the Guidelines and the budget on the organization of CHOGM. To fulfill that 
objective, the government of Uganda through the Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic 
Development provided around UGX 300 billion (USD 100 million) for hosting CHOGM 
(Auditor General, 2008). The Ministry of Local Government was assigned the responsibility of 
the beautification of the Kampala-Entebbe road corridor. The responsibility was aimed at 
improving the road corridor reserve and the general ambience of Kampala city and Entebbe 
municipality. Effective interventions started in June 2007 with various interventions. The total 
amount of money that was allocated and released to the Ministry of Local Government to cater 
for the beautification of Kampala amounted to UGX 6,327,568,145 (approximately USD 3 
million). Part of this included extra funds for – among others – upgrading waste management 
services. Other activities in line with beautification of Kampala included among others: installing 
security lights, repair of roads and pedestrian walkways, working on pavements and drainages, 
beautification of parks and open spaces, landscaping and greening of the road reserves, removal 
of kiosks, planting trees and grass, removal of signage and unsightly structures. As already 
highlighted, SWM was a key component on the beautification of Kampala. In fact KCC received 
budget support from the National CHOGM Preparatory Fund through the Ministry of Local 
Government for solid waste management. Contracts worth Uganda shillings 193,964,521 
(approximately USD 100.000) were made with four garages for the repair of refuse trucks in an 
attempt to boost the garbage collection exercise ahead of the CHOGM meeting (Auditor General, 
2008). These additional funds were related, but not limited, to: refuse collection from generation 
and storage points and transportation to the disposal site; implementation of acceptable standards; 
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provision and maintenance of personnel, vehicles, containers and other equipment for solid waste 
management service; design and implementation of a billing and revenue collection system (for 
all categories of clients); ensuring adequate cost recovery and sustainability of the service; 
publicity, sensitization and marketing of the service; and assistance in enforcement and 
compliance with the solid waste ordinance. The city‟s five (5) divisions also received UGX 
6,000,000 (approximately USD 3000) per month from June 2007 to December 2007 (Office of 
the Auditor General,2008). In total about UGX 400 million (USD 200,000) was spent on SWM 
related services for the CHOGM preparations. This amount was in addition to the KCC annual 
budget for SWM of around UGX 1.4 billion (USD 600,000) (KCC, 2006). Before CHOGM, 
neither KCC nor the central government released any money to the districts for solid waste 
management. KCC (the employer) on behalf of the five Kampala divisions also initiated sealed 
bids from eligible bidders for the execution of solid waste management services around 
CHOGM. For these so-called CHOGM contracts, the bidding document was prepared, based on 
the government of Uganda‟s Public Procurement and Disposal of Public Assets Act, 2003. The 
method of procurement was by National Competitive Bidding (NCB). Invitation for bids was 
open to eligible bidders, from eligible countries. An invitation for bids was advertised in the main 
national newspapers. According to the Public procurement and Disposal Compliance Check 
Report (KCC, 2007), the Ministry of Local Government and the Ministry of Works and Transport 
handled CHOGM procurements in the areas of beautification, roads, drainage, street lighting and 
toilets, of which solid waste management was a key component. KCC took part in the evaluation 
process of the solid waste tenders. The companies contracted to manage solid waste collection 
and transportation in the two investigated divisions were: Nabugabo, TERP Group and ESCOM 
joint venture in Kampala Central division, and Hilltop Enterprises and NOREMA in Kawempe 
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division. The providers were directly paid by the Ministry of Local Government for these 
CHOGM contracts, which ran from June 2007 to November 2007.  
As already noted above, as part of the beautification of Kampala, KCC advanced extra 
funds for fuel and the Ministry of Local Government for repairing of KCC trucks. Fuel, a key 
ingredient in solid waste management, was sufficiently available during CHOGM to transport 
garbage to the dump site, while it was often not sufficiently available before CHOGM. After 
CHOGM, the amount of fuel allocated to KCC refuse trucks again became scarce. On average 
990 liters of diesel was monthly allocated for KCC refuse trucks after CHOGM, compared to 
approximately 4500 liters which was claimed KCC needed, resulting in underutilization of both 
the trucks and workers.  
Efforts were made to involve as many public and private stakeholders as possible in solid 
waste management around CHOGM. The central and local government worked together 
harmoniously, unlike before CHOGM. In addition, community-based organizations (CBOs), non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) and other private sector organizations were actively 
involved. A formal contract was negotiated between the Ministry of Local Government and the 
private sector, through KCC. Several meetings with private sector stakeholders resulted in the 
formation of the Kampala Solid Waste Management Association, whose objectives were to 
cooperate with government to improve solid waste management practices like carrying out 
sensitization and publicity with respect to keeping Kampala clean. 
 
5.4.3 Perceptions of solid waste management practices and environmental effects 
The questionnaire that was administered addressed solid waste management practices and 
environmental effects before, during and after CHOGM. Six indicators were used, measured by 
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the perceptions of residents: littering and illegal piles of solid waste, nuisance of solid waste 
transfer points, smell of solid waste, solid waste collection from households, solid waste 
collection from enterprises, and sweet sweeping.  
In Table 5.3 A below the perceptions of all respondents in the two Kampala divisions are 
compared between before and during CHOGM on six solid waste items, using Wilcoxon signed 
rank test. The results in Table 5.3 A indicate that the median value of the six variables for the 
period before CHOGM are statistically significantly (P<0.001) different from those during 
CHOGM. Z is a measure of the magnitude of the effect; the larger Z the larger the difference of 
the values between „before‟ and „during‟ CHOGM. Hence, on all variables solid waste 
management during CHOGM was better than solid waste management before CHOGM, 
according to the respondents.  
 We also compared perceptions of solid waste management during CHOGM with solid 
waste management four months after CHOGM. Table 5.3 B below indicates that the median 
value of all six variables during CHOGM are statistically significantly (p<0.001) different from 
those after CHOGM. This means that there was significantly better solid waste collection and 
less related environmental nuisance during CHOGM, compared to solid waste collection and 
solid waste nuisance four months after CHOGM. The considerable amount of money and 
resources advanced to KCC for the cleanup of Kampala, referred to as the “rescue garbage 
collection operation”, did give positive solid waste management and environmental effects during 
CHOGM.  
To analyze solid waste management legacies of CHOGM we compared the solid waste 
management situation before CHOGM with the solid waste management situation after CHOGM. 
Without any lasting environmental legacy the situation before and after CHOGM would be 
similar in terms of perceived solid waste management. The results in Table 5.3 C indicate that the 
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median value for the six solid waste variables for before and four month after CHOGM are 
statistically (p<0.001) different. In other words, the state of solid waste management before and 
four months after CHOGM is statistically different, with better functioning solid waste 
management and less environmental effects four months after CHOGM than before. This first 
indication of a solid waste management legacy of the 2007 CHOGM major event is further 
strengthened by taking a larger time span of one year for investigating post-CHOGM effects 
(Table 5.3 D). The median values of the six solid waste management variables for the period 
before CHOGM are statistically significantly (p<0.001) different from those one year after 
CHOGM. This implies that one year after CHOGM solid waste management was still 
significantly better than before CHOGM.  Or to put it differently: solid waste management 
improvements achieved during (and because of) CHOGM did become institutionalized to some 
extent and lasted well beyond this major event. 
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Table 5.3: Results of Wilcoxon signed rank test for before CHOGM, during CHOGM and after CHOGM 
 A B C D 
Variables  Results of Wilcoxon signed rank test for 
before CHOGM and during CHOGM (1st and 
2nd survey) 
Results of Wilcoxon signed rank test for 
during CHOGM and four months after 
CHOGM (1st and 2nd survey) 
Results of Wilcoxon signed rank test 
comparing before CHOGM with Four 
month after CHOGM (1st and 2nd survey) 
Results of Wilcoxon signed rank test 
comparing before CHOGM with one 
year after CHOGM (2nd survey) 
 N Z N Z N Z N Z 
Littering and illegal piles of waste  858 25.264*** 860 -22.596*** 857 22.198*** 409 7.899*** 
Nuisance from solid waste transfer 
points  
857 24.740*** 858 -21.610*** 856 22.472*** 410 5.377*** 
Smell of solid waste before 
privatization 
857 24.894*** 856 -22.042*** 853 21.622*** 408 6.849*** 
Solid waste collection from 
households 
852 18.729*** 850 -13.039*** 848 15.627*** 447 6.006*** 
Solid waste collection from 
enterprises 
851 17.202*** 855 -12.274*** 851 14.536*** 402 4.102*** 
Quality of street sweeping 847 16.616*** 848 -12.753*** 844 13.283*** 406 4.305*** 
 
*** All the Z – values were significant at 5% level of significance 
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5.4.4 Assessment of environmental legacy institutionalization 
Is this environmental legacy fully institutionalized and thus constant over time? In order to 
measure whether the positive CHOGM effect wears down or stays constant over time the Z 
values (a measure of the magnitude of the effect) of „before CHOGM – four month after 
CHOGM‟ need to be compared with the Z values of „before CHOGM – one year after CHOGM‟. 
Table 4 shows that the Z values „before CHOGM – one year after CHOGM‟ are lower than those 
of „before CHOGM – four month after CHOGM‟. Since the Z values here represent the degree of 
disparity between before and after CHOGM it can be concluded that solid waste management 
practices four month after CHOGM were better than those one year after CHOGM. The fact that 
over time Z values are declining for all variables implies some erosion of the CHOGM-effect. 
Obviously, CHOGM-induced improvements have not been fully institutionalized in solid waste 
management. However, still, one year after CHOGM, solid waste management was still 
significantly better than before CHOGM. These findings are consistent with collected solid waste 
data recorded at the Mpererwe Sanitary Landfill. During January – October 2006 the average 
monthly amount of solid waste brought to the landfill was 13,817 tonnes. In the 10 months 
directly preceding CHOGM (January – October 2007) this average monthly amount increased to 
18,961 tonnes of solid waste, to decrease to an average monthly amount of 16,685 tonnes of solid 
waste for the months January – October 2008 (after CHOGM). The amount of solid waste 
recorded at the Mpererwe Sanitary Landfill increased slightly  to an average monthly 17,113 for 
the months November 2008 – September 2009. It increased further to an average monthly 19,154 
for the months of October 2009 – March 2010. 
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Table 5.4: Comparing the Z values from the Wilcoxon signed rank test „for before – four months 
after CHOGM‟ and „before CHOGM – one year after CHOGM‟ (N=410, 2nd survey) 
 Z-values* (2nd survey) 
Before and four months after 
CHOGM 
Before and one year after 
CHOGM 
Littering & illegal piles of waste 14.059 7.899 
Nuisance from solid waste transfer points 12.370 5.377 
Smell of solid waste 12.679 6.849 
Solid waste collection from households 9.868 6.006 
Solid waste collection from enterprises 8.255 4.102 
Street sweeping 9.974 4.305 
 * all the z-values were significant at 5% level of significance 
 
How to explain this environmental legacy of CHOGM and the watering down of that 
legacy? In our in-depth interviews we came across three reasons that contribute to an explanation 
for this legacy. First, the office of the solid waste engineer was institutionalized in all divisions in 
Kampala to handle the day to day business of solid waste collection. Before CHOGM, solid 
waste management was handled by health inspectors at the division level and even then, the posts 
were vacant in most of KCC divisions. The medical department did not give solid waste 
management much priority due to the urgent and highly demanding health care responsibilities of 
the divisions (KCC, 2002). The fact that separate solid waste management offices were created 
formed a good start for institutionalizing solid waste management at the division level, while it 
was formerly only articulated as such at the city level by KCC. Division solid waste management 
engineers, for example, began to streamline activities to ensure that CHOGM standards were 
maintained. The fact that some divisions are copying best practices learnt from CHOGM, such as 
transparent procurement processes and zoning of divisions, is related to the establishment of the 
division solid waste management offices. But there is also constant (political) opposition. A case 
in point is Kawempe division, where a solid waste management committee was established to 
manage private contractors around and after CHOGM. This effort was frustrated by politicians 
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engaged with the NOREMA and Hilltop private companies, which both had signed a 
memorandum of understanding with Kawempe division to collect and transport waste without 
any competition from other service providers.  
Second, relations between KCC and the five divisions have been improving. The evidence 
here is that KCC supplements the divisions‟ finances to improve the collection and transportation 
of garbage, a process that started with CHOGM. After CHOGM, KCC disbursed a sum of 7 – 12 
million Uganda shillings (USD 4000 – 6500) per month to the four divisions (except the central 
division which is perceived to be richer in resources by KCC) for solid waste collection and 
transportation. Although, money transfer is sometimes delayed, with substantial consequences for 
solid waste management, this delegation of solid waste management resources and authority to 
the division works better than the centralized process before CHOGM. 
Third, the new equipment and vehicles acquired especially by the private sector contractors 
in the months leading to CHOGM (in anticipation of money from the National CHOGM 
Preparatory Fund) enlarged their capacity and improved service, also in areas further away from 
the city. Compactor trucks, though allegedly disadvantageous, were purchased by NOREMA and 
Nabugabo Updeal Joint Venture for serving Kawempe division and were still in operation one 
year after CHOGM. Residents have also noted an improvement in the way garbage is transported 
to the dump site. KCC vehicles that were not functioning before CHOGM were repaired and this 
boosted the garbage collection exercise after CHOGM. These material improvements, caused by 
additional CHOGM budgets, contributed to positive environmental legacies well after CHOGM. 
But there were also institutional discontinuities after CHOGM. For instance, the Kampala 
Solid Waste Management Association, formed just before CHOGM (see above), became inactive 
four month after CHOGM and never met to put into practice what they had agreed to achieve, 
according to members of the association. Public and private sector sensitization and publicity 
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with respect to keeping Kampala clean subsided a bit. And most importantly, the central 
government provided lower attention and resources to solid waste management after CHOGM. 
KCC and her divisions has taken full responsibility of solid waste management again with little 
central government support, quite comparable to the situation before CHOGM. Most of the so-
called CHOGM-contracts with private waste collectors were not continued under the same 
(favorable) conditions after CHOGM. 
 
5.4.4.1 Geographical differentiation of environmental legacies 
As earlier mentioned, the two divisions of Kampala were selected especially due to the 
geographical differences between the two vis-à-vis the CHOGM location. To examine whether 
CHOGM impacts on solid waste management in the Central division differed significantly from 
those in Kawempe division, the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test was used. The results (Table5.5 A 
below) show that differences between people‟s perception of solid waste management between 
Central division and Kawempe division are only statistically significant before CHOGM.  Only 
for one variable (smell of solid waste) a difference can be noted during CHOGM and one year 
after CHOGM (p< 0.05). This means that significant differences in the status of solid waste 
management between Central division and Kawempe division existed before CHOGM. But 
during and up until one year after CHOGM overall significant differences between the two 
divisions are not observable. This implies that CHOGM had a leveling effect between the two 
divisions. While originally the differences were big, CHOGM leveled that difference. 
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5.4.4.2 Impact on geographical distance with respect to CHOGM location 
To determine the impact of geographical distance with respect to CHOGM, divisions are not a 
very precise categorization. There are areas in Kampala Central that are far away from the city 
centre (and from the CHOGM events), and there are areas in Kawempe division, such as 
Makerere University and Wandegeya, that are near the place where CHOGM enrolled. In order to 
determine more precisely the effect of distance to CHOGM, the respondents of both divisions 
were re-categorized in those living close to where CHOGM events took place, and those living 
far away from CHOGM events. Again, a Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test was used to compare 
both categories of respondents. The results in Table 5.5 B below show that for before CHOGM, 
during CHOGM as well as one year after CHOGM there are statistically significant differences 
(p<0.05) between people‟s perception of solid waste management between areas close to the 
CHOGM event location and areas far away from the CHOGM location. This means that solid 
waste management differs between areas close to CHOGM and areas far away from CHOGM. 
However, some striking differences are observed between the three points in time. For example, 
the Z values before CHOGM are higher than those during CHOGM in all the six variables of 
waste management. This implies that before CHOGM, there was a large disparity between areas 
close to CHOGM and areas far away from CHOGM as far as solid waste management is 
concerned. This disparity substantially diminished during CHOGM. However, one year after 
CHOGM the disparity is gaining momentum again depicted by the increasing Z-values for all 
solid waste management variables (except solid waste collection from enterprises).  It can also be 
noted that in some aspects of solid waste management, the disparity has increased to levels higher 
than it was before CHOGM (e.g. street sweeping). Overall if we compare parishes close to 
CHOGM with those located far away from CHOGM, the leveling effect of CHOGM seems to 
fade away one year after CHOGM.  According to KCC officials this might be explained by the 
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fact that – under growing scarcity of government funding – private companies concentrate on 
areas that are densely populated and rich (those closer to the CHOGM areas). The richer parishes 
pay more and contractors enjoy economies of scale in densely populated areas, as compared to 
areas far away from the CHOGM location, which have scattered homesteads.  
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Table 5.5: Results of the Two-sample Wilcoxon rank sum test depicting the differences in solid waste management between Central 
division and Kawempe division around CHOGM & also between areas close to and areas far away from CHOGM 
 A B 
Variables  Two-sample Wilcoxon rank sum test depicting the differences in 
solid waste management between Central division and Kawempe 
division around CHOGM 
Two-sample Wilcoxon rank sum test depicting the differences in solid waste 
management between areas close to and areas far away from CHOGM 
 Before CHOGM During 
CHOGM 
One year after  
CHOGM 
 Before CHOGM during CHOGM One year after 
CHOGM 
 
Littering and illegal piles of waste  4.031 
(0.000) 
1.499 
(0.134) 
1.556 
(0.120) 
9.488 
(0.000) 
2.206 
(0.027) 
4.400 
(0.000) 
 
Nuisance from solid waste transfer points  5.113 
(0.000) 
0.468 
(0.640) 
1.215 
(0.224) 
10.011 
(0.000) 
1.712 
(0.087) 
7.852 
(0.000) 
 
Smell of solid waste before privatization 3.665 
(0.000) 
3.665 
(0.000) 
2.350 
(0.019) 
8.951 
(0.000) 
2.248 
(0.025) 
4.841 
(0.000) 
 
Solid waste collection from households 5.168 
(0.000) 
-0.261 
(0.794) 
2.405 
(0.016) 
11.510 
(0.000) 
1.709 
(0.000) 
12.624 
(0.000) 
 
Solid waste collection from enterprises 2.742 
(0.006) 
-0.560 
(0.576) 
0.349 
(0.727) 
9.779 
(0.000) 
8.325 
(0.000) 
3.438 
(0.000) 
 
Quality of street sweeping 3.849 
(0.000) 
-1.432 
(0.152) 
1.527 
(0.127) 
10.910 
(0.000) 
7.839 
(0.000) 
13.446 
(0.000) 
 
A - (Z values; p values between brackets; 2
nd
 survey, N=410); B - (Z values; p values between brackets; 2
nd
  survey, N=410) 
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It can be concluded that CHOGM, as a major event, had a leveling effect between 
Kawempe division and the Central division of Kampala, which lasted for at least a year. The 
leveling effect of CHOGM lasted shorter between areas nearby and areas far away from the 
CHOGM locations. This suggests that innovations of CHOGM or new standards to some 
extent spread across Kampala city. This might be explained by the sensitization campaigns 
through various media during CHOGM. Poorer areas seemed to have learnt how to better 
manage their garbage, even when KCC and the private collectors do not reach them. From 
interviews conducted and through observations, it was revealed that most people living in 
areas far away from the CHOGM locations have learnt to burn the garbage and some have 
now their own 'incinerators'. In places like Katanga in Kawempe division, near Makerere 
University, the community started to become self-organized in cleaning the area and it 
appears to be working well. This community initiative started immediately after CHOGM and 
remained very popular according to interviews with the local and opinion leaders in the area. 
It is also worth noting that the new equipment of private collectors enabled them to reach 
areas that were formerly poorly or not served and that transportation capacity was still large 
one year after CHOGM. For example private contractors, notably NOREMA and Nabugabo 
Updeal Joint venture, acquired compactors trucks that are able to load more garbage than the 
tipper trucks that they were previously using.  
 
5.5 Conclusions 
Although CHOGM was not a mega-event (in terms of massive infrastructure construction, 
masses of people attending, and intense global media coverage), for Uganda and Kampala it 
was a major event with international visibility. Hence, significant efforts were made by the 
Uganda and Kampala authorities to invest in the city in the road towards CHOGM 2007. 
Solid waste management was one of the main areas that received additional resources and 
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faced institutional changes. This resulted in considerable improvements in solid waste 
management practices and effects during CHOGM, as could be expected. But there are still 
clear positive solid waste management legacies one year after hosting a major event like 
CHOGM, related to among others new institutional arrangements and material improvements.  
As solid waste management often differs throughout metropolitan cities in developing 
countries and major events are not equally spread over these cities one can expect that 
environmental legacies are unequally distributed over the city. Following CHOGM, we found 
that there are no longer significant different perceptions in solid waste management between 
Central and Kawempe divisions. Central division and Kawempe division are perceived as 
equally clean (or equally dirty), suggesting that solid waste management innovations are 
gradually spreading across divisions. In a more fine-tuned comparison between citizens living 
close to places where the CHOGM events took place and locations more peripheral to 
CHOGM, the distinction in solid waste management started to fade somewhat during 
CHOGM, but there are signs of a reemerging distinction, indicating the erosion of leveling 
effects.  
However, this does not dispute the fact that, one year after CHOGM, solid waste 
management was perceived to be still significantly better than before CHOGM. Hosting cities 
– also those in developing countries – can secure positive future environmental effects of 
major events, at least up until one year after the event concludes. What happens after one year 
is up for further study. One could speculate that at least some of the institutional innovations 
that were installed through CHOGM will continue to contribute to positive environmental 
legacies. But compared to mega-events such as the 2010 soccer World Cup, major events as 
CHOGM lack major infrastructural works and a truly global audience, limiting its 
environmental legacies in the further future. 
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CHAPTER 6: DISCUSSIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
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6.1 Introduction 
This study has been conducted in the context of the PROVIDE programme that addresses the 
need for sustainable and accessible infrastructures for sanitation and solid wastes in East 
Africa. In line with the PROVIDE division of tasks, this thesis investigates public and private 
provisioning of solid waste management in Kampala. 
 As already noted in the introduction to this thesis, a growing number of cities in Africa 
face the challenge to provide their populations with water supply, sanitation and solid waste 
services. Improving urban environmental infrastructure is therefore high on the development 
agenda. Uganda is among the countries that have focused on improving urban environmental 
infrastructure in an attempt to realize the millennium development goals (MDGs). Solid waste 
management (the focus of this study) has undergone major changes since the late 1990s in 
Kampala, as part of an attempt to modernize urban environmental infrastructure to improve 
on the quality of life of urban residents. Before the changes, Kampala enjoyed the urban 
administration‟s monopolistic statutory requirement of collection, storage and disposal of 
waste. But faced with a growing population in the city coupled with inadequate resources, 
KCC could no longer manage the growing volume of waste produced. A case in point was the 
inadequate supply of communal containers (skips) and trucks, that led to accumulation and 
overflowing of garbage as well as emergence of illegal dumping sites.  
 Realizing the daunting challenge of keeping the city free of accumulating and rotting 
garbage, KCC embarked on a policy reform that led to the enactment of the solid waste 
management ordinance (2000) which ushered in formal private involvement in collection and 
transportation of wastes to the landfill. But even with privatization of solid waste 
management, the public sector has remained in the business of collecting garbage and 
sometimes released big sums of money in the name of beautification of Kampala, when major 
events took place in the city. Together, these initiatives and dynamics in SWM justify the 
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relevance of this thesis. The performance of these reform strategies and interventions and of 
the various actors in addressing the challenge of solid waste management in Kampala is worth 
to be examined. More specifically, the study addressed the following four research questions:  
 How do the operations and performance of the public sector in the provision of solid 
waste collection in Kampala compare to those of the private sector?  
 What is the impact of the removal of solid waste communal containers (skips) in 
Kampala on households and on private sector provision of services?  
 How does the informal sector co-exist with the formal (public and private) sector in 
solid waste collection in Kampala?  
 What are the environmental legacies of Kampala hosting CHOGM in relation to solid 
waste management? 
  The organization of SWM revolves around the achievement of efficiency and 
effectiveness. The major reason why private sector participation was introduced in SWM was 
to improve its efficiency and effectiveness. Several scholars in the field of urban governance 
have consequently studied SWM in view of ascertaining whether the involvement of the 
private sector would indeed lead to increased efficiency (e.g. Ndadiko, 2010) with the results 
indicating that private involvement in local service delivery may not imply the attainment of 
superior levels of efficiency. Others, such as Baud et al., (2004), have broadened the scope of 
service effectiveness analysis by including issues like equality, coverage, affordability and 
environmental concerns. Or they have explored and found out the role of different actors in 
SWM and how they relate to each other (Karanja, 2005; Tukahirwa, 2011). Or have 
questioned the sustainability of private sector in SWM (Kassim, 2006), assessed the 
institutional arrangements in urban centres (Majale, 2011) or have opened up the black box at 
household level and found out the role of households in SWM (Oberlin, 2011). The 
framework in this thesis  centred around examining the effectiveness of solid waste 
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management as measured through service quality and customer satisfaction, which has not 
been researched in any detail in previous studies.  
 This thesis contributes in four ways to the international literature and knowledge on 
solid waste management in developing countries. First, survey data showing – for various 
types of household – the roles that services of public and private providers, including informal 
providers play, the exact services they provide and the fees charged, are provided.  Second, a 
choice based approach to explaining household decisions as to the type of provider, with an 
application to evaluating the collection technologies that characterize public and private 
collection systems is introduced and quantified in this study. Third, the study contributes to a 
theory on the dynamics of coexisting public and private collection systems, including the 
informal providers. Specifically, new evidence has been generated through this study on how 
to understand the informal sector in solid waste collection by analysing the reasons for the 
existence of informal collectors in solid waste collection and how they co-exist with the 
formal sector. Lastly, data showing how SWC services have changed over time, and in 
particular how they responded to a major event like CHOGM are provided. In the process, the 
study adds to the emerging academic discipline of mega events and their legacies, by 
presenting evidence of the environmental (in particular solid waste management) legacies of 
Kampala when hosting CHOGM.   
 In the remainder of the chapter, the main findings and policy conclusions are 
discussed. In section 6.2 we summarize and discuss the answers to the above research 
questions in the context of solid waste management literature. Section 6.3 discusses the policy 
implications and governance relevance of the findings. In section 6.4 some of the limitations 
of the study are presented and areas for further study are identified.  
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6.2 Synthesis of the main study findings 
 A major discussion in the literature on urban services is related to the effectiveness of 
public versus private provisioning of these service. This discussion extends also to the field of 
solid waste collection. Among the key difficulties in measuring effectiveness in solid waste 
collection in developing countries is the lack of data on waste being collected, households 
being served, fees being charged and environmental effects being imposed. One of the main 
strategies followed in this study to deal with this lack of official waste handling data, was to 
measure household satisfaction through questionnaires. Household data on satisfaction with 
solid waste services, as obtained in this study, suggest that the private sector is more effective 
than the public sector in solid waste collection. Private sector companies provide services like 
container provision and they work according to timely and fixed collection time tables.  Often 
such findings of better performance of private sector in service provisioning is attributed to 
competition, which encourages service providers to adopt customer friendly strategies that are 
also cost effective. These findings are in agreement with the WDR (2004) assertion that the 
strength of the private sector lies in its customer responsiveness and innovativeness. Contrary 
to popular perception, this study found that fees charged by private companies are moderate. 
In addition, public sector clients in Kampala are charged fees even when the service is 
supposed to be free, pointing to corrupt dealings and lack of transparency in solid waste 
governance. Generally all clients of the private and public sector solid waste collection 
services indicate that the situation of SWM has improved after the involvement of the private 
sector. This finding is similar to other studies carried out immediately after the private sector 
became involved in SWM (See Goloba-Mutebi, 2002; Kassim, 2006). However, there is still 
concern about the situation of SWM, as evidenced by illegal dumping of waste and lack of 
seriousness on the part of the local authority to enforce laws and regulate the SWM sector. 
This is similar to the observations by Oduro-Kwateng (2011) that weak regulatory practices 
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affect the performance of SWM.  In conclusion, the findings of this study on the comparison 
of the operations and effectiveness of public and private sector provision of SWM services 
generates the much needed data to inform future interventions in SWM practices for Kampala 
and other cities with similar conditions. It suggests a formal public-private partnership where 
the public and private sector can work together, with the public sector dominating poor and 
marginalized areas and the private sector dominating the richer ones.  
 One of the measures in the privatization of solid waste management in Kampala was 
the removal of communal containers (skips), which played a major role in solid waste 
collection practices before privatization. The skips were important not only to households and 
formal public waste collection providers but also to informal collectors. This study assessed 
the impact of the removal of solid waste communal containers (skips) on households 
perceptions and on the performance of private providers of solid waste management services 
in Kampala. The removal of skips resulted in an increased use of commercial services in solid 
waste collection, mainly performed by the private sector. The respondents in the surveys 
indicated a strong association of skips with lack of cleanliness, similar to findings of other 
studies (Agunwamba, 1998; Achankeng, 2004; Oberlin, 2011). The lack of satisfaction with 
the skip system (and appreciation of the current system) was most notably recorded in high-
income areas. In contrast, in poor areas the skips were appreciated, despite concern about the 
unreliable collection schedules of skips by KCC. Our findings indicate that informal waste 
collectors collect waste from households to transport it to the transfer stations. These informal 
waste collectors are therefore involved at the very first point of collection of waste from 
households. This resembles findings of other studies (for example Oberlin, 2011) that show 
that when skips are present many households pay people (informal workers) to take their 
waste to collective collection points, including these skips. The advent of the (formal) private 
sector and the removal of the skips by KCC to facilitate private sector development in solid 
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waste management led to a decrease in the demand for informal services. The evaluation by 
households of the waste disposal services before and after the removal of skips shows that 
richer households are clearly pleased with the removal, but that poorer households, 
particularly those with low levels of education, do not feel better served than they were 
before. Perhaps that is why poor households feel the skips should return (c.f. Oberlin, 2011). 
The return of the skip might prevent these households and informal collectors from resorting 
to other, less sustainable and less healthy methods of getting rid of their wastes (illegal 
dumping). By the same token, the return of the skip might jeopardize the development of 
private solid waste collection, which seems to have contributed to higher levels of satisfaction 
with solid waste collection services, especially in richer areas. Any return of skips need to 
take these contrasting piece of evidence into account, for instance by including geographical 
specificities in a return of the skip (e.g. only in some areas, and not city-wide). The findings 
of this study acknowledge the differences between low income neighbourhoods and high 
income neighbourhoods and therefore the need to devise different strategies to enable all areas 
to be served properly.  
 The informal sector did play a role in solid waste collection arrangements where skips 
prevail. But as the informal sector has a much wider reach in solid waste collection, this study 
paid ample attention to the existence of the informal collectors and how they co-exist with the 
formal providers in solid waste services in Kampala. This proved especially relevant as 
limited systematic knowledge is available on the informal sector in solid waste collection.  
Informal collectors distinguish themselves from the formal waste collectors by providing 
„first-line‟ services only, taking garbage away from households, but not taking this all the way 
to the landfill. The informal sector avoids regulation more than large formalized private firms 
and public organizations. Regardless of these differences, the informal sector is structurally 
linked to the formal public sector and it provides a cheaper, but lower rated level of service 
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provisioning, and especially (but certainly not exclusively) to poorer households. The fairly 
large market share of informal collectors relative to the formal private sector is related to their 
competitiveness: their collection fees are substantially lower than private sector fees. Yet, the 
incomes that the informal collectors derive from their business is comparable to what they 
could earn in other occupations. The informal providers are able to ask lower fees because 
they provide less packaging material, have little equipment (and thus investments), and do not 
carry waste very far, thus reducing transport costs and time. In fact, informal service providers 
exploit the lapse in the enforcement of environmental regulation. The persistence of the 
informal collectors can be attributed to the poor enforcement of regulations by city officials, 
but also by the returns to the providers of the service and the fact that they are cheaper, often 
quite reliable, and they fill a niche for some households, where public and private service 
providers do not serve some neighborhoods. The persistence of the informal collectors is 
further attributed to the incomes they get from the business which is comparable to others 
who work in the similar business (both formal private and public). The findings of this study 
contribute to the debates on the desirability and relevance of the informal sector to SWM and 
on urban development policies (Nzeadibe et al., 2010) in developing countries. 
 Most of the studies in solid waste management in developing countries investigate 
solid waste management as a continuous activity, basically applying a comparative static 
framework.  In this study, attention was also paid to sudden disruptions and the effects these 
have on levels of service provision in later periods. The Commonwealth Heads of 
Government Meeting (CHOGM), which took place in Kampala in 2007, is such a major one-
time event that de-routinized solid waste collection practices and structures and it was taken 
as a case study to investigate whether such events might have positive environmental legacies 
(in our case in terms of better solid waste collection). Although CHOGM was not a mega-
event (in terms of huge infrastructure construction, masses of people attending the event 
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globally, and intense global media coverage), for Uganda and Kampala it was a significant 
event with international visibility. Hence, significant efforts were made by the Uganda and 
Kampala authorities to invest in the city on the road towards CHOGM 2007. Solid waste 
management was one of the main areas that received additional resources and faced 
institutional changes. This resulted in considerable improvements in solid waste management 
practices during CHOGM, as could be expected. In investigating the legacies and effects after 
CHOGM interesting results could be noted. One year after CHOGM, solid waste management 
was perceived to be still significantly better than before CHOGM.  This is attributed to the 
institutionalization of good practices and innovations in SWM after Kampala hosting 
CHOGM, such as streamlining the office of the solid waste engineer, improving the relations 
between central government and the local government (KCC),  and the new equipment 
acquired by both public and private sector. In a fine-tuned comparison between citizens living 
close to places where the CHOGM events took place and locations more peripheral to 
CHOGM, it was found that this distinction in solid waste management started to fade 
somewhat during CHOGM, but there were signs of a reemerging distinction, indicating the 
erosion of leveling effect brought about by CHOGM. Generally, the findings in chapter five 
disprove the arguments of skeptics of hosting mega/major events who argue that such events 
are often seen as no more than public relations ventures far removed from the realities of 
urban problems and challenges (Hiller et al., 2000; Pillay et al., 2008).  
 Altogether, this research has shown the dynamics involved in the public and private 
provisioning of solid waste services. The reform initiatives introduced have had an impact on 
the general organization of SWM. What clearly comes out of this study are the challenges 
faced in public and private provisioning of solid waste services. It is also clear that certain 
policies like privatization if not well thought out could end up being not helpful to some 
sections of the population especially the marginalized ones.  
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   This study is placed in the wider unending debate on public and private provisioning 
of services. Both qualitative and quantitative methods of data collection and analysis were 
used. These were data that could be drawn from household surveys while other data came 
from interviews and observation. Combining both methods allowed the study to benefit from 
the flexibility of qualitative methods to do an intensive examination of the cases as well as 
from the advantage of generalizing the findings to other urban authorities in East Africa. Our 
results contribute to the partnership paradigms and the knowledge base of Modernized 
Mixtures Approach (MMA). This research proves that the modernized Mixtures Approach is 
viable to help identify and design urban environmental infrastructural solutions that are 
adapted to specific local conditions. 
 
6.3 Policy implications 
This study is part of and contributes to the academic research programme (PROVIDE), that 
has examined alternative approaches to the challenges developing countries face in the fields 
of sanitation and SWM. The alternative approaches are brought together under the framework 
of the Modernized Mixtures Approach (MMA). The MMA aims to combine existing socio-
infrastructural paradigms in both the developed and the developing world so that hybrid 
solutions are constituted which better fit the specific local situation in developing countries, 
but at the same time perform superior compared to the current paradigms. In contributing to 
this program, this research has looked into issues of public and private provision of solid 
waste collection services and the performance of policies aimed at addressing solid waste 
management challenges in Kampala. In this light, strategies can be proposed for long term 
sustainability of reformed SWM which make combination of existing public systems, private 
systems, informal systems, or NGO-based systems. These combinations, or hybrids are 
relevant for developing cities that face the same conditions like Kampala.  
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 Chapter 2,  3 and to some extent 4 contribute to the on-going policy debate on how the 
poor can be served under the changing nature of service provision in urban areas where the 
private sector is dominant. To produce better SWM practices, the private sector and public 
sector have to collaborate. The results of the study indicate it is possible and even beneficial 
for the public sector and the private sector to work alongside each other in the urban provision 
of SWM services. There is need for institutional reforms to strengthen the relationship of the 
public sector and the private sector. The challenge is how to maintain cost recovery within the 
system (so that little public money is spent on solid waste collection) among the poor and the 
middle income without leading them to opt out of the services with disastrous consequences 
for the environment. Tailoring private sector participation to specific local conditions and 
groups, deepening efforts to promote competition so that collection fees are lowered, and 
introducing mechanisms to ensure that low income groups have access to affordable solid 
waste collection services may partly be the solution to the problems in urban provisioning of 
services in low income countries. In this regard, these reforms could take advantage of the 
strengths of the private sector as identified by this study (innovation and customer 
responsiveness) and the strength of the public sector with its ability to address equity and 
market failure (WDR, 2004). 
 Next to hybrid arrangements or collaborations between public and private sectors in 
solid waste collection and transportation, collaboration or hybrid arrangements between 
formal and informal services can be beneficial. The findings from chapter 4 underscores the 
importance of urban governments withdrawing completely from the primary collection 
service and putting containers in locations to facilitate the work of informal house-to-house 
waste collectors. This could also help the poor as they appear uncomfortable with the present 
system of door-to-door collection arrangement, as chapter 3 reveals. This could be based on 
the de facto informal arrangement between the informal waste collectors and the urban 
 160 
 
authorities. Government officials could adopt this ad hoc and informal arrangement for three 
reasons. Firstly, it is possible to reduce costs of waste collection operations by abandoning the 
door-to-door collection service by the public sector and concentrate only on transporting the 
containers to the final dumping site. Secondly, informal waste collectors are capable of 
collecting more waste from households than the municipal trucks operators using their simple 
technologies. They have better physical access to household in the unplanned areas and slums. 
Thirdly, it is a possibility to create job opportunities for individuals who are engaged in solid 
waste collection on their own initiative. For these reasons it may trigger an increase in the 
number of informal solid waste collecting enterprises offering environmentally friendly 
services.  Consequently, an appropriate mix of public and informal private services could be 
useful especially if public provisions could be strengthened for the second stage of waste 
collection (secondary collection points) among the low income communities, to enable them 
to dispose of garbage cheaply and possibly eliminate illegal dump sites. This may offer 
environmental benefits to the community. This kind of modernized mixtures, where large 
scale and highly technological solid waste services, typical of public and formal private 
sector, mixes with small scale technological solutions of the informal sector, could be a 
solution to the solid waste problem facing many African cities, notably for the poor. Such 
systems could improve accessibility and could be ecologically sustainable, improving 
environmental performance of urban infrastructure in the long run and thus help in achieving 
the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). This recommendation is akin to what is alluded 
to in the WDR (2004), which calls for recognizing „independent service providers‟ and 
enabling them to partner with formal public and private operators. It is also important to 
ensure that the regulatory framework enables contracting and working arrangements with 
informal collectors. 
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 The findings from chapter five underscore the importance of hosting major events in 
cities of the developing world. The evidence of SWM improvement at least for one year 
points to a possibility of a sustainable improvement in the quality of life if there is massive 
investment of infrastructure in preparation to host major events. The key challenge is the 
institutionalization of environmental upgrading activities and strategies so they last well 
beyond the event. City governments should not only focus on hosting events, but also pay 
much more  attention to the post event legacies and put in place mechanisms to ensure that 
major event benefits are sustained. 
Generally, the study shows that the private sector is becoming dominant. Private 
sector dominancy potentially gives responsibilities to the public sector. City authorities 
responsible should actively play their major roles and work hand in hand with their partners 
(the private sector). Strengthening the public sector‟s capacity to safeguard standards and 
protect the public from the negative consequences of private provision of solid waste services 
is vital. The environmental standards, legislation and contractual obligation should be 
enforced and upheld.  
 
6.4 Limitations and suggestions for further research 
 This findings of this study are based mainly on household surveys and information 
from the demand side. For example, in chapter two we only compared public and private 
provision of solid waste collection services from the household perspective. We could not 
measure service efficiency for public and private sector in SWM due to lack of data from the 
supply side (providers). The co-existence of public and private providers in an organized 
framework provides opportunity for such a study. Future studies could take time to get data to 
measure the efficiency of public and private actors in SWM because empirical research on the 
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relative merits is still inconclusive. The conclusions from such a study could ignite debate on 
policy changes especially in developing countries.   
 Based on our analysis in chapter four, we suggest further in-depth analyses (perhaps a 
longitudinal study) should be done to document and understand the activities of the informal 
sector in solid waste collection by conducting a large survey targeting the informal collectors 
to estimate the size of the informal sector and the socio-economic and demographic 
characteristics. It is also important to determine the informal sector‟s level of flexibility in the 
labour market and establish whether there is a substantial movement of labour between formal 
and informal sectors in solid waste collection.  Further, this work is focused on a single city, 
yet in related studies (Oberlin, 2011) within the PROVIDE program, informal waste 
collectors were found to be existing and active in other cities, like Dar-es-salaam. Future 
research could contribute to multi-city comparative studies on this phenomenon to be able to 
explain similarities and variations across space and to make definitive statements about the 
character and importance of informal waste sector. 
 In chapter five, we analyse the environmental legacies as a result of hosting a major 
event (CHOGM) that led the central government to inject a substantial amount of money 
towards SWM improvements. It is important for future research to look into a question of 
sustainable ways of financing solid waste management services in developing cities like 
Kampala.  
 Lastly, new changes in the administration of Kampala have been effected with the 
transformation of Kampala City Council to a Kampala Capital City Authority where the 
central government will be more visible in the affairs of management of the city as opposed to 
the previous system where Kampala was operating like any other local government. The 
impact of this change in relation to service delivery needs to be studied in comparison with 
the way the old Kampala City Council was handling the state of affairs in SWM. 
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For long term solutions of waste management problems in cities like Kampala, 
strategies need to look beyond collection of waste. Waste management is much more than 
simple collection and dumping or destruction of waste. It includes waste minimization, waste 
separation, transport, disposal, destruction, and recycling. It includes also the actors, people 
and organizations involved in these processes. Yet to many urban managers and politicians, 
waste management still only implies collection and disposal or dumping of waste. For 
example, the continued production of cheap and readily available Low Density Polythene 
(LDP) material (sometimes given out free of charge by shop keepers) and the rural - urban 
influx of unprocessed food along with non-consumable materials such as banana stems, maize 
stalks, non-edible vegetable stems call for new strategies by municipal authorities to minimize 
the production of waste. Future studies could examine the different policies required to 
promote waste reduction, recycling and reuse within or outside households for sustainable 
development.  
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Summary 
Following the largely unimpressive performance of the public sector in the provision 
of solid waste services in many cities of African countries, the search for alternative strategies 
for addressing this challenge became inevitable. One of the strategies is the involvement of 
the private sector in solid waste management.  As of today, the contribution by the private 
sector to solid waste service provision is now a common phenomenon in most cities in 
developing countries. However, SWM cannot be easily left to be handled by the private sector 
alone because it has strong external effects and markets may not achieve socially acceptable 
levels of equity. Therefore, public intervention is necessary for example in form of regulation 
of the private sector. Public intervention has sometimes involved governments allocating huge 
sums of money for beautification of cities especially when major events are hosted in those 
cities with upgrading of waste management services given a special consideration. Even 
without government involvement, a proportion of people who make a living from activities in 
the informal sector have played a big role in solid waste management in many cities in the 
developing world.  
Despite the active involvement of many actors in SWM and the policies and initiatives 
introduced and implemented in recent decades in East Africa, many urban centres are still 
facing major problems. Even where successes have been registered, the question is whether 
that success can be sustained for a long time.  This study addresses the situation of household 
waste collection in Kampala. It  is one of the key factors in ensuring the health and safety of 
the population. This study is part of the Partnerships for Research on Viable Environmental 
Infrastructure in East Africa (PROVIDE), towards sustainable waste water and solid waste 
infrastructures in East African cities. It contributes to the PROVIDE project by addressing 
issues of governance and management of solid waste in Kampala. The study‟s contribution is 
a deeper understanding of the various actors in solid waste collection and the performance of 
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the interventions and policies so far implemented in the solid waste management sector in 
Kampala. Specifically, the study compares the operations and assesses the effectiveness of 
public and private provision of solid waste collection in Kampala; examines the effect of 
removal of communal containers popularly known as „skips‟ in Kampala; examines how the 
informal sector co-exists with the formal sector in solid waste collection in Kampala and 
lastly examines the environmental legacies related to solid waste management from hosting 
the 2007 CHOGM event in Uganda.  
Chapter two compares the operations and discusses the effectiveness of public and 
private sector provision of solid waste collection in Kampala, Uganda. Household data 
suggest that the private sector is more effective than the public sector. Private sector 
companies provide services like container provision and providing timely and fixed collection 
time tables. Contrary to popular perception, fees charged by private companies are moderate. 
Public sector clients are charged fees even when the service is supposed to be free. Clients of 
private sector providers are more satisfied than those of public sector providers. It is however, 
revealed that while public sector serve mainly the low incomes, the private sector serves 
mainly the rich. In spite of these notable differences, clients of both public and private sector 
perceive the problem of solid waste management (SWM) in Kampala to be very serious. The 
effectiveness of public and private sector operations in solid waste collection in Kampala is 
hampered by corruption and lack of transparency. 
Chapter three examines the impact of the removal of communal containers (skips) in 
Kampala. From the analysis related to the choices made and the perceptions after most of the 
skips were removed, the major alternative to skips was the use of the commercial services, 
mainly private sector‟s services. When asked to rate the skips system, the respondents in the 
surveys indicated a strong association of skips with lack of cleanliness. The lack of 
satisfaction with the skip system (and appreciation of the current system) was most notably 
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recorded in high-income areas. On average the present system was much better evaluated. We 
found that the evaluation of skips is negatively affected by not only the income level of the 
neighbourhood but also the household income and education level. In addition, we found a 
weak positive effect of the current fees paid. The effects of income are strong enough to 
render the evaluation of the skips system equal, if not superior to the current system for the 
households with lower income and education and outside the rich areas. The removal of many 
of the skips not only induced the former skip-users to switch to commercial services, but also 
enabled many non-users of skips to avail of these services. The lowest benefits are derived 
from mere dumping and many households have chosen to abandon this practice in exchange 
for commercial solid waste collection services, typically much more expensive. Formerly 
many households paid people (informal workers) to take their waste to collection points, 
including the skips. These informal workers continued to do so, though some shifted to using 
commercial services especially (formal) private sector. The advent of the (formal) private 
sector thus led to a decrease of the demand for informal services. The evaluation by 
households of the waste disposal services before and after the removal of skips shows that 
richer households are clearly pleased with the removal, but that poorer households, 
particularly those with low levels of education do not feel better served than they were before. 
Chapter four addresses the co-existence of formal and informal providers in solid 
waste collection in Kampala. Study findings show that the informal collectors distinguish 
themselves from the formal waste collectors by providing „first-line‟ services only, taking 
garbage away from households, but not taking this all the way to the dumpsite. They avoid 
regulation more than large firms. As the opportunities for restricting themselves to this stage 
are typically enhanced by KCC that offers (free-access) container services, informal collectors 
can be seen as structurally linked to the formal public sector. And the informal providers 
provide a cheaper, but lower rated level of service, and more often (but certainly not 
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exclusively) to poorer households. The fairly large market shares of informal collectors can be 
explained by their competitiveness vis-à-vis the formal private sector: their fees are 
substantially lower than private sector fees. The informal collectors can do so as they provide 
less packaging material, have little equipment, and do not carry waste far. In fact they exploit 
the lapse in enforcement of environmental regulation. Their continued role next to public 
service provision is explained by them filling a niche in taking garbage from the households 
to collection points, while earning incomes at par with alternative occupations.  
Chapter five examines the environmental legacies of major events in cities of the 
developing world. The Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) in 
Kampala is taken as a case study. Although CHOGM was not a mega-event (in terms of 
infrastructure construction, masses of people attending, and intense global media coverage), 
for Uganda and Kampala it was a major event with international visibility. Hence, significant 
efforts were made by the Uganda and Kampala authorities to invest in the city in the road 
towards CHOGM 2007. Solid waste management was one of the main areas that received 
additional resources and faced institutional changes. This resulted in considerable 
improvements in solid waste management practices during CHOGM, as could be expected. 
As solid waste management often differs throughout metropolitan cities in developing 
countries and major events are not equally spread over these cities one can expect that 
environmental legacies are unequally distributed over the city. Following CHOGM, we found 
that there are no longer significant different perceptions in solid waste management between 
Central and Kawempe divisions. Central division and Kawempe division are perceived as 
equally clean (or equally dirty), suggesting that solid waste management innovations are 
gradually spreading across divisions. In a more fine-tuned comparison between citizens living 
close to places where the CHOGM events took place and locations more peripheral to 
CHOGM, the distinction in solid waste management started to fade somewhat during 
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CHOGM, but there are signs of a reemerging distinction, indicating the erosion of leveling 
effects. However, this does not dispute the fact that, one year after CHOGM, solid waste 
management was perceived to be still significantly better than before CHOGM.  
Generally, this research has shown the dynamics involved in the public and private 
provisioning of solid waste services. The reform initiatives introduced have had an impact on 
the general organization of SWM. What clearly comes out of this study are the challenges 
faced in public and private provisioning of solid waste services. It is also clear that certain 
policies like privatization if not well thought out could end up being not helpful to some 
sections of the population especially the marginalized ones. Finally, in agreement with the 
modernized mixtures approach, we can derive the conclusion that SWM initiatives and 
reforms are likely to have a positive impact if all actors and stakeholders are involved. The 
mixture of actors and strategies are required for solid waste management to improve for 
instance an appropriate mix of public and private service (formal and informal). 
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Samenvatting 
Na weinig indrukwekkend prestaties van de publieke sector inzake afvalverwerking in 
veel Afrikaanse steden, werd gezocht naar alternatieve strategieën ervoor. Een van de 
strategieën is het betrekken van de particuliere sector bij de afvalverwerking. Tegenwoordig is 
de particuliere sector een normale partner in die dienstverlening in de meeste steden in 
ontwikkelingslanden. Afvalverwerking kan echter niet zonder meer worden overgelaten aan 
de particuliere sector. Het heeft sterke externe effecten en marktwerking levert doorgaans niet 
het sociaal aanvaardbare niveau van gelijkheid van toegang tot zulke diensten.  
Overheidsinterventie is daarom gewenst, bijvoorbeeld in de vorm van regulering van die 
marktwerking en de particuliere sector. Dergelijke interventie heeft er soms uit bestaan dat de 
regering enorme bedragen besteedde ter verfraaiing van steden, vooral wanneer belangrijke 
evenementen in die steden werden gehouden. Hierbij kreeg het ophalen van afval even 
bijzondere aandacht. Maar zonder de betrokkenheid van de overheid, is een deel van de 
bevolking in de informele sector van veel steden in ontwikkelingslanden toch al actief in het 
ophalen en afvoeren van afval.  
Ondanks de actieve betrokkenheid van vele partijen bij de afvalverwerking en ondanks 
de initiatieven die zijn genomen in de afgelopen decennia, hebben veel stedelijke centra in 
Oost-Afrika nog steeds grote problemen. En waar successen zijn geboekt, is het maar de 
vraag of dat succes kan worden volgehouden. Deze studie richt zich op het ophalen van 
huishoudelijke afval in Kampala. Het is een van de belangrijkste factoren voor de gezondheid 
en de veiligheid van de bevolking. Deze studie is onderdeel van de Partnership for Research 
on Viable Environmental Infrastructure in East Africa (PROVIDE), dat mikt op duurzame 
infrastructuur voor afvalwater en afvalstoffen in Oost-Afrikaanse steden. De bijdrage van dit 
proefschrift ligt op het gebied van bestuur en beheer van afvalverwerking in Kampala. Het 
mikt op een beter begrip van de diverse actoren in de afvalinzameling en het nut van 
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interventies en het beleid voor deze sector in Kampala. In het bijzonder worden in de studie 
de activiteiten en de doeltreffendheid van openbare en particuliere afvalinzameling in 
Kampala vergeleken; wordt het effect van de verwijdering van communale containers, in de 
volksmond bekend als „skips‟, onderzocht ; en bezien hoe de informele sector kan samengaan 
met de formele sector bij de afvalinzameling in Kampala en tot slot wordt onderzocht wat het 
Oegandese gastheerschap van CHOGM in 2007 heeft betekend voor het milieu in Kampala, 
in het bijzonder de afvalverwerking. 
Hoofdstuk twee vergelijkt de activiteiten en bespreekt de doeltreffendheid van 
publieke en private dienstverlening inzake afvalinzameling in Kampala. Enquêtegegevens van 
huishoudens suggereren dat de particuliere sector effectiever is dan de publieke sector. 
Particuliere sector bedrijven bieden extra serice, zoals het verschaffen van afvalemmers en het 
aanhouden van vaste ophaaltijden. In strijd met de gangbare opinie, zijn de tarieven van 
particuliere bedrijven gematigd. Klanten van de publieke sector worden om vergoedingen 
gevraagd ook al wordt de service verondersteld gratis te zijn. Klanten van particuliere 
aanbieders zijn meer tevreden dan die van publieke aanbieders. Er wordt echter duidelijk 
gemaakt dat waar de publieke sector voornamelijk de lage inkomens bedient, de particuliere 
sector voornamelijk de rijken als klant heeft. In weerwil van deze opmerkelijke verschillen 
zien de klanten van zowel de publieke als de particuliere sector het huisvuil als een ernstig 
probleem in Kampala. De doeltreffendheid van de activiteiten van de publieke en private 
sector inzake afvalinzameling wordt beperkt door corruptie en gebrek aan transparantie. 
Hoofdstuk drie onderzoekt de impact van het weghalen van gemeenschappelijke 
containers (skips) in Kampala. Uit de analyse van de keuzes en de percepties van huishoudens 
na de verwijdering van de meeste skips, kwam naar voren dat het voornaamste alternatief 
voor hen was om gebruik te maken van commerciële diensten, voornamelijk van de 
particuliere sector. Gevraagd het skip-systeem te beoordelen, gaven de respondenten in de 
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enquêtes aan skips in sterke mate te associëren met gebrek aan reinheid. Een geringe 
tevredenheid met het skip-systeem (en waardering voor het huidige systeem) werd met name 
aangetroffen in gebieden met een hoog inkomen. Het huidige systeem werd gemiddeld veel 
beter gewaardeerd. We vonden dat de waardering van skips niet alleen negatief werd 
beïnvloed door het inkomensniveau van de buurt, maar ook door inkomens- en 
opleidingsniveau van het huishouden. Bovendien vonden we een zwak positief effect van de 
tarieven die nu werden betaald. De effecten van inkomen zijn sterk genoeg om de waardering 
van skips gelijk te maken aan die van het huidige systeem, zo niet hoger, voor de huishoudens 
met lagere inkomens en opleiding en woonachtig buiten de rijke gebieden. De verwijdering 
van veel van de skips ging niet alleen gepaard met overschakeling naar gebruik van 
commerciële diensten, maar stelde ook veel niet-gebruikers van skips hiertoe in staat. De 
laagste waardering wordt gegeven aan louter dumping en vele huishoudens hebben besloten 
deze praktijk te verruilen voor commerciële afvalinzameling, hoewel meestal aanzienlijk 
duurder. Voorheen betaalden vele huishoudens mensen (informele dienstverleners) om hun 
afval naar inzamelpunten te brengen, zoals naar de skips. Deze informele werkers bleven dit 
doen na verwijdering van de skips, hoewel sommigen overstapten naar met name de (formele) 
particuliere sector. De komst van de (formele) particuliere sector heeft dus geleid tot een 
daling van de vraag naar informele diensten. De beoordeling door de huishoudens van de 
ophaaldiensten vóór en na verwijdering van de skips laat zien, dat rijkere huishoudens 
duidelijk tevreden waren over de verwijdering, maar dat armere huishoudens, met name die 
met lage opleidingsniveaus, zich niet beter bediend voelden dan voorheen. 
Hoofdstuk vier gaat in op de co-existentie van formele en informele aanbieders van 
huisvuilophaaldiensten in Kampala. De bevindingen tonen aan dat de informele inzamelaars 
zich van de formele bedrijven onderscheiden door het verstrekken van 'eerstelijns-diensten‟, 
waarbij het vuilnis weliswaar van huishoudens wordt weggebracht, maar niet helemaal naar 
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de vuilstort. Zij negeren de verordeningen die dit verbieden vaker dan grote ondernemingen. 
De mogelijkheden om zich tot dit eerstelijnsdeel van afvalverwerking te beperken verbeteren 
meestal wanneer KCC een (gratis) containerservice aanbiedt, en informele inzamelaars 
kunnen aldus worden gezien als structureel verbonden met de formele publieke sector. Deze 
informele dienstverleners bieden een goedkoper, maar lager gewaardeerd niveau van service, 
en doen dit vaker (maar zeker niet uitsluitend) aan armere huishoudens. Het vrij grote 
marktaandeel van informele inzamelaars kan worden toegeschreven aan hun concurrentie-
vermogen ten opzichte van de formele particuliere sector: hun tarieven zijn aanzienlijk lager 
dan die van de particuliere sector. De informele inzamelaars kunnen dit doen aangezien zij 
minder verpakkingsmiddelen (afvalzakken of -emmers) aanbieden, zelf weinig uitrusting 
hebben, en het afval niet ver weg brengen. Zij gedijen in feite bij het niet handhaven van de 
milieuwetgeving. Hun structurele rol naast de publieke dienstverlening valt te zien als het 
innemen van een niche door het vuilnis van de huishoudens naar de inzamelpunten te 
brengen, en tegen een inkomen dat op vergelijkbaar is met alternatieve banen.  
Hoofdstuk vijf onderzoekt de milieu-erfenis van grote evenementen in steden van de 
derde wereld. De vergadering van de regeringsleiders van het Gemenebest (CHOGM) in 
Kampala is als een casestudie genomen. Hoewel CHOGM niet een mega-evenement was in 
termen van infrastructuur, mensenmassa's, en mediabelangstelling, was het voor Oeganda en 
Kampala een belangrijke gebeurtenis met internationale zichtbaarheid. Vandaar dat de 
autoriteiten in Oeganda en Kampala zich hebben ingespannen om te investeren in de stad in 
de aanloop naar CHOGM 2007. Afvalverwerking behoorde tot de belangrijkste sectoren die 
extra middelen ontvingen en met institutionele veranderingen werden geconfronteerd. Dit 
resulteerde in aanzienlijke verbeteringen in de praktijk van afvalinzameling tijdens CHOGM, 
zoals verwacht kon worden. Aangezien afvalinzameling al vaak binnen grote steden in 
ontwikkelingslanden verschilt en grote evenementen niet gelijkelijk verspreid over deze 
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steden,  viel te verwachten dat de gevolgen ervan voor het milieu ook ongelijk zijn verdeeld 
over de stad. Na CHOGM vonden wij echter dat er niet langer significant verschillende 
percepties waren inzake afvalverwerking tussen de wijken Central Division en Kawempe. 
Central Division en Kawempe werden als even schoon (of even vuil) gezien, wat suggereert 
dat de verandering in het afvalinzamelingbeleid zich geleidelijk over de wijken heeft 
verspreid. In een nadere vergelijking tussen burgers die dicht bij de plaatsen wonen waar de 
gebeurtenissen van CHOGM zich afspeelden en meer perifere locaties, viel te zien dat het 
verschil in afvalinzameling tijdens CHOGM wat vervaagde, maar in 2009 waren er tekenen 
van een hernieuwd onderscheid, wat betekent dat de effecten afnemen. Dit laat echter 
onverlet, dat een jaar na CHOGM de afvalinzameling nog steeds aanzienlijk beter is dan vóór 
CHOGM.  
In meer algemene zin heeft dit onderzoek de dynamiek laten zien van publieke en 
private dienstverlening inzake afvalinzameling. De initiatieven hebben een duidelijke invloed 
gehad op de algemene organisatie van afvalverwerking. Wat uit deze studie duidelijk naar 
voren komt, zijn de uitdagingen waar de publieke en particuliere dienstverlening voor staan. 
Ook is duidelijk geworden, dat bepaalde beleidslijnen zoals privatisering, indien niet goed 
doordacht, uiteindelijk verkeerd kunnen uitwerken op sommige delen van de bevolking, 
vooral de gemarginaliseerde groepen. Tenslotte kunnen we, in overeenstemming met de 
„modernized mixtures‟ benadering van PROVIDE, concluderen dat de hervormingen van de 
afvalinzameling een positief effect kunnen hebben wanneer alle actoren en belanghebbenden 
erbij worden betrokken. Verbetering van afvalinzameling, bijvoorbeeld in een gepaste mix 
van publieke en private dienstverlening (formele en informele), vergt een combinatie van 
actoren en strategieën. 
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